


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THE DEVELOPMENT of
THE MARXIAN
DIALECTIC



DICK
HOWARD



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INTRODUCTION



This essay was originally written as a doctoral dissertation, bearing the rather ponderous title, "From Philosophy to Political Economy: Karl Marx and the Theory-Praxis Problem." It grew out of discussion groups and political action in the United States and France which convinced me (1) that Marx still does have much to contribute to an analysis of our society and the possibilities for changing it, and (2) that it is necessary to return to the sources, to explicate and rethink Marx's project in its *own* terms, and to lay bare the crucial theoretical and methodological moves by which he elaborated his answer to the traditional problems of philosophy. In the face of a massive and still-growing Marx literature, it seemed important that the roots of Marx's *theory* be systematically laid out by means of a chronological study whose main focus would be the uncovering of the *philosophical* problematic which guided Marx's development.

In the two years which followed, I have refined my conclusions, deepening them by further study in German idealism, and broadening them by work in political theory and practice. Returning to this preparatory study, I was pleased to find that, on the whole, there was not too much that had to be changed. I changed the title to express more simply and directly the contents of the book, and because I am convinced that the dialectic is the key to Marx's position—his theory and his practice—and that this key has been consistently misinterpreted by commentators, friend and foe alike.

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Moreover, it has become more and more clear to me that dialectical philosophy is the only kind that can break the monotony of word games and historical or philological research, and the only one whose method does not, by its very nature, condemn it to be a defense of the established order—no matter what the subjective intentions of its practitioners.

Of course, were I to begin a study of the Marxian dialectic today, I would come at it from a different slant. I would probably approach the subject more thematically than chronologically; I would draw the political conclusions more sharply; and I would nuance more fully the discussion of Marx's critique and completion of the tradition of German idealism. In reworking the present essay, I attempted to modify it in these respects, while at the same time preserving what I see as the virtues of the original form, particularly the chronological presentation and the systematic exposition of Marx's development.

A formal difference between the two versions—the omission here of the lengthy bibliography with which dissertations must be crowned—in fact points to a continuity. I am not interested here in the history of ideas, or in the sociology of knowledge. My concern is with the systematic aspect of Marx's theory, and in explicating it I have relied on primary sources for the most part—the writings of Marx himself, and those of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. I generally refer to secondary literature only when it seems to me important that the contributions of a commentator be stressed (as is particularly true of Georg Lukács), or when I want to set off my own interpretation from those of others. Frankly, the theoretical level of most secondary sources on Marx is extraordinarily low, and I have found that one can learn more about Marx by reading original theoretical contributions made by those whose aim is to further and to update the contributions of Marx; the reader interested in pursuing the theoretical and political problems posed here should consult the works of the authors treated in *The Unknown Dimension*, edited by myself and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

One problem raised by many commentators—most recently and cogently by Louis Althusser's books *For Marx* and *Reading "Capital"*—needs to be mentioned here. The argument is that Marx's

works must be divided into two periods, which are sharply separated by an "epistemological rupture." The young Marx is seen as an Hegelian, a romantic and a humanist, while the mature Marx is viewed as the founder of a new science, breaking with the problematic of traditional philosophy. Althusser writes, for example, that "Formulae is celebrated as 'philosophy's becoming worldly,' 'the reversal of subject and attribute,' 'the root of man is man,' 'the suppression and the realization of philosophy,' 'philosophy is the head of human emancipation, the proletariat is its heart,' etc. etc. are all formulae borrowed directly from Feuerbach or directly influenced by him. All of the formulae of the idealist 'humanism' of Marx are Feuerbachian formulae." (*Pour Marx* [Paris: Maspero, 1966], pp. 39-40, my translation).

Inasmuch as this study treats Marx's development only through 1844, its conclusions would be put into question if the *Zweiseelenlehre* is correct. However, I do not believe that the theory of the distinction between the young humanistic and the mature scientific Marx can be justified. My original intention was to follow this book with another, four hundred pages of which have been written, treating Marx's further development; however, my present plan is to write not a further commentary, but a thematic study of the dialectic, demonstrating that the same dialectic which Marx develops in his early writings is carried through and applied in the economic and political works of the maturity. That study will also entail a critique of the Leninist interpretation of Marx, in theory and in practice. Here only a few pages can be devoted to my contention that there is *one* Marxian dialectic, developed in the early writings and maintained throughout; in the notes to the text, I return to this problem of several occasions.

It must be stressed that in his early writings, Marx consistently and explicitly adheres to the demands of philosophical rationality. He does not *opt* for praxis as opposed to theory; he does not fall into the idealist trap of opposing a *paradigm* of a humanistic society to the conditions of contemporary capitalism. Marx insists that philosophy, like the Unhappy Consciousness in Hegel's *Phenomenology*, is caught in a situation in which its theoretical completion is at the same time its loss as theory; philosophy itself demands the turn to praxis. In this rigor, Marx's position differs

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radically from the rest of the Young Hegelians, and it is on this basis that his dialectic is developed.

Marx's theory is a *critical* theory because it is based on the recognition that the previous, purely *contemplative* theory has a negative foundation which forces it, once it has reached theoretical completeness, to negate and transcend itself. This critical theory is common to the young and the mature Marx; *Capital*, it should be stressed, is subtitled *A Critique of Political Economy*, and its crucial methodological section, "The Fetishism of Commodities," makes clear the negativity on which the theories of political economy are based. The critical theory has a twofold nature: it is a theory *for* practice, and a theory *of* praxis. That is, it shows on the one hand that theory is self-transcending, that it calls for specific kinds of practice; and on the other hand, it reveals that the things of this world are constituted by and understandable as objectifications of praxis. This characteristic is present in both the early writings and in *Capital*, and it is in terms of the theory of praxis that political practice is shown to be both possible and necessary; it is in this sense that Marx stresses repeatedly that capital is not a *thing* but a *social relation*, constituted, reconstituted, and ultimately changed by the practice of men and women.

The important distinction which must be made between Marx and the humanism of Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians concerns the category of *mediation*. Without mediations, theory can be revolutionary in its verbiage and rhetoric, but it remains idealistic and powerless to effect change in the real world; it is only an abstract call to action, an Appeal to Reason. The advance of Hegel over his predecessors was the discovery of mediations which connect the "is" and the "ought," being and thought, praxis and theory. But, contends Marx, this is only a thought-mediation, imprisoned still in the contemplative attitude for which theory can only come after the fact, flying, with the owl of Minerva, at dusk. An element of futurity must enter in; not only the past and the present, but the future must be considered. How can this be done without resorting to utopias, to the abstract "ought"?

There must be a mediation which is in the process of becoming, and whose realization will bring forth the future. The future serves as the *telos*, the principle of closure in terms of which the dialectical analysis functions. Marx's theory of proletarian revolution is

formulated in terms of this dialectic, and it is important to recognize its strengths as well as its weaknesses. The proletariat is not a thing, a fixed structure delineated from without; the proletariat is not defined by empirical sociology, any more than the moral opposition of rich and poor serves any useful analytical function. Abstractly, the proletariat must be seen as the mediation between philosophy and the world, between theory and praxis; it is the subject-object of history, produced by capitalist conditions, and at the same time, as subject, continually reproducing those conditions. In becoming conscious of itself as a class, the proletariat also becomes conscious of its objective situation and capacities; the “lightening of thought”—as Marx puts it without further specification—starts the fire which enables the working class to transform itself and society.

The problem with this theoretical formulation is its abstraction. Who is the proletariat? How is it defined? Has its composition and function changed with the evolution of the capitalist mode of production to the point that today cybernetics and automation seem to be the wave of the future? It is here that one is tempted to have recourse to “scientificity,” to demand a concrete analysis of the objective structures of society and their historical evolution. And *Capital*, which concludes with an unfinished chapter entitled “Classes,” but speaks little about the subjective element in their formation and function, seems to lend itself to such a direction.

It would be wrong, I think, to reject the dialectical formulation of the nature of the proletariat because of its “abstraction.” The stress on objective, structural contradictions whose discovery would be the task of theory, and whose exploitation would be the job of the revolutionary party, leads to the error of Lenin and the Stalinist Third International. The neglect of the subjective factor, and the concomitant stress on the party-as-the-consciousness-of-the-class, imply the kind of top-down, “political” change typical of bourgeois revolutions, and criticized by Marx in “On the Jewish Question” and elsewhere. Marx’s theory of proletarian revolution was based on his discovery of the primacy of civil society—of what we would call today *everyday life*; if it does not change daily life, then the “revolution” is only a formal, structural change—at best a means, but surely not an end in itself.

This is not to say that the objective conditions do not have to

be analyzed and continually reanalyzed; on the contrary. The point is that one of the objective conditions is itself subjective; and it is in this light that Marx's mature works must be understood. *Capital* is not a handbook of political economy; it was intended to be a theory of the social totality, objective and subjective, and its theoretical presuppositions and methodology are established in Marx's early writings, whose central problem is the elaboration of a mediated dialectic in terms of which the theory-praxis problem, the problem of philosophy's becoming worldly and the world's becoming philosophical, can be resolved. The application of this dialectical method to the social relations which constitute capitalism is the unfinished task of *Capital*, which can only be understood in this light.

This Introduction is not the place to elaborate the detailed political and theoretical implications of these assertions; I leave that for future work, my own and that of the reader. The concern of the following pages is less ambitious—to present a systematic reading of Marx, to analyze his development, and to lay bare the theoretical problems to which he addressed himself. In this regard too, it should be noted, there are theoretical problems whose implications are skirted due to the nature of this study. Particularly significant are the criticisms from an Hegelian point of view which Klaus Hartmann's recent book, *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), addresses to Marx. Hartmann's is by far the most serious philosophical analysis and critique of Marx to appear in decades; unfortunately, I was not able to deal with it here although, if correct, some of its criticisms seriously put into question the validity of Marx's conclusions.

Two formal comments need be made here. My goal in the text is to present the development of Marx's own thought, the reasoning which led him to advance and refine his positions. The notes to the text, in the majority of cases, are not intended as scholarly devices so much as they are used to clarify, to draw implications, and to indicate further problems which are not dealt with directly by Marx. They are, therefore, essential to the structure of the book, and hopefully will be useful to the reader. Second, though it may be a slight disservice to the English-speaking reader, I have made my own translations of Marx's work, as well as of all other sources,

unless otherwise indicated. There are several editions of Marx's writings in German, and even more translations and editions in English. I have used the Cotta edition, *Karl Marx: Frühe Schriften* (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962) whenever possible because it gives in footnotes the variant readings of other editions of Marx's nearly undecipherable handwriting, and because it is more accessible than the earlier Ryazanov edition (the MEGA: *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*), whose text is often inaccurate. The more recent East German edition, the MEW (*Marx-Engels-Werke*) separates the "safe" early works from the politically unpalatable (for the so-called communist regime) essays, which are printed only in two *Ergänzungsbände* at the end of the forty volumes of the MEW. The Cotta edition is not complete, however, and when necessary I have used either the MEGA or the MEW. By using the Cotta edition when possible, I have been able to indicate the source of citations by a page number in parenthesis in the text, thus avoiding a too lengthy apparatus of footnotes. At the advice of the editor, I have omitted Marx's italicization in the citations, save in cases where his emphasis was crucial to the meaning of a phrase.

It remains to thank the many people whose suggestions and criticisms helped me in the preparation of this work, as a doctoral dissertation and as a book. As a dissertation, this essay was begun under the direction of Douglas Morgan, whose untimely death was a great loss. It was completed under the direction of Irwin C. Lieb, along with Joseph J. Bien, Richard M. Zaner, and Norman Martin. In revising it, I have benefited, as I have for several years, from the criticisms of Klaus Hartmann—though my conclusions usually don't agree with his. I was also aided by suggestions from Karl E. Klare, with whom I worked closely and from whom I learned a great deal while coediting *The Unknown Dimension*. For encouragement and critical exchanges, I should thank Brigitte Howard, Paul Buhle of *Radical America*, and Paul Piccone and Paul Breines of *Telos*; the common project we share and struggle toward is the ultimate reason for writing this book.

Carbondale, Illinois
April 29, 1971

DICK HOWARD

The Development of the Marxian Dialectic



ENCOUNTER WITH THE HEGELIAN SYSTEM

The Germany of 1818, into which Karl Marx was born, was caught in the painful transition to modernity. Divided still into a large number of independent states, it had witnessed a rebirth of national feeling after the successful struggle against Napoleon. Paradoxically, its most ardent nationalists were those who wanted to preserve the liberal measures which the French invaders had introduced.

Economically, Germany was entering into the industrial revolution. The small farmers were being pushed from the land, providing the growing cities with new labor power. Industry grew rapidly, as did commerce. Though it was still far behind England, Germany's growth rate was greater than that of any other country. Rheinland-Westphalia, where Marx was born, was the region of greatest growth during this period.

Politically, Germany was living under the restored autocracies which had been temporarily destroyed by Napoleon. Each state, large or small, had its official religion, and in each the political and religious spheres were tightly interwoven. The division of Germany plus its anachronistic autarchies tended to stifle the developing industries, which in turn fostered discontent and liberalism among the growing bourgeoisie, who entered into more or less open opposition to the still feudal regime. The bourgeois opposition de-

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manded a more democratic state and economic liberalization. The clash of these demands with the feudal monarchy led to the Revolution of 1848.

Though some socialist ideas had filtered across the Rhine from France, there was in effect no organized working-class opposition before 1848. The ideas of the utopian socialists Saint-Simon and Fourier were known among the intellectuals, and some skilled workers such as Wilhelm Weitling attempted to transmit a messianic socialism to their coworkers. The opposition of the rich and the poor, not that of worker and capitalist, was at the base of these attempts.

Intellectually, the Hegelian philosophy was dominant. A contemporary described its influence as follows:

Many of our contemporaries still remember the time when all the sciences nourished themselves from Hegelian philosophy, when all of the faculties made themselves antechambers before the philosophy faculty in order to benefit—even if only a little—from the sublime vision of the Absolute and from the suppleness of the famous dialectic; when, if one was not an Hegelian, one could only be a barbarian, an idiot or a backward empiricist, receiving only scorn; when the state itself considered itself secure because its necessity and its rationality had been demonstrated by Hegel; and when, for this reason, it was almost a crime in the eyes of the cultural authorities not to be an Hegelian. One must remember this time in order to be able to imagine what is implied by the absolute domination of a philosophical system. In their profound conviction of the absolute value of their doctrine, the Hegelians of 1830 actually asked themselves in all seriousness what the future content of the world might be, given that in Hegel's philosophy the World Spirit had arrived at the end of its evolution, at the entire knowledge of itself.¹

Despite its overwhelming impact, it was not long before Hegel's system came under attack. Hegel claimed to have developed a complete philosophical system in whose categorial edifice the rationality of the real and the reality of the rational were demonstrated. Because the system had achieved the synthesis of the real

and the rational, there was no room for change within it; this is why Hegel's contemporaries "asked themselves in all seriousness what the future content of the world might be." Hegel's students were caught in a dilemma. They knew that Hegel's was a total system, a rational construction of the world as Absolute Truth, while, on the other hand, they were confronted by a society which they felt could not be true, rational, or just.

Heinrich Heine, the satirical poet, was one of the first to criticize the Maestro, as he called him:

*He liked me very much, for he was sure that I would not betray him; I held him then to be even servile. Once, when I was annoyed by the saying "All that is is rational," he smiled strangely and remarked: It could also read: "All that is rational must be."*²

It appeared, in other words, that the Hegelian system could be used as a paradigm with which to attack the established order. But this position implied a return to a pre-Hegelian, nondialectical division of the real and the rational, the is and the ought. The result was a romantic ethos of pure and endless subjective striving toward an ideal which, by its very nature, cannot be achieved; it was a fall back into a Kantian-Fichtean idealism. The problem was to discover the mediations which would make possible the reconciliation of the two poles.

Marx's Youth and First Encounter with Hegel's Philosophy

Karl Marx was no different than any other young bourgeois of his time. His father, who had been born a Jew, had converted before Marx's birth in order to insure the success of his legal career. Marx's father had a strong influence on his early development, as did his future father-in-law, the Baron von Westphalen, his "dear fatherly friend" to whom Marx dedicated his doctoral dissertation. Heinrich Marx was a passionate believer in the ideals of the Enlightenment, and an admirer of Voltaire and Rousseau. From the Baron von Westphalen, Marx learned to love the culture of the Greeks and the artistry of Shakespeare.

The influence of this milieu is evident in the earliest works of Marx which have been preserved, two final examination questions

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written on leaving the Trier High School. The first, "Reflections of a Youth on Choosing a Career," begins with the following typical passages:

Nature itself has determined the arena in which the animal moves, and it peacefully completes its tasks without striving to go beyond them, and also without even sensing any others. To man also, God gave a universal goal, to ennoble humanity and himself; but He left it to man himself to seek out the means through which he can achieve this goal; He left it to man to choose the standpoint in society which is most fitting for him, from which he can best elevate himself and society.³

After a discussion which stresses the importance of "working for the universal" and that "man's nature makes it possible for him to reach his fulfillment only by working for the perfection and welfare of his society," ⁴ Marx concludes:

When we have chosen the position in which we can best work for mankind, burdens cannot bend us, for they are only the sacrifice for all; then we enjoy no poor, limited egoistical joy, but our fortune belongs to millions, our acts live on silently but eternally effective, and our ashes will be moistened by the glimmering tears of noble men.⁵

The second essay runs in the same vein, and was judged by Marx's teacher as "rich in thought, a flourishing, powerful presentation." ⁶ The question asked for a discussion of "The Union of the Believers with Christ according to John, 15, 1-14." The first passages of Marx's reply are suggestive of the spiritual climate in which Marx grew up:

Before we regard the ground and the essence and the effects of the union of Christ with the believer, we wish to see whether this union is necessary, if it is determined by the nature of man, whether man is not by himself capable of reaching the goal for which God called him forth from Nothing.⁷

The sentiment expressed in these youthful essays should not be read retrospectively as presaging the future Marx, as does Auguste Cornu, who writes that "for the first time K. Marx stresses the role

of social relations in the determination of men's lives." ⁸ It would also be incorrect to interpret Marx's pathos as an individual quirk, an accident due to "an early experience of freedom, an early vision or rich possibilities," which supposedly led him to become a revolutionary.⁹ Marx's views are typical of the Enlightenment ethics, and from the point of view of theory there is nothing extraordinary about them.

Following his father's wishes Marx went to study law, first at Bonn and later, after a ribald year during which he took part in a duel and was arrested for "nocturnal noisemaking," at Berlin, the center of Hegelianism. During these years, Marx wrote a great deal of poetry which even his admiring biographer, Franz Mehring, admits shows a "trivial romanticism."¹⁰ He also attempted to write a dramatic play and a satirical novel, neither of which surpassed his poetic efforts. Gunther Hillmann suggests that these early literary efforts can be used to show the psychological make-up of Karl Marx, and to account for certain later positions which Marx took.¹¹ The more orthodox view, presented by Auguste Cornu, suggests that "since the world in which he lived does not respond to the profound aspirations of his being, he opposes to it an ideal world which does correspond to them."¹² Mehring's judgment is philosophically the most relevant. Marx's literary and poetic efforts reflect the romantic spirit prevalent at the time: the deepest aspirations of the French Revolution were reflected in a burst of creativity combining literary, philosophical, and historical motifs, and condemning the actual social order.

In a letter to his father written in 1837, Marx explains why he turned his attention from law to philosophy. He had worked diligently on his legal studies, taking courses from the editor of the second edition of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, Gans, and from the leader of the Historical School of law, Savigny. He wrote and destroyed a three-hundred-page treatise on Roman law, which he explains to his father in some detail. This was his first confrontation with Hegel; Marx describes it as "permeated with trichotomous classifications, penned with wearisome prolixity." Finally, he continues, "it became clear to me that without philosophy no solution was possible" (12).¹³ After destroying the legal treatise, he wrote a philosophical dialogue, "Cleanthes, or the Starting Point

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and the Necessary Progress of Philosophy." This work, which he also destroyed, had as its "last sentence . . . the beginning of the Hegelian system" (14).

The letter shows the type of demand Marx makes of philosophy. He writes:

Particularly here I was greatly disturbed by the conflict between what is and what should be, a conflict peculiar to idealism. . . . [The nature of] the triangle induces the mathematician to construct it, to demonstrate its properties, but it remains a mere representation [Vorstellung] in space and undergoes no further development. We must put it beside another form. Then it assumes different positions, and the other form with its various relative positions endows the triangle with different relations and truths. On the other hand, in the concrete expression of the living world of thought—as in law, the state, nature, philosophy as a whole—the object itself must be studied in its development; there must be no arbitrary classification; the Reason [Vernunft] of the thing itself must roll forward [fortrollen] in all its contradictoriness and find its unity in itself. (P. 9)

The "conflict between what is and what should be," the dilemma of German idealist philosophy, has already been mentioned. The problem is to find the mediations which permit a reconciliation of the two poles. Marx had come up against this problem in attempting to reconcile philosophical notions of law with actually existing legal relations. He assumes that the philosophical notions are true: they say what should be; the actual relations, however, do not "form themselves as rich unfolding, living things," and the conceptual philosophical apparatus seems to prevent the grasping of the true (9). Because he was unable to reconcile this opposition, Marx says of the results of his legal treatise that they were "like Fichte's, only mine were more modern and more superficial" (9).¹⁴

Marx did not remain within a Fichtean position, realizing that his error was that "I understood under Form the necessary architectonic of the formation of the concept, under Matter [*Materie*] the necessary quality of these forms. The error lay in my belief that the one could and must be divided from the other" (10). He was

thus drawn to the position that "the form can only be the continuation of the content" (10). For this reason the intellectualist position of the mathematician who deals in representations, constructing their "different relations and truths," is opposed to the demand that the thing itself present itself in its own truth. But, how does the thing go about presenting itself? It is necessary to find a method which can show how the "thing itself . . . in all its contradictoriness" can "find its unity in itself." This will have to be a *mediated* development on the side of the object; but as yet Marx has no way of showing this. It is noteworthy that he assumes that such a unity can in fact be found and that it is more than just an artificial construction. But how can this be shown? The search for a mediator lies behind the *Preparatory Works* (*Vorarbeiten*) for his doctoral dissertation.

The Search for a Mediation in the Vorarbeiten

In Berlin, Marx was a member of the *Doktorklub*, a group of intellectuals who were the leaders of the Young Hegelian movement. The first philosophical impulse for the Young Hegelian movement was born with D. F. Strauss's *Das Leben Jesu*. Strauss's systematic researches into the historical life and myth of Jesus opened the tiny hole in the Hegelian dike through which torrents of Young Hegelian words would soon flow. His attack on Hegel's speculative Christology had ramifications which went right to the center of the Hegelian system.

For Hegel, the place of a spiritual manifestation within the system is determined by the manner in which its object is known. Religion is "representative thought" [*vorstellendes Denken*], which Hegel explains as follows:

In religious consciousness the form in which objects are known is the representation, i.e., such a form as contains more or less of the sensible, e.g., relations of natural objects. In philosophy we would never say that God creates his son. But the thought contained in such a relation, the substantial in such a relation, is still recognized in philosophy. In that philosophy has as content the Absolute in the form of [a] thought-object, it has for itself

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*the advantage that what in religion is still a separated existence, having separated moments, in it is one.*¹⁵

In accord with his method, Hegel must reject the notion of a God who is transcendent and unknowable, replacing Him by an immanent God who is known within—and who indeed is—the speculative system. The historical Christ is the mediator between God and the world, the ideal and the real. Hegel's statement that "in philosophy we would never say that God creates his son" means that the transcendent and mysterious process of the creation of the son is placed in an unknowable dimension. The Hegelian philosopher could never make such a statement, even though "the thought contained in such a relation . . . is still recognized in philosophy," for the postulation of an unknowable rules out a fortiori the possibility of a systematic philosophy, which is an intricate structure of categorial mediations.

Religious thought for Hegel is not the same as Absolute Knowledge, even though both have the same object. Hegel explains that "the spirit of revealed religion has not yet overcome its consciousness as such, or, what is the same thing, its real self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness."¹⁶ Religious thought still represents its object as external to itself, and a fortiori only knows its object in an incomplete manner, for Otherness is still present; the speculative synthesis must show the mediations which make the religious object in fact immanent to the system. Religion thus becomes the penultimate stage in the evolution of consciousness to Absolute Knowledge. The truths of religion are not denied by philosophy; rather, they are demonstrated, elevated to a higher synthesis. Although Hegel is often accused of atheism, he always insisted that the truths of religion, and most importantly the historical incarnation of Christ, were central to his system.

Strauss showed that the New Testament could not be accepted as an historical document. It was simply a product of the myth-making consciousness of the Jewish people. The biblical Christ, whose veracity Hegel had accepted, and, in his speculative manner, made the pivot of his system, is rejected. This rejection poses a new question: if the incarnate Christ is not the bearer of philosophical, historical, and religious development, who is? Strauss's

solution seems to be only a slight modification of the Hegelian system:

*The properties and functions which the teachings of the Church ascribe to Christ are contradictory when they are thought of in an individual, a God-man; in the Idea of the genus [Gattung], they are harmonious.*¹⁷

This proposal was later developed by Feuerbach and modified by Marx. A variant of it, based on an Hegelian notion of "God" as the internal relation of self-consciousness was developed by Bruno Bauer. We will return to it later.

Strauss's work undid the tightly sewn seams of the Hegelian system. It was no longer possible to identify religion with philosophy; the former was the domain of myth, the later, of truth. Historical development could no longer be identified with a logical schema of rational development; Hegel had proved the "logical" necessity of an historical phenomenon, the Christ, which was in fact a myth. It was no longer possible to accept the Hegelian synthesis of the real and the rational; the universality of the speculative dialectic was destroyed.

Following Strauss's breakthrough, the Young Hegelians turned their attention to Greek philosophy. They had by no means rejected the motivations of the Hegelian system. Since Hegel's error concerned his philosophy of religion, and since religious thought and the thought of the classical Greeks were both examples of "representative thought," a study of Greek thought was now necessary.

Marx was at one with his fellow Young Hegelians. He decided to write his doctoral dissertation on the history of Greek philosophy, and though in the end he limited his topic, his notebooks, the *Vorarbeiten*, are rich with analyses of the problems facing the Young Hegelians. In a short essay on Baur's "Platonism and Christianity," Marx remarks that

here [in the representation of the Absolute as transcendent] indeed is the affinity of the Platonism with every positive religion, particularly with Christianity, which is the completed philosophy of transcendence. Here also is one of the respects

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in which a deeper connection can be made between historic Christianity and the history of ancient philosophy.¹⁸

Not only Plato, but all of Greek philosophy and the shifts it underwent must be analyzed, for

the form which we see emerging at the end of the working of the Greek philosophical consciousness . . . is the same as the form in which Greek philosophy strode living over the stage of the world, the same form which saw gods in the burning fire, the same form which drank from the poison goblet, and the same one which enjoys itself as the god of Aristotle, the highest spirituality, the theory.¹⁹

Marx's concern is to analyze the way in which this form moves in its different incarnations. This concern was not only speculative. He was pushed to the study of the history of Greek philosophy by the analogy between the all-embracing conceptual synthesis of Aristotle and that of Hegel. In his dissertation, Marx asks:

it is not a remarkable phenomenon that after the Platonic and Aristotelean [systems] extending to the totality, new systems appear which do not follow the model of these rich spiritual forms but turn to the simplest schools—in physics, to the natural philosophers, in ethics, to the Socratic school? Why, further, is it that the systems which follow Aristotle find, as it were, their fundamentals ready in the past? (P. 24)

Perhaps, Marx thinks, there is something to be learned here, something which will enlighten him on the function which he will play as a follower of the total system of Hegel?²⁰ The way in which Marx poses this problem shows that he is operating within the post-Hegelian tradition: he conceives of the history of philosophy as a rational progression whose movement must be understood rationally.

In the short essay, "Nodal Points in the Development of Philosophy," Marx delimits a first solution. He begins by describing the conceptual movement of Greek philosophy:

Just as the nous of Anaxagoras acquires movement with the Sophists (where the nous in reality becomes the nonbeing of

the world) and this immediate Daemonic movement as such is manifested in Socrates' Daimonion, the practical action of Socrates in turn becomes general and ideal in Plato, and the nous extends itself to a realm of ideas. With Aristotle this process is again confined to an individuality which, however, has now become the actual, conceptual individuality. (P. 102)

What is important here is the interplay between the movement of the ideas and their fixation; there is an interplay between the actions of the individual philosophers and the development of the system.

Just as there are nodal points in philosophy that raise philosophy to concretion, form abstract principles into a totality, and thus interrupt a straight-line continuation, so there are also moments when philosophy turns its eyes to the external world. No longer reflectively but like a practical person, it spins intrigues with the world, emerges from Amenthes' transparent realm, and throws itself on the bosom of the mundane siren. (P. 102)

The Hegelian speculative understanding of the history of philosophy demands that it be seen as a straight line; it seems to prohibit the study of those moments when philosophy "spins intrigues with the world." A new method must be developed in order that the history of philosophy be made understandable and that, a fortiori, Marx understand the tasks which await the post-Hegelian era. By what mediations does progress occur?

Marx's explanation of the periods of movement which follow the nodal development is not clear. He argues that a split occurs in what had been a reconciled relation between philosophy and the world, and that "this split is driven to extremes, because spiritual existence has become free, enriched to universality" (103). This seems to be a purely descriptive account, no explanation is offered as yet, though the problem is clearly circumscribed. The argument could be interpreted as saying that when a philosophy reaches completion, reconciling itself with the world in thought, it is still only a philosophy, and, because of its universality, which is its freedom, the opposition between it and the world becomes all the more evident, obliging it to turn to the world in an attempt

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to effect a real reconciliation.²¹ But the mediation is lacking; philosophy is taken as a paradigm, an ideal which "should" be realized.

When philosophy turns to the world, the interaction is a stormy one; the peaceful, atemporal reconciliation gives way to a time of movement. He who does not understand the necessity of this period of movement cannot understand the crisis of philosophy, nor that of the world to which it turns. It is not possible to yearn for the good old days; "the first necessity for philosophical research," affirms Marx, "is a reckless, a free spirit."²² The philosopher must know, with Themistocles, that it is time to found "a new Athens on the sea, on another element"²³ (104). For, continues Marx, "titanlike . . . are the times that follow an implicitly total philosophy and its subjective forms of development, for the diremption—its unity—is tremendous. Thus Rome came after the Stoic, Sceptic, and Epicurean philosophies" (104). The philosopher, the "reckless, free spirit," must understand that the misfortune of philosophy, the end of its synthesis, is the fortune of the world. Philosophy now is intimately related to the world; the form of that relation enables the historian of philosophy to judge "the immanent determinateness and the world-historical character of the course of a philosophy" (105).

In another essay in the *Vorarbeiten*, "The Tasks of the Philosophical Writing of History," this line of thought is presented somewhat differently. Marx is explicitly concerned with the mediation between the philosophical system and its historical existence. It is not sufficient merely to describe the opinions of the system's contemporaries, nor to treat it as an abstract spiritual form. The historical mediation between the system and its epoch is the "critical moment" which must be understood by the historian of philosophy. Yet, again, Marx finds no mediations; he sees the importance of studying the way in which the individual philosopher and his historical existence affect the system, and recognizes that the Hegelian presentation of the history of Greek philosophy omits this mediation. In his own doctoral dissertation, "Concerning the Difference of the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature," Marx attempts to understand the critical moment in the Epicurean philosophy, and therewith to clarify his own personal philosophical tasks.

The Epicurean Philosophy as Historically Mediated

The foreword to the dissertation shows that Marx is using Epicurus as a case study of the problems which he had contemplated in the *Vorarbeiten*. He notes that Hegel had correctly understood the general nature of Greek philosophy, but that his method had prevented him from seeing "that which he names speculative par excellence" (20). Marx thinks that the dissertation has "solved a thus far unsolved problem in the history of Greek philosophy" (20). The key to this solution is the stress on the role played by the individual thinker as an historical person. Marx asserts:

As long as a single drop of blood pulses in its world-conquering and absolutely free heart, philosophy will continually, with Epicurus, shout at her opponents: "Impiety is not the destruction of the gods of the crowd but rather ascribing to the gods the ideas of the crowd."

Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus: "In a word, I hate all gods" is its own, its own slogan against all gods of heaven and earth who do not recognise human self-consciousness as the highest divinity. There shall be none other beside it. (P. 21-22)

Because of the foreword, and certain passages in the dissertation, it is easy to think that Marx's favorable treatment of Epicurus is the result of the latter's attack on mythology and false consciousness, or to think that it is the result of a romantic, Promethean drive, looking for the Absolute in the here and now. This interpretation is not borne out by the text. Marx is not interested in the philosopher as an individual, but as "representative of a species [*espèce*]" (21). He had already expressed this in the *Vorarbeiten*:

Why should the intention behind the view [of a philosopher] and not rather, on the contrary, the view and insight [Ansicht und Einsicht] of his intention be explained? The latter principle is not only the more historical, but also the only way in which the study of the intention of a philosopher can take place in the history of philosophy. We see there that which, as system, explains itself to us in the form of a spiritual personality; and we

*see at the same time the demiurge stand living in the middle of the world.*²⁴

Marx investigates the Epicurean and Democritean philosophies as the objectifications of the manner in which the philosopher relates to the world, for "in the general relation which the philosopher gives to the world he only objectifies the relation of his particular consciousness to the real world" (32).

The philosophies of nature of Democritus and Epicurus are generally thought to be based on a similar metaphysic; both are atomists. Yet closer investigation shows them to differ on questions concerning "truth, certainty, the use of science; on the relation of thought to reality in general" (28). These differences, Marx will try to show, depend on the philosopher's relation to his world. This comportment determines his ontology.

The first part of the dissertation shows that Democritus and Epicurus have different notions of necessity. Democritus, the "sceptic and empiricist," attempts to discover external causal necessity in the phenomenal world, while Epicurus, the "philosopher and dogmatist," (36) wants to prove that no necessity can exist outside of the individual self-consciousness. Democritus's world view is cosmological; that of Epicurus is determined by an ethical outlook. Marx summarizes the difference between the two atomists as follows:

Chance is a reality which has only the value of possibility; but abstract possibility is precisely the antipode of the real. The latter is limited by sharp frontiers, like the understanding; the former is unlimited, like phantasy. The real possibility seeks to ground the necessity and reality of its object; for the abstract [possibility] it is not a question of the object to be explained but of the subject which explains. The object has only to be thinkable. That which is abstractly possible, that which can be thought, does not stand in the way of the thinking subject; it is no boundary for him, no stumbling block. Whether this possibility be also real, this is indifferent, for the interest here is not on the object as object. (Pp. 34-35)

Though the remainder of the first part of the dissertation has been lost, it is not difficult to see what Marx has in mind.

For Democritus, the phenomenal world is a subjective appear-

ance of the reality which is the atom; phenomena can be studied objectively, but still their truth must be doubted. The world is the external; Democritean physics must explain the real possibility of its existence and structure. As a subjective appearance, the world can be studied by the empiricist; ultimately, however, its subjectivity demands a skeptical attitude: the real possibility of the facts may be shown, but their necessity is not demonstrable.

Epicurus on the other hand, treats the phenomenal world as the objective reflection of individual subjectivity. The phenomenal world, therefore, is explained in terms of the subjectivity which is its foundation. This is why Epicurus is interested only in abstract possibility; Marx notes his "limitless nonchalance in the explanation of individual physical phenomena" (35). Epicurus's ethical standpoint is evident. He is interested in freeing the subject from the external world; this is the function of his entire philosophy. Whereas the "empiricist and sceptic," Democritus, must doubt the phenomenal world of experience, Epicurus, the "philosopher and dogmatist," understands it as the objective reflection of the individual subject. For Epicurus, the phenomena are not to be explained, but to be explained away. The function of science and philosophy is to assure the ataraxy, the calm and peace, of the individual soul. To be valid, explanation must not contradict the perception of the senses. Whether there be one explanation or many is not important, "for the interest here is not on the object as object."

Marx prefers the Epicurean position. Epicurus is more "philosophical"; he rejects the empirical study of nature in favor of a "dogmatic" attempt to understand nature as a *principiata* which is founded by a *principle*, the individual self-consciousness. It is to this that Marx refers in the foreword when he notes that Hegel had not seen "that which he calls speculative par excellence." Marx's preference is for Epicurus's *ontology*, although this ontology is intimately connected with his ethical concern, as is shown in the second part of the dissertation. Marx is referring to this interrelation of the ethical and the ontological concerns when he speaks of the comportment of the philosopher in relation to his world, which he says determines the nature of the resultant philosophy.

The second part of the dissertation treats the differences be-

tween the two systems, discussing the swerving of the atoms, their qualities, their function as "beginning" and as "elements" in the system, and the nature of time. The last chapter deals with the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, showing that Democritus has only empirical observation to offer, while Epicurus's position is based on his ethico-ontological principle, the ataraxy of the individual self-consciousness. A brief discussion will clarify what Marx claims is unique in Epicurus's theory, and make it possible to evaluate the technique which Marx has employed in his search for self-understanding as a post-Hegelian.

Like the Greek people themselves, Greek philosophy revered the heavenly bodies as holy because they assumed them to be immortal. The heavenly bodies were taken as eternal and unmoving; Aristotle's god, the "unmoved mover" who sits in eternal self-contemplation, was to be venerated as the highest good and the sole object worthy of contemplation. The corollary of this, however, is that the individual soul is incomplete, for it is not eternal and its attention is directed outward, away from itself. The incompleteness of the individual soul opens the door to mythology, to superstition, and to false consciousness, which are ways in which the soul finds what it thinks is its completion *outside* of itself. The explanation of the heavenly bodies will therefore affect the ethical position taken by a philosopher, for on it depends the value which he gives to the human being and its freedom.

Epicurus rejects the belief that the heavenly bodies are holy. How can the soul enjoy its ataraxy when there is something outside of consciousness, something eternal and godly, which stands over against consciousness? Epicurus's position, as Marx presents it, is like that of Hegel when confronted with the Church doctrine which presents God as a transcendent Being: the transcendence must be explained away; "our lives have no need of ideology and empty hypotheses, but rather of living without confusion" (63). The heavenly bodies cause fear and unhappiness, for we fear what we do not know. But what is striking is that Epicurus explains away the heavenly bodies not with a single explanation but with many. "The number of explanations, the multiplicity of possibilities must not only pacify consciousness and take away the grounds of the fear, but also negate the unity, the identical and absolute

law of the heavenly bodies" (64). This is indeed a strange doctrine, for not only are there a multiplicity of explanations, but in turn the object to be explained is denied its unity. Marx notes that "all authors who have written on the Epicurean philosophy have presented this doctrine as incompatible [*inkohärent*] with the rest of the physics, with the doctrine of the atoms" (65). It is not sufficient to explain Epicurus's position as resulting from his attack against mythology, astrology and so on; Marx will attempt to understand the principle of Epicurus's doctrine.

In the preceding chapters, Marx showed that the Epicurean physics is built upon the opposition between the individual self-consciousness and the atoms. The individual self-consciousness is seen as the form of the atoms or, in another sense, as their essence. The contradiction between form and matter, essence and existence accounts for the swerving of the atoms, their qualities, and so on. However, if the heavenly bodies exist, and are the holy, then in them the contradiction is reconciled, and the whole system falls apart, losing its foundation. Therefore, the heavenly bodies are dangerous to the Epicurean system not simply because they cause fear or create a false, mythological consciousness; they are dangerous because their acceptance would entail the rejection of the rest of the system. The principle of the system, the individual self-consciousness, exists only in its opposition to the phenomenal world; if this opposition were negated, the principle of the system would fall, and with it its *principiata*. The preservation of the individual's *ataraxy* is therefore the correlate of an entire ontology. The ethics and the ontology of Epicurus mediate one another reciprocally.

The doctrine of the heavenly bodies is obviously that "critical moment" which enables the historian of philosophy to uncover the principle of a philosophical system at the moment of its contradiction with the world view of its time. When Epicurus denies the prevailing Greek view of the heavenly bodies, he does so in defense of a new system based on a new principle. Only at this moment does the novelty of the system show itself; for the new system necessarily was formulated in the old terms, with the familiar concepts. It is here, at the "critical moment," that the individual philosopher makes his personal contribution felt. The first

of the tasks of the dissertation is accomplished: Marx has demonstrated that philosophy cannot be understood as a series of developments of the Spirit. He has proposed a new method for the writing of the history of philosophy.

Marx had also hoped to learn something about his own post-Hegelian position by studying the nature of philosophy after the totality system of Aristotle. On this score, the results seem meager, and it is important not to be deceived. Marx obviously appreciates Epicurus's stress on the individual self-consciousness. However, this does not mean that he himself adopted such a position. On the last page of the dissertation, Marx notes that

if the abstract-individual self-consciousness is posited as absolute principle, then all true and actual science is transcended [aufgehoben] insofar as individuality does not dominate in the nature of things. (P. 68)

Marx is still an Hegelian, insisting that science must deal with universals. He is not proposing a philosophy of self-consciousness, of either the Epicurean or the Kantian-Fichtean kind, though many of the Young Hegelians did in fact adopt such a position, whose logical conclusion is the abstract individualistic egoism of Max Stirner, whom Marx later takes to task in *The German Ideology*.

On the other hand, it will be recalled that Marx was concerned with the problem of the *bearer* of philosophical development. Could it be that Marx wants to affirm here that it is the individual self-consciousness, entering into relation and conflict with the historical epoch, which calls forth the new philosophical development? Is it the function of philosophy to provide a theoretical possibility of individual action? Is Marx proposing not a philosophy of praxis, but a philosophy *for* praxis? Or, is the individual self-consciousness historically specific to the Epicurean development? If so, how does philosophy enter into its periods of movement? Marx provides no answer to these questions in the dissertation. However, one of the Notes (*Anmerkungen*) appended to the dissertation points in the direction of the solution at which Marx will eventually arrive.

On the World's Becoming Philosophical and Philosophy's Becoming Worldly

In the letter to his father, Marx remarked that he resolved "to seek the Idea in the real itself. If formerly the gods had lived above the earth, now they became its center" (13). In the *Vorarbeiten*, he expresses a similar notion:

*The ancients were rooted in nature, in the substantial. Their degradation, their profanation fundamentally designates the break of the substantial, solid life. The modern world is rooted in spirit, and can freely let loose its Other, nature, from itself. But in the same way, on the other hand, that which with the ancients was profanation of nature is for the moderns dissolution of the chains of servitude to belief. The point from which the old Ionian philosophy, at least according to its principle, begins—the seeing of the godly, the Idea, in nature—is the point to which modern rational perception of nature must, for the first time, climb.*²⁵

Hegel thought that his own philosophy had achieved this reconciliation. That Marx demands something more implies that he has seen a limitation, an incompleteness in the Hegelian speculative totality.

Marx seems to be implying that the Epicurean philosophy of individual self-consciousness is the first stage in the modern development which closes with Hegel. Hegel is taken as a philosopher of spirit, whose system must now be transcended by the "climb" which achieves the reconciliation of nature and spirit, of ancient and modern philosophy. Philosophy must begin a new epoch, must achieve a synthesis not only in thought but in reality as well. This position is similar to that of August von Cieszkowski in his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* (1838).

Cieszkowski argues that the Hegelian system is not the end of philosophy but only the termination of one of its stages, that of "consciousness." Philosophy began with the stage of "intuition," asserts Cieszkowski. The stage of "intuition" is what Marx called ancient philosophy, based on nature as its principle. In it, continues Cieszkowski, the World Spirit is "external to itself"; that is,

to use Marx's terms, "the godly, the Idea [is seen] in nature." In the second era, that of "consciousness," the World Spirit is "in itself"; it is reconciled with itself as incarnate in the world, and its final moment is the Hegelian philosophy. But the Hegelian reconciliation of consciousness and nature, of thought and being, is a reconciliation only in thought: Cieszkowski wants the reconciliation to take place in action as well. Thus, he postulates the necessity of a third stage of philosophy, the stage of "action," where the World Spirit is "out of itself."

*Practical philosophy, or put more precisely, the philosophy of praxis—the most concrete action [Einwirkung] on life and the social relations, the development of truth in concrete activity—this is the future task of philosophy in general.*²⁶

This is the stage in which Cieszkowski situates post-Hegelian philosophy.

Cieszkowski's philosophy of praxis is based on the postulate that history is an organism which must develop in a predictable manner. Moses Hess, who took over many of Cieszkowski's ideas in his book, *Die europäische Triarchie* (1841), expresses this in the following manner.

*If a philosophy of history, like the Hegelian, has only attempted to know the past and that which is [das Daseiende] as rational, it has only half understood its task. To the knowledge of history belongs essentially this: From the past and the present, from what has been and what is, from these two known quantities an unknown third, that which is becoming [das Werdende] must be concluded. Posited in this manner, the task of the philosophy of history is a worthy one, and with the solution to this task the philosophy of history becomes philosophy of action.*²⁷

However, neither Hess nor Cieszkowski are able to explain how the deduction from past and present to the future is to operate. Georg Lukács points out that for them the future functions like the Kantian ideal, which can never be reached but must always be the goal of individual striving.²⁸ The problem is that there is no force to move the thinker from the present to the future; there is

only the individual will, whose rationality cannot be shown since the future remains unknown. The problem of the bearer of the historical movement remains unresolved for both Hess and Cieszkowski.

In a note appended to the dissertation, Marx takes up a theme similar to that of Cieszkowski and Hess. He comments first on the accusation that the Hegelian philosophy is an "accommodation" with the historical present in which Hegel had written. Such an accusation is uninteresting, for it in no way contributes to the progress of knowledge.

Hence, if a philosopher has actually accommodated himself, his disciples have to explain from his inner essential consciousness that which for him had the form of an exoteric consciousness. In this way, that which appears as a progress of conscience [Gewissens] is also a progress of knowledge [Wissens]. It is not the particular conscience of the philosopher that is suspect; rather, the essential form of his consciousness is constructed, raised to a determined form and significance, and at the same time surpassed [hinausgegangen]. (P. 71)

This is what Marx had done in the dissertation when he came to the critical moment in the Epicurean theory, the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, refusing to treat it as an inconsistency as had his predecessors. By extension, he implies, the same thing should be done with Hegel.

Marx remarks that the "unphilosophical" turn which much of the Hegelian school had recently taken is a necessary development "which will always accompany the transition from discipline to freedom." He continues: "it is a psychological law that the theoretical spirit, having become free in itself, turns into practical energy, stepping forth as *will* from the shadow-world of *Amen-thes*" (71). In the Hegelian system, the spirit has come to know itself in all its determinateness. Now it must turn to praxis:

The praxis of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique which measures the individual existence against the essence, the particular reality against the Idea. But this immediate realization of philosophy is burdened with contradictions in its

innermost essence, and this its essence forms itself in the appearance [i.e., in the world] and puts its stamp thereon. (P. 71)


The notion of philosophy as critique was popularly—and vaguely—used by the Young Hegelians. At this point in Marx's development, *critique* refers to the criticism of the established order carried out by comparing its reality to that which philosophy said it should be. This "critical" philosophy is Marx's first, and unsatisfactory, resolution of the problem of the 'is' and the 'should be' of which he had spoken in the letter to his father. Marx is treating philosophy as a paradigm against which to measure the real, but he still has no mediation by which to assure that what 'should be' will in fact become real; his critique is thus negative only.

When philosophy is "realized," Marx continues, it is "burdened by contradictions in its innermost essence." When philosophy turns to the world as will, it breaks up the union that it had established with the world, and finds itself standing in opposition to the world; it no longer is a totality system, but is now one side of a new opposition. At the same time, the world becomes philosophical; no longer mere empirical facticity, related only to itself, it is infected by the normative demands which philosophy makes on it. A new quest for unity must start, a unity not simply of philosophy with itself and with the world-as-thought, but rather the real unity of philosophy and the world. The philosopher finds himself making a "double-edged demand, of which one edge turns against the world, the other against philosophy itself" (72). This accounts, on the one hand, for the "liberal party," which accepts the truth of the philosophical system and turns it against the world, and, on the other hand, for the "positive philosophy" which attempts to remedy the deficiencies it perceives in the philosophical system by adding empirical "truths" to it (72-73). Marx thinks that it is the liberal party which, though in fact its object is not philosophy but the world, makes the most progress because, in trying to change the world by making it philosophical, it "adheres to the concept," to the demands of rationality.

Marx is making a philosophical argument for philosophy's self-annihilation, for its self-transcendence is the critical move to a praxis which will affect the world. It is not a question of setting

out an ethical paradigm; Marx's position is dialectically grounded in the new totality and opposition between philosophy-as-realized and the world. His contention is that "the realization [of philosophy] is at the same time its loss" (71), insofar as the philosophical thought-totality finds itself now entangled in a new dialectical interaction with the nonphilosophical world.²⁹ The categorial dialectic of Hegel is replaced by a dialectic between philosophy and the world in which the philosopher makes a "double-edged demand": that philosophy become worldly and that the world become philosophical.

Marx's own self-understanding is not yet clear, as is seen in his reference to a "psychological law" to explain this new dialectic. Marx is still thinking subjectively, treating the individual philosopher as the incarnation of the philosophical system. However, he has here laid down the conceptual basis for his own position which is based on the theory-praxis dialectic in which philosophy annuls and transcends itself, seeking its realization in a world which must be made rational. At this point, Marx has seen that philosophy, the critique, must incarnate itself in the world. What remains to be seen is how the critical philosophy can discover the mediations on the side of the world which will make it philosophical. Because he accepts the premises of dialectical logic, Marx is certain that these mediations must exist. Thus, after receiving his doctorate in April, 1841, he turned to journalism in an attempt to become more directly involved in the world.



THE PHILOSOPHER IN THE WORLD

The Young Hegelians

At the end of 1839, Bruno Bauer was pressing Marx to finish his dissertation in order to come teach in Bonn.¹ Bauer had been stirring up a storm with his Young Hegelian critique of theology and religion, and insisted that Marx too would be an instant success. In 1841, Bauer and Marx planned to edit together a "Journal of Atheism";² when their plans for the journal fell through, they talked of a collaboration with Feuerbach and Ruge on an anti-religious journal.³ However, Bauer's headstrong attacks on everything which represented the *status quo*, his insistence on "the terrorism of the true theory,"⁴ led to his dismissal from Bonn. With Bauer's lost job went Marx's hopes of a teaching career on which, judging from his replies to Bauer's entreaties, he had not placed much hope in the first place.

With his dissertation completed, Marx was eager to enter into the political activities of the Young Hegelians. In 1841, an anonymous volume, *The Trumpet of the Last Judgment against Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist*, was published. The book had been written by Bruno Bauer with the help of Marx, and seems to have caused quite a stir.⁵ The book pretended to be the work of a Believer, and purported to show that Hegel's philosophy of religion

was a pantheism and an atheism, and that it was the Young Hegelians who were the true disciples of the revolutionary Master. Bauer reinterpreted the Hegelian Absolute Idea in his own manner, equating it with the "universal Consciousness" which becomes incarnate in the philosopher as Self-Consciousness. This incarnate Self-Consciousness has as its task the critique of all that exists, for only the Self-Consciousness is the Truth. The phenomenal world appears as pure negativity as opposed to the Truth of Self-Consciousness, and is a fortiori the target of the "Absolute Criticism." The Hegelian reconciliation had seen the phenomenal world, the "antithesis," as having positive value; by insisting on the pure negativity of the phenomenal world, Bauer in effect returned to a Fichtean idealism whose two poles, Absolute Consciousness and the world, are irreconcilable. The theory thus precludes any positive action, despite its revolutionary rhetoric, for no mediated development can take place.⁶

Marx's collaboration with Bauer was short-lived. In 1842, he began to work with Arnold Ruge, the political veteran among the Young Hegelians. Ruge had spent several years in prison for his participation in the *Burschenschaft* movement, after which he edited a succession of periodicals, each of which was suppressed by the government. Ruge criticized the Hegelian philosophy for what he perceived as a disjunction between logical and historical truth. Hegel treated only the "concept of right and of the state," whereas Ruge was interested in the "true actualization of freedom and of the state."⁷ When attention is directed to "the other side, to the unreason [*Unvernunft*] of existing things, then unrest, dissatisfaction, the demand and the passionate Ought [*Sollen*] of praxis appear. Now something must be done . . . the theoretical standpoint is left behind, and the appeal of the critique turns to the will of men."⁸ The move from the theoretical to the practical standpoint is determined by the movement of history, which is the "objective critique."⁹ "Only when history enters the domain of science are existing things themselves [the center] of interest."¹⁰ This stress on history and on the actual world separates Ruge from the absolutely negating Self-Consciousness of Bruno Bauer. Yet Ruge was unable to relate the subjective critique, which remained theoretical, to the objective critique exercised by concrete history;

the idealist separation of subjective and objective is never mediated in his work, and the dialectic he employs is simply a temporal succession in which each moment is seen [*vorgestellt*] as transcending and preserving the previous ones. Despite the naïveté of his *vorstellende Dialektik*, Ruge's critique of Hegel did have an important influence on Marx's development, and their collaboration lasted for several years, until the time that Marx's own position was worked out.

In addition to his collaboration with Ruge, in whose *Anekdoten* he published two articles,¹¹ Marx began to write regularly for a Cologne newspaper, the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Marx soon became its editor, attempting to give it a radical political orientation while simultaneously trying to avoid conflict with the censorship. The censors, however, were not fooled, as one of their secret reports indicates:

The *Rheinische Zeitung* has the clear character of an opposition paper. The task which it has taken on is to propagate liberal French ideas in Germany and to push the constitutional state as the only form of state equal to the necessities of the present time. It attempts to make this argument prevail both by theoretical argumentation, showing that the constitutional state is the necessary consequence of German philosophy, and by incessant attacks against the actual constitution. . . . The *Rheinische Zeitung* appears as a propaganda organ of the Young Hegelians. Just as it defends from the political point of view the French rationalist theories, it openly adopts, from the religious point of view, the atheism of the *Hallische Jahrbücher* [edited by Ruge, suppressed in 1841], maintaining that present philosophy must replace Christianity.¹²

The tactical measures Marx was forced to take in order to keep the paper out of the reach of censorship led to a split with the majority of the Berlin Young Hegelians. They had taken to calling themselves "The Free" and had adopted an anarcho-individualist position and life style. Marx took to red-pencilling and finally refusing to publish the contributions of his ex-friends, demanding that they have "more knowledge of the facts," and that they "criticize religion more in the critique of political conditions than the political conditions in the critique of religion."¹³ Bruno Bauer at-

tacked Marx's action as an accommodation with the established order.¹⁴ Marx's first meeting with Engels was colored by this quarrel, for he thought Engels was an emissary from The Free and received him coldly.

During this period Marx was in close contact with Moses Hess, who was for a time coeditor of the paper, and then its French correspondent. Hess had criticized the Hegelian philosophy for its abstract nature, arguing that

*that which remains dissociated, the truth itself, if it endures in its high separateness, becomes untrue. Just as the reality which is not permeated by truth, so too the truth which is not realized, is inferior.*¹⁵

Hess had become a communist during his travels in France. Against the Hegelian theory in which the state and its laws subsume under themselves, and give reason to, civil society, the socio-economic sphere in which everyday life is lived, Hess maintained that civil society is the key to understanding the state, and that within civil society the opposition of the rich and the poor is the main contradiction. He sneered at liberal reformers, insisting that when the social contradiction between the rich and the poor led to a revolution, all previous political reforms would be swept away as irrelevant. Hess remained friendly with Marx during most of his life. He was, however, unable to comprehend clearly the nature of Marx's later communist philosophy; as Georg Lukács argues, he was of that class of intelligensia which sympathizes with the coming social revolution as a moralist who must make the revolution in order to help others.¹⁶ His politics were, in modern terms, the politics of guilt, for he was never able to see the need of a *mediation*, a bearer of the sociohistorical development,¹⁷ and found himself opting for an "ethic of love" as the revolutionary force.¹⁸ His dichotomy between the rich and the poor was an emotional, not a rational basis for theory.

Marx's work on the *Rheinische Zeitung* was important in his later development. In the preface to the *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), he recalls this period:

In 1842–1843, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, I found myself for the first time forced to express my opinion concerning the so-called material interests. The deliberations of the Rhenian

Landtag concerning wood theft and the parceling out of landed property, the official polemic which Mr. von Schaper, at that time First President of the Rhenian province, engaged with the *Rheinische Zeitung* concerning the situation of the Moselle peasants, and finally the debates on free trade and protectionism gave the first occasion for my concern with economic questions. At the same time, during which the good will to "move forward" replaced competence, a weak, philosophically colored echo of French socialism and communism made itself heard at the *Rheinische Zeitung*. I was against this shoddy work, but admitted at the same time, in a controversy with the *Allgemeine Augsburger Zeitung*, that the studies which I had thus far made did not permit me to make any judgment concerning the content of the French tendencies. I seized the opportunity granted by the illusion of the owners of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, who thought that through a more moderate position they could annul the death verdict against their paper, in order to leave the public stage and to retire to my study.¹⁹

It is important to try to get underneath Marx's journalistic work, to find out what political positions he took and why he took them. Though none of the articles which he wrote at this time is explicitly philosophical, they do inscribe themselves in the development which is being analyzed here. Marx is turning philosophy to the world, and the manner in which he does this is indicative of his future development.

Three major tasks were incumbent on Marx as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*. He had to refine his critical tools while under fire both from the Left (The Free), and the Right (the Government and its censors); he had to defend the freedom of the press, heavily menaced under the regime of Frederick-William IV; and he had to take a position on concrete political problems which demanded an immediate solution. Each of these will be looked at separately.

Refinement of the "Critical" Philosophy

In the same volume of Ruge's *Anekdoten* in which Feuerbach published his *Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*,

Marx published a short article entitled "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss and Feuerbach." This essay was a rejoinder to an attack on Feuerbach by Max Stirner. In order to understand Marx's defense of Feuerbach, one must recall the lines which Engels wrote forty-five years later in his *Ludwig Feuerbach*:

*The spell was broken. The "system" was exploded and cast aside. And the contradiction, shown to exist only in our imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at once Feuerbachians.*²⁰

The question, to what degree Marx in fact became a Feuerbachian, can be left aside here. It is sufficient to note that Feuerbach's ideas fall within the line of thought which the Young Hegelians were pursuing, while at the same time Feuerbach's a-political and a-historical insistence on an "ethic of love" and the divinity of man were soon demoded.²¹

Marx's position in this article does not represent a "naturalist view of religion affiliated with a nascent existentialism, with an insistence on the priority of immediate experience over any schema of concepts for getting at things 'as they are,' " as a common interpretation presents it.²² The passage on which such an interpretation is based is:

*And I advise you, speculative theologians and philosophers: free yourselves from the concepts and presuppositions of existing speculative philosophy if you want to get at things differently, as they are; that is to say, if you want to come to the Truth. And there is no other road for you to Truth and Freedom than through the stream of fire [Feuerbach]. Feuerbach is the purgatory of the present.*²³ (P. 109)

Feuerbach's philosophy can be called existential only insofar as all serious post-Hegelian philosophy *had* to be existential: that is, Feuerbach recognized the need for philosophy to turn to the world, to incarnate itself.

Marx's stress is not on the getting to things "as they are," but on "Truth and Freedom." Feuerbach is the "purgatory of the present" in that he breaks the conceptual stronghold of the Hegelian categories which, as Marx had seen in his legal treatise, act like psy-

chological blinders, opening many vistas while simultaneously closing others. Marx argues that the road to Truth and Freedom goes "through" Feuerbach; he does not say that Feuerbach has found Truth and Freedom. That is, Feuerbach has performed the valuable service of forcing philosophy to turn outward from its internal conceptual synthesis in search of a new union with the world. Marx is not demanding a break with Hegel's own "inner essence," as he put it in the discussion of "accommodation." He sees that Feuerbach has taken a step toward reclaiming the Hegelian task on a new level, that of the interaction of philosophy and the world, and it is for this reason that he defends him.

Marx's still-Hegelian orientation is confirmed in the article, "The Philosophical Manifesto of the Historical School of Law," which was occasioned by his ex-professor Savigny's becoming a Prussian minister. Hegel had already attacked the Historical School on the grounds that historical and philosophical truth are different, and that the latter is higher than the former:

By dint of obscuring the difference between the historical and the philosophical study of law, it becomes possible to shift the point of view and slip over from the problem of the true justification of a thing to a justification by appeal to circumstances, to deduction from presupposed conditions which in themselves may have no higher validity . . . and generally to put the relative in place of the absolute and the external appearance in the place of the nature of the thing. . . . Once the origination of an institution has been shown to be wholly to the purpose and necessity in the circumstances of the time, and this has been demonstrated, then the demands of history have been fulfilled. But if this is supposed to pass for a general justification of the thing itself, it turns out rather to be the opposite, namely because since these circumstances are no longer present, the institution has lost its sense and its right.²⁴

Marx brings Hegel's criticism up to date, asking how the laws of the Prussian state can be justified.

The Historical School maintains that the scientific justification of legal measures is based on an examination of individual facts. What exists, this school maintains, should exist; the only power

which can judge the facts is that power which preserves or eliminates them. This, says Marx, is the "law of arbitrary power" (207). Marx attacks the Historical School's positivist reasoning which leads to a "scepticism concerning the existence of reason," and its belief "that the appearance [*Schein*] of reason is extinguished in that which is positive so that the positive can be recognized without the appearance of reason" (201). It is incorrect to maintain that "according to Marx, such an unquestioning acceptance of the judicial order leads to extreme conservatism," and that "it is mainly because of these practical implications that Marx became violently opposed to the historical interpretation of right."²⁵ For Marx, the claim that Reason does not exist is totally unacceptable, as is a philosophical nominalism, which is the implication of this method. Of course, this world is not the incarnation of Reason; however, philosophy's entry into it is the first step toward its change. Marx is operating on the assumption that a reconciliation between philosophy and the world is an immanent possibility, and that a position which denies this in effect denies the possibility of rational change and must either criticize blindly, or justify the existing order.

Marx uses a method similar to the one in the dissertation, seeking the critical moment in the doctrine of the Historical School in order to find its *principle*. When the Historical School justifies the existing Prussian state, a state which Marx considers irrational to the core, its critical moment is evident; no rational doctrine could justify an irrational situation. The principle of the Historical School, Marx argues, is the Kantian view that the things-in-themselves are unknowable, that absolute truth cannot be reached and that philosophy must be content with only appearances. But, "Hugo misunderstands the master Kant in that [he assumes that] since we cannot know what is true, consequently we let pass the untrue, as long only as it exists, as entirely true" (199). "This method can not be ascribed to the accidental individuality [of Hugo]; rather it is the *method of his principle*, the frank, naïve, direct method of the Historical School" (200). For Marx, it is the principle which must be criticized, not the man who happens upon it. The Historical School is the completed skepticism concerning the possibility of a rational social order; for it, "only what

is animalistic appears indubitable" (202). Marx mocks Hugo's position with quotations from his works, showing how the denial of rationality leads to ludicrous postures on a variety of subjects, such as marriage, education, freedom, public and private law.

The Historical School is "uncritical": "everything that exists is for it an authority; every authority is for it a reason [*Grund*]." That is, continues Marx, "in one paragraph are cited Moses and Voltaire, Richardson and Homer, Montaigne and Ammon, Rousseau's '*contrat social*' and Augustine's '*De civitate dei*.'" Peoples are likewise leveled" (200). This leads to a "base skepticism" (202), which denies that the rational can be found in the "positive," in the world. The critical analysis which Marx implies is necessary would treat the factual in terms of its rationality; it would distinguish between degrees of rationality to which it *should* accede. The critical philosophy applied here operates on the assumption that the real will become the rational, and that insofar as it has not reached its full development, it must be criticized, presented in its irrational nakedness so that its mediated development can be seen. In this, Marx's position is different both from The Free, and from the justifiers of the established order. His methodology, too, has taken a step forward. He assumes that a new synthesis of the world and philosophy is possible, and on the basis of that presumed synthesis, he criticizes the actual social relations. This is the first, not yet explicit use, of Marx's dialectic.

Marx employs his dialectical critique in another article, "On a Proposed Divorce Law: Critique of the Critique." Marx criticizes the previous criticisms of the proposed law for dealing only partially with their object, and proposes a critique "from the standpoint which is deliberately universal, that of the philosophy of law."²⁶ "It will no longer suffice," he continues, "to examine the separate grounds for divorce pro and con. It will be necessary to develop the concept of marriage and its consequences."²⁷

Previous criticisms of the new law had condemned the mixing of religious with legal motivations, and then discussed the problem of divorce in legal terms. However, Marx points out, marriage and divorce are neither religious nor legal, but ethical relations.²⁸ From the standpoint of statute law the ethical nature of an institution is unimportant; statute law is based, however, on "an abstraction

which absorbs into itself the natural, legal, and ethical content as in itself lawless, and then attempts to shape, modify, and arrange this spiritless and lawless matter for an external purpose.”²⁹ By showing the ethical nature of the marriage and divorce relations, Marx will simultaneously criticize the legislative and legal procedures of the Prussian state.

Marriage is an ethical relation par excellence. As opposed, for example, to friendship, marriage is ethical because it is the basis of the family. This is the argument presented in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*. Marriage cannot be broken up because of individual will or caprice in the way that a friendship can thus be ended. Because it is the basis of the family, marriage is subject to legislation while friendship is not. Legislation in regard to divorce must, however, take into account “the will of marriage, the ethical substance of this relationship.”³⁰ This legislation is not merely the invention of arbitrary rules; “the legislator must consider himself as a natural scientist. He does not make the laws, he does not invent them; he only formulates them, he expresses the inner law of the spiritual relationships in conscious positive laws.”³¹ Thus, to oppose the proposed divorce law as representing the arbitrary nature of the legislative process, as previous critiques had done, presupposes that divorce must be legislated. But, in this case, the concept of marriage must itself provide the grounds on which proper legislation should be based. No legislature can decree what is ethical; nor can the legislature christen the unethical “legal.”

Marx’s analysis of the concept of marriage begins: “Hegel says: . . .”³² What Hegel says is that implicitly (*an sich*), in accord with its concept, marriage is indissoluble. This is true of all ethical relations as concerns their concept; the state, marriage, familial relations are all implicitly indissoluble. However, reality does not always correspond to its concept: “No ethical existence corresponds, or at least does not have to correspond to its essence.”³³ The argument against the historical school of law pointed out that it is not their sheer existence that justifies institutions and relations; what counts is whether their existence corresponds to their essence.

Divorce is the external sign that a marriage is dead, that its existence is no longer adequate to its essence. Legislation must

determine whether the marriage is in fact moribund; its task is to formulate the conditions in which the death certificate should be given. "The certainty that the conditions under which the existence of an ethical relation no longer corresponds to its essence . . . will however only be present when the law is the conscious expression of the will of the people, created with and through it."³⁴ Marx does not explain what he means by a "law [which] is the conscious expression of the will of the people, created with and through it," though his later argument for a democratic state can be seen as a *post hoc* justification. His intention here seems to be to show first of all that if legislation is true it must be based on the essential nature of its object as shown by philosophical analysis. On the basis of such an analysis, the legislator must formulate consistent laws. Secondly, Marx wants to affirm that for these legal measures to be effective, the people must recognize them as "the conscious expression of the will of the people"; that is, they must know that the legislature is not making arbitrary regulations which are intended to rule over their lives. Put another way, when the world has become philosophical and philosophy has become worldly, then the lives of the people will be lived rationally, and their laws, being rational, will be "the conscious expression of the will of the people, *created with and through it.*" (my stress)

Marx has no "practical" alternative to the proposed divorce law, partly because it is a "reform, a mere revision" of the present law,³⁵ but more importantly, because his critique has not yet found a way in which it can *in fact* make the world philosophical, though it has seen how philosophy becomes worldly. The sole advance thus far is that the critique has turned away from the criticism of religion of the Young Hegelians toward the critique of the state and its laws.³⁶

On the Freedom of the Press

Marx's first attempt to deal with the censorship problem appeared in Ruge's *Anekdotas*, which itself was printed in Switzerland to escape the Prussian censors. His lengthy article is a rhetorical tour de force, using the very principles on which the government based its use of censorship as the grounds for a criticism of the

censorship, pointing out the contradictions in the position of the proponents of censorship. Marx points to the confusion in the censorship decree between a notion of religion as the ethical basis and rational justification of the state, and a rationalist view that all religions must be tolerated because the state is not the tool of any religion. There is a distinction between morality and religion, says Marx, using the argument of "such intellectual heroes of morality as Kant, Fichte, and Spinoza," as well as Hegel, that morality is the product of the self-imposition of order on the free spirit, whereas religion is the imposition of external restraint. Morality is autonomous, while religion is heteronomous. Thus, police cannot regulate morality, though they might be able to impose a religion on a people. Censorship is but another way of policing the public mind, and as such it contradicts the essence of the truly free and rational state whose laws, as Marx puts it elsewhere, are "the Bible of freedom of a people (148). This fundamental Marxian stance is based on the distinction between the autonomy and heteronomy of the Spirit. It reappears throughout his work, as will be seen, and is the philosophical foundation of the notion of communism and of the later critique of alienation.

Marx discusses the censorship problem from another angle in his first publication in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. This was the first in a planned series of five articles analyzing the proceedings of the Rhenish Landtag. The Landtag was the provincial parliament which was supposed to give a semblance of democracy to the Prussian state. Lacking effective power, it was dominated by the landed nobility and the princely Estate. Marx intended to examine the debates concerning censorship, then those dealing with the relations between Church and state and finally the laws concerning the theft of wood, hunting regulations, and the provisions for the division of land. Only the first and third of these articles were published; the second was censored and has been lost; the last two were never written.

Marx notes first that the debates of the Landtag were normally not published; the citizens are thought not to need to concern themselves about such matters. On the contrary, argues Marx, citizens are more than children who can remain content with their immediate experience; they need to know and to understand public

affairs. The duty of the press is to bring them the requisite information. Marx is not arguing that the citizens are in fact clamoring for the publication of the Landtag debates. His position is based on the dialectic, which shows that the true citizen *would* make such a demand. One must "learn to know the freedom of the press as a *need*," for "the existence of what I truly cherish is necessary to me, something of which I am in need and without which my essence cannot have a fulfilled, satisfied, completed existence" (116). Like the other Young Hegelians, Marx seems to hold that the task of the critique is to create the *need* for freedom, for rationality.³⁷

Marx notes that the arguments of each of the Estates represented in the Landtag are determined by their social position, by "the individual interest of the particular Estate" (117). It would be incorrect, however, to assert that this recognition shows Marx "entering into contact for the first time with the class war in its simultaneously economic, political and social aspects," and that this contact "determines the progressive transformation of his ideas"³⁸ Aside from the fact that Marx did not pursue the notion of "class warfare," the internal evidence in this article shows that his intention is not to present a doctrine of the class determination of ideas, but to show that censorship is irrational, and that rational institutions are the only ones which can guarantee freedom. Thus, for example, the princely Estate argued that the press must be controlled in order to avoid provocative reporting which could lead to revolutionary unrest, citing the role of the press in various revolutionary situations in other countries in order to prove the nefarious effect of an uncensored press. Yet, replies Marx, the press can make no revolution by itself. The press is part of the "spirit of the people"; if the people makes a revolution, the press must partake, though it is not the cause of that revolution. "The revolution of a people is *total*: that is, each sphere revolts in its manner. Why not the press as press?" (124) To blame the press of a nation for the nation's revolutionary actions, says Marx, is not to attack the press but rather the autonomous spirit of that nation. This is the conspiracy theory of revolution, often heard today from both bourgeois reactionaries and from believers in a "vanguard party." While it might be called Leninist, it certainly is not Marx's view.

The free press is the "open eye of the people" (150); if it is censored the spirit of the people is perverted because it grows used to censorship and hence to unfreedom (156). The justification of the free press is phrased in Hegelian language. Marx writes that "it is clear from the standpoint of the Idea that the freedom of the press has a totally different justification than has the censor, in that it itself is a form of the Idea, of freedom and is a positive good, while the censor is a form of unfreedom . . . a mere negative nature" (138). The censored press is a bad press so long as it cannot be demonstrated that censorship is part of the essence of the freedom of the press (144). The argument that men are weak and might fall prey to the demagoguery of an untrammelled press is based on an unproved assumption, and would include among the weak the censors themselves (142). "The true censor," says Marx, "the one which is grounded in the essence of the freedom of the press itself, is the *critique*; it is the court which is created by the freedom of the press itself" (144).

Marx favors the institution of press laws, arguing on the Hegelian grounds that laws are the protection of true freedom. "The press law is a true law because it is the positive form of freedom. It regards freedom as the normal condition of the press . . . and first enters into conflict with the errors of the press as an exception which contradicts its own rules and therefore eliminates itself [*sich aufhebt*]" (148). It is the essence of the press to be free and critical. If the press violates its own canons, then the press law should enter and correct the error. There is no such thing as a "preventive law," notes Marx; the term itself is a contradiction (149). Laws are made for freedom, in terms of the positive; their function is to permit the free exercise of freedom, not to restrain it. Censorship is a "preventive law," and as such it is not rational.

Marx's argument must be understood dialectically. He is not saying that the regime as presently constituted should or could promulgate press laws rather than engage in censorship. As in the article on the divorce law, his argument is predicated on the assumption that "in order to defend the freedom of one sphere, and even to understand this sphere, I must grasp it in its essential character and not in external relations" (164). The freedom of the press must be defended as freedom in a society which has be-

come philosophical, which exists in a rational manner. Only therein can the essence of the free press be understood, without the danger of confusing its essence with its external relations in the not yet fully rational world. The dialectical critique is thus positive as well as negative; not only is it directed against the established order, it is also forward-oriented.

From this dialectical position, Marx attacks the arguments of the representatives of the cities. They viewed the press as a commercial object and argued that its freedom was the same as freedom of commerce. Marx's reply is caustic. The press deals with the truth, and the truth is not for sale. "The writer in no way sees his works as means. They are ends in themselves" (164). This is not simply a romantic notion. In his article on censorship in the *Anekdoten*, Marx had stressed that "truth is universal. It does not belong to me, it belongs to all; it possesses me, I do not possess it."³⁹ To institute censorship, he argued, was against "what is of the highest interest to the citizens, their mind [*Geist*]." ⁴⁰ The writer's works are not means. They are the crystallization of the spirit of a people and not simply the product of some lonely genius. The free press, Marx assumes, is the critical press; it performs a social function, finding the rationality of that which is becoming and criticizing the irrationality of that which is. Its function must be viewed dialectically, as that of a mediator.

Marx returns to the defense of the freedom of the press in reply to an attack on the *Rheinische Zeitung* made by the *Kölnische Zeitung*. He stresses, first of all, that

philosophy asks what is true, not what is accepted as such, what is true for all men, not what is true for individuals. Its metaphysical truths do not recognize the boundaries of political geography; its political truths know only too well where the "boundaries" begin, to confuse the illusory horizon of the particular world and natural world outlooks [besonderen Welt- und Volkanschauung] with the true horizon of the human spirit. (P. 183)

"Philosophy" refers to the post-Hegelian philosophy that Marx himself is attempting to develop. Marx is concerned here with the dialectical philosophy, a philosophy which deals with that which is in terms of its becoming, which recognizes the limitations

of the present order while at first transcending them in thought and then criticizing them in terms of that which they must become, what they should be. Critical philosophy is both positive and negative, Marx recognizes; but he still is unable to present it in its fully mediated form, though he knows that this can be done.

At first, Marx continues, philosophy does not think that journalism is its proper task. Journalism, after all, is a worldly action, while philosophy is concerned with absolutes. Yet philosophy finds itself drawn into the struggle. "The yelling of its enemies has for philosophy the same meaning as the first cry of a child for the anxious waiting ear of its mother" (188-89). The reason that philosophy finds itself drawn into the world is expressed in these famous lines:

But philosophers do not grow like mushrooms out of the earth; they are the fruit of their time, of their people, whose most subtle, costly and invisible sap circulates in philosophical ideas. The same spirit that builds railroads with the hands of the workers builds philosophical systems in the brain of the philosophers. Philosophy does not stand outside the world any more than man's brain is outside him because it is not in his stomach; but philosophy, to be sure, is in the world with its brain before it stands on the earth with its feet. . . .

Because every true philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its time, the time must come when philosophy comes into contact and interaction with the actual world of its time, not just internally, in terms of its content, but externally, in terms of its appearance [in that world]. Then philosophy ceases to be a determined system opposed to another determined system; it becomes the philosophy in general opposed to the world; it becomes the philosophy of the present world. . . . philosophy becomes worldly and the world becomes philosophical. (P. 188)

The "spirit which builds railroads [and] philosophical systems" is not a conservative spirit which remains ever the same; it is forward moving, pushing the present to the limit of its possibilities. Philosophy expresses the development of the spirit of an age, growing with it to the limits of its possibilities. When philosophy has reached completion, Marx is asserting, it is no longer the expression of the world within which it was formed; it becomes op-

posed to the world as another aspect of that world, acting on it. It demands that the world move forward to the full development of its possibilities and, since it itself, as a complete rational system, is part of the world, the world must therefore strive to attain the perfection of philosophy. In this way, Marx is replacing the "psychological law" of which he spoke during the dissertation period by an argument in terms of philosophy's relation to its Other; philosophy's relation to the world demands that the world become philosophical and that philosophy become worldly.⁴¹

The *Kölnische Zeitung* pointed to what it saw as an anti-Christian attitude on the part of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, and argued that while scientific inquiry should be permitted, it should not conflict with the established religion, which is the foundation of the state. The attack continued by arguing that the ancient world was doomed once scientific inquiry revealed the errors of the ancient religions. But, replies Marx, "it was not the decline of the ancient religions which brought the collapse of the ancient states but the decline of the ancient states brought the collapse of the ancient religions" (180). The ancient religions are the spiritual manifestations, the philosophies of their times, and their decline reflects a corresponding change in the societies which gave birth to them. It is foolish to hope to preserve a religious or philosophical belief that no longer corresponds to the epoch which fostered its existence, just as it is foolish to blame the free press—or some conspiratorial group—for a peoples' revolution.

The *Kölnische Zeitung* argued that religious questions should not be discussed in newspapers, and especially that they should not be discussed politically. Marx replies that when religious questions become political questions, it is the duty of a newspaper to take them seriously, lest they be treated as affairs of passion alone. Further, religion itself cannot be a party to political disputes, as the editor of the *Kölnische Zeitung* seems to think, for did not Jesus say that one should "render unto Caesar. . . ." Thus,

either the Christian state corresponds to the concept of the state as the actualization of rational freedom, and then nothing else can be demanded for it to be a Christian state than that it be rational; then it is sufficient to show the development of the state from

the rationality of human relations, a task which philosophy accomplishes. Or the state which is the incarnation of rational freedom cannot be developed out of Christianity; then you yourselves will admit that this development does not lie in the tendency of Christianity, since Christianity does not wish a bad state, and a state which is not the actualization of rational freedom is a bad state. (P. 195)

Marx thus turns the tables on his pious opponent, using the same style of argument which he had used in the *Anekdotia*. It is significant that Marx speaks here, as throughout, of "rational freedom" and not of "human freedom." The two freedoms are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary.⁴² Marx, however, is making the demand that the world become philosophical and that philosophy become worldly, the position on which his dialectic is based.

Marx insists that political questions must be openly discussed and analyzed, in accord with the canons of reason. When the *Rheinische Zeitung* came under attack because of a series of anonymous articles concerning the conditions of the peasants in the Moselle river valley, Marx once again defended the duty of the free press to discuss political questions. He argues that a "free press is a necessity because of the peculiarity of the emergency on the Moselle."⁴³ There are two sides to the conflict: the state and the private persons. The interaction of those two sides is at the roots of the conflict. The role of the free press (and a fortiori of philosophy) is to *mediate* between these two sides, to relate the particular interests to the universal interest. The free press, says Marx, has "a political head and a civic heart."⁴⁴ Censorship can only come from the side of the state, and would thus make true mediation impossible. The only censorship which the free press can accept is that of the critique. In this way, Marx thinks, the requirement that the laws be "the conscious expression of the will of the people, created by and through it," can be met.

The First Political Stance

In reply to an attack by *Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung*, Marx found himself forced to take a position on the new ideology called

communism. The *Rheinische Zeitung* was accused of spreading the communist ideas of persons like Fourier and Wilhelm Weitling, one of whose articles it had reprinted. Marx used this occasion to emphasize his view of the role of the press. He replies that the *Rheinische Zeitung* is not a communist paper, but, on the other hand, that it is important to bring to the attention of the public this phenomenon which is of "European significance."⁴⁵ The Augsburg paper is doing itself and its readers an injustice if it persists in ignoring this new ideology; more, it is treating the German people as children who need the fatherly protection of the "knowledgeable." The facts about which the communists speak—poverty, the housing question, industrial crises—are real, omnipresent facts. However, Marx "cannot concede even theoretical reality to communist ideas in their present form, and thus even less wish for or consider possible their practical realization."⁴⁶ These ideas must be submitted to a "fundamental critique," which Marx proposes to undertake, beginning with the works of "Leroux, Considérant and above all the penetrating work of Proudhon."⁴⁷ Communist practice, concludes Marx significantly, is not dangerous for the state: it can be answered "with guns"; but communist ideas are more dangerous: "they are the demons which man can vanquish only by submitting to them."⁴⁸ Marx is still an "idealist," believing in the importance of the critique in effecting political change.

The most significant of the political articles which Marx wrote for the *Rheinische Zeitung* is his analysis of the Landtag debates concerning a proposed law against the theft of wood. In this article, it is possible to find presaging signs of the future Marx. Auguste Cornu, for example, sees in the "warm tone" of the defense of the poor a sign that Marx has taken sides in the class war.⁴⁹ While Marx clearly does side with the poor, it is more important here to follow the development of his arguments. Marx's political stands were always the result of a clearly developed philosophical position which must be understood in order to grasp the politics.

Marx has the double goal of showing the injustice of the wood theft law, and of demonstrating that the Landtag ignores the "first principles of lawmaking." The latter criticism, based on the princi-

ple of autonomy as opposed to heteronomy, is similar to the attack on the government's proposed divorce law and the rejection of censorship. The wood theft law is a preventive law, not a law designed to enlarge the sphere of freedom. Marx had already shown that a preventive law is a contradiction in terms. To that argument, Marx makes the rhetorical addition here that "if each violation of private property, without differentiation and without closer precision, is theft, then is not all private property theft? In having private property do I not prevent anyone else from having this property? Do I not violate his property right?" (213). Marx is not yet attacking private property as such. He only wants to show the absurdity to which a preventive law must lead if its logic is followed to the ultimate consequences. The argument should be seen as a *reductio ad absurdum*.

Marx defends the right of the poor to gather loose wood as a traditional right whose origins go far back into Germany's Teutonic past. These traditional rights are not laws, for laws are forms of freedom whereas the customary rights were born in a society of inequality and are a response to that inequality. The customary rights are survival rights, the rights of animals; their origin lies in a feudally ordered society which itself is an "animal kingdom" where men relate to each other as if they belong each to a kind of natural species—the nobility, the serfdom, etc.⁵⁰ Traditional right "is only rational when right exists alongside and outside of the law, where the tradition is the anticipation of a legal right" (217). The traditional rights of the poor may become laws if their rationality is shown to develop in the historical evolution of society.

It is not a question of giving legal status to traditional rights, somewhat in the manner of the Historical School. Marx does not say that because the traditional rights are traditional they are deserving of the status of a law. Positive law, like Hugo's "historical" justification, is a product of the Understanding (*Verstand*); it is one-sided, taking things as determined and petrified, ignoring the flowing development implicitly contained in the relation.⁵¹ The needs reflected in the traditional rights of the poor contain a demand for the rational freedom provided by true laws. There lives in these traditions of the poor class an instinctual sense of right; its root is positive and legitimate, and the form of the tra-

ditional rights is here even more natural in that the existence of the poor class itself has hitherto been a mere tradition of civil society which has not yet found an appropriate place in the conscious division of the state" (221).

Marx is not taking a "natural law" position here, as Adams suggests.⁵² As well as being an implicit criticism of Hegel, the last clause cited above points to Marx's use of the dialectic. The "poor class" is a part of society, and if a society is truly rational, all of its members must have a rationally determined role to play. Marx is suggesting that the instinctual traditional rights point to the place which the poor occupy in society; the dialectic demands that what is positively rational in the traditional customs be developed and shown as in fact rational and therefore amenable to being considered a law of freedom.

Marx sees that the historical circumstances of Germany's development, particularly its industrialization, are responsible for the attitude of the legislators. He cites one representative who noted that the old right to gather berries in the fields must be abrogated now that the berries can be sold commercially to Holland. "The nature of the object," comments Marx, "demands a monopoly because the interest of private property has discovered it" (222).

Marx is still not attacking private property as such here; he condemns the "small, wooden, spiritless and self-seeking soul of Interest which sees only one point, the point where it is violated" (223). Laws are being made to protect private interest, not to promote freedom; in so doing, "the Landtag doesn't consider at all the first rules of law-giving" (223). Preventive laws are promulgated to protect private interest whose "sophistical spirit" Marx tries to demystify. His argument is based on the insistence that the law, the incarnation of rational freedom, must be higher than the person who is only an individual and is subject to private caprice (231-32).

The aspect of the proposed law which comes under the heaviest criticism is the surreptitious placing of the state in the service of a private interest, the forest owner. Marx denounces the sophistical argument that the convicted thief should not be made to stay in jail, which supposedly would have bad consequences on his character, but rather should make amends by working for the

forest owner. Always piously couched in terms of "right," this argument is but the voice of self-interest. The "bad consequences" in question are bad for the owner of the forest, who would receive neither a payment for the wood, nor free labor in its place. "Interest doesn't think," comments Marx, "it calculates" (240). The state must represent the universal interest, the interest of the whole of society; a law which makes it the servant of only one part of society debases the state by treating it as a means and not an end. The forest owners demand that the state give up its spiritual domain in order to revenge the loss of [their] wood" (250). But, when the state gives up its "spiritual domain," it is no longer the state as a universal but only another interest group.

The proposed law contains a second ploy which puts the state in the service of private interests. When the wood gatherer is convicted, he usually doesn't have the money to pay his fine. The Landtag therefore proposed that in this circumstance a second, civil, suit should be filed and that the wood gatherer be forced to pay his fine by working for the forest owner. Thus, comments Marx sarcastically, having your wood gathered by the poor is a way of receiving an additional rent. The forest owner receives not only the amount of the fine, continues Marx; he also receives a "surplus-value," the labor of the convicted wood gatherer⁵³ (242). More important, this provision of the law contradicts the nature of punishment and that of the state. Marx agrees with the Hegelian theory that punishment is retributive, the "reestablishment of right," and not simply a replacement of values (242-43). "The public punishment is the settlement of the crime with the Reason of the state; it is thus a right of the state. But it is a right of the state which it can so little cede to private persons as an individual can step into the conscience of another" (244). The state must maintain its status as universal, as the rational which integrates into itself and mediates between the particular interests. The proposed law gives to the wood "the remarkable property that once it is stolen its owner takes on state qualities which he did not have before" (244). The law presents the thief as taking wood from the owner and the owner using the thief to take the state away from itself (245).

Throughout his criticism, Marx defends this Hegelian notion

of the state. His goal is the reconciliation of the universal and the particular, of philosophy and the world. This reconciliation must be achieved in the concrete world and not merely in thought. At this time, Marx conceives of the state as preventing the domination of one or another particular interest, for it is universal, whereas none of the other interests can claim this property.⁵⁴ By insisting that the state retain its universality, and that its laws be rational laws guaranteeing rational freedom, Marx is able to criticize the state when it takes the side of the particular interests; he is also able to criticize proposed legislation which would aid one or another particular interest. Marx's critique is based on the "critical moment" where the principle of the state as universal and rational is contradicted by the law which upholds a particular interest. This critical moment occurs in a society making the transition from feudalism to capitalism. The particular interests must give way before the universal interest, that of the state. Thus,

the state can and must say: I guarantee the right against all accidents. Right alone is immortal in me, and therefore I prove to you the mortality of the crime in that I annul it. But the state can and may not say: a private interest, a given existence of property, a hut in the woods, a tree, a splinter of wood—and against the state the greatest tree is scarcely a splinter of wood—is guaranteed against all accidents, is immortal. (P. 249)

The critique is thus used to negate irrational aspects of the phenomenal world whose negation is seen as a step toward the institution of a positive, rational order. Marx's use of the Hegelianized notion of the state thus plays both a negative and a positive role. But again Marx still has no mediation, and his view of the state serves only as a paradigm, an ethical ideal.

Yet Marx recognizes that even if the state plays its universal role, "the form is worth nothing when it is not the form of the content" (254). The "content" of the proposed legislation is prejudiced in favor of private interests. "The Landtag has thus completely fulfilled its function [*Bestimmung*]. It has represented a determined particular interest, as it was called on to do, and treated it as the ultimate goal" (255). The Landtag has not played the role that the Hegelian schema assigned it; it has represented

the particular and not the universal. "This depraved materialism, this sin against the holy spirit of peoples and of humanity is an immediate consequence of the doctrine which the *Preussische Staatszeitung* [the official Prussian government newspaper] preaches to the legislators, to think only of wood and forest when considering a wood law, and not to resolve the individual material tasks politically, that is, not in relation to the entire rationality of the state and its ethics" (256). The legislators, in other words, ignore the human relations which compose the object of their legislation, treating that object as a givenness to be analyzed by the Understanding and not by (dialectical) Reason, which could deal with the political content of the material forms.

The critique of the actions of the Landtag thus sows the seeds of doubt in Marx's mind concerning the Hegelian notion of the state which he was using as a paradigm to attack the proposed legislation of the Landtag. While he does not doubt Hegel's goal, the reconciliation of the particular and the universal interest, the Hegelian realization is put into question. In the citation with which the last paragraph ended, Marx remarks that for the legislators the wood and the forest become subjects and man becomes an object of the action. As Karl Löwith notes, this is Marx's first application of the Feuerbachian criticism of Hegel, that Hegel reverses subject and attribute, making the Absolute Spirit into the subject when it is in fact but an attribute.⁵⁵ Marx remarks too that the Landtag fetishizes the wood in the same way that the Cuban natives accused the Spanish Conquistadores of fetishizing gold (256). This remark, as will be seen, is indicative of a major development in the Marxian theory.

After his resignation from the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx began work on a critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state, attempting to systematize the seeds of doubt which his practical experiences had sown concerning the Hegelian system. In that uncompleted essay Marx lays the groundwork for his final resolution of the theory-praxis problem; in it he lays the foundations of a critical philosophy which will enable him to discover the objective mediations needed to escape the idealism of the earlier Young Hegelian critique.



CRITIQUE OF HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE THE FIRST POSITIVE STEPS

Feuerbach's Influence

Marx's journalistic work convinced him that the Prussian state by no means corresponded to the state whose philosophical justification Hegel had presented in the *Philosophy of Right*. He discovered several "critical moments" where the theoretical system and the actual social relations clashed and contradicted one another. The state, which was theoretically universal and above all private interests, was in fact the tool of private interests. The government did not act as an impartial mediator but allied with the Church and with private interests. Censorship prevented the press from playing its mediating role between the state and the people. It is understandable, therefore, that on retiring from the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx's first theoretical effort was a critique of the Hegelian philosophy of the state.

Marx's critique was not published during his lifetime. He refers to it in the afterword to the second edition of *Capital*, when he says that he had already criticized the "mystifying side of the Hegelian dialectic" thirty years previously. In fact, however, his critique of the Hegelian "mystification" was not completed. In

the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," Marx promises a further development of "the necessary shift from the empirical to the speculative and from the speculative to the empirical" (306).¹ Later, speaking of the "fundamental dualism" of Hegel's *Logic*, he indicates that "the further exposition of this point belongs to the critique of Hegel's *Logic*" (373). At the point where the manuscript breaks off, the next page of Marx's notebook is empty save for the heading: "Table of Contents," and a first entry, "On Hegel's Transition and Explication" (426). It will be necessary, therefore, to follow in detail Marx's critique of Hegel in order to make explicit the methodological principles on which he is operating.²

Marx's analysis is strongly influenced by the Feuerbachian "invertive method" [*Umkehrungsmethode*]. This method was first explicitly presented in Feuerbach's *Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*, which appeared in the same volume of Ruge's *Anekdoten* as Marx's essay, "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss and Feuerbach." Feuerbach presents his method as follows:

*The method of the reformatory critique of speculative philosophy in general is not different from the method already applied to the philosophy of religion. We have only to always make the predicate into the subject, and thus as subject to object and principle—i.e., only to invert the speculative philosophy, and thus we have the undisguised, the pure blank truth.*³

Feuerbach treats Hegel's philosophy as "theology made into logic."⁴ He insists that to be true, metaphysics or logic must "not be separated from the so-called subjective spirit."⁵ that is, from "consciousness." "The task of the true philosophy," writes Feuerbach, "is not to recognize the infinite as the finite but the finite as the not finite, as the infinite; or, not to posit the finite in the infinite but the infinite in the finite."⁶ Feuerbach stresses the need for philosophy to begin from the "nonphilosophical,"⁷ the empirical. "The infinite is the true essence of the finite—the true finite. The true speculation or philosophy is nothing other than the true and universal empirical."⁸ Because he does not see this, Hegel is accused of "mystification."⁹

Feuerbach's "new philosophy" was to be an anthropology in

which man's finitude is treated as infinite. He demanded a philosophy of immediacy, a "sensualism."¹⁰ Human consciousness was taken to be the "real unity of spirit and nature,"¹¹ while nature was taken to be the true essence of all being.¹² The problem with this anthropology of immediacy is precisely its immediacy, its lack of a mediated development whereby thought and being, truth and reality, etc. are united. The problem is clear in Feuerbach's *Fundamental Theses of the Philosophy of the Future*, written a year later:

True and godly is only that which needs no proof, which is immediately known through itself . . . the absolutely determined [Entschiedene], absolutely undoubtable, the sun-clear. But only the sensible is sun-clear; only where sensibility begins does doubt and conflict end. The secret of immediate knowledge is sensibility.

Everything is mediated, says the Hegelian philosophy. But something is true only when it is no longer something mediated, but immediate.¹³

From this theoretical option for immediacy, Feuerbach builds the philosophy of love based on the immediacy of the 'I-Thou' relation which was to exert a powerful influence on thinkers like Hess, Karl Grün, and the "True Socialists."

The Feuerbachian position "solves" the post-Hegelian problem by an *option*, an act of will which decides simply to reject philosophy as a theoretical problem. This represents a defeat for the man who, in 1828, sent to Hegel his dissertation, and wrote in a manner reminiscent of the young Marx of the "realization and making-worldly of the Idea," of a "new ground of things, a new history, a second Creation in which . . . Reason will be the universally perceived form of things" which "must now finally be put into effect as well."¹⁴ Rejecting the notion of a mediated, dialectical development, Feuerbach chooses simply to rebaptize the finite as the infinite, the worldly as the philosophical. In so doing, he falls into the contemplative, nonpraxical attitude which is more a reflection of reified society than its overcoming, and for which Marx takes him to task in the 1845 *Theses on Feuerbach*.

Nonetheless, at the time of their publication, Feuerbach's works had a powerful influence on Marx, though he never accepted

Feuerbach's refusal of mediation, and insisted on developing his own dialectical position. Shortly after reading the *Provisional Theses*, Marx wrote to Ruge that "Feuerbach's aphorisms are not to my liking in one point, that he concerns himself too much with nature and too little with politics. But that [i.e., politics] is the only alliance through which contemporary philosophy can become truth."¹⁵ Feuerbach's stress on the "nonphilosophical," on nature and the empirical, on "real man," remains—paradoxically—idealistic, substituting an intuitive contemplation for the Hegelian speculative "mystification." Consequently, it was necessary for Marx to use Feuerbach for his own purposes, to show how the post-Hegelian problem of making philosophy worldly and the world philosophical can be solved.

Critique of the State in General.

The methodological misdeeds with which Marx charges Hegel are: mysticism, dualism, formalism, panlogicism, romanticism, allegorism, idealism of the state, existentialism, and noncritical philosophizing. Stripped of their rhetoric, there are two objections to Hegel's methodology: inversion of subject and object (or predicate), and uncritical logical mediation. The former objection originated with Feuerbach; the latter is Marx's own discovery, and that which differentiates most clearly his position from that of Feuerbach.

Hegel's philosophy has an esoteric and exoteric side, Marx notes. The former is the attempt to show in the logical structure of the state "the history of the logical concept" (263). The latter concerns the content, the functions and powers of the state. As opposed to Hegel's conceptual idealism which makes the Idea or Spirit the motor, Marx argues that the real development takes place on the exoteric side: "Family and civil society make *themselves* into the state. They are the driving forces. According to Hegel, on the other hand, they are *acted upon* by the actual Idea. . . . They owe their being to an other spirit than their own; they are determinations posited by a third factor and not self-determinations; hence, they are determined as *finitude*, as the proper finitude of the 'actual Idea'" (263). Marx's dialectical

position demands that in the state family and civil society become what they should be, the universal. Due to Hegel's inversion of subject and object, "the condition becomes the conditioned, the determining becomes the determined, and the producer is posited as the product of his product" (263).

Hegel's concern is with the esoteric side of his philosophy. He explains that the abstractly universal state posits itself in finite form as family and civil society so that, through the mediation of these existent finite forms it can return to itself as a fully mediated concrete universal. "At this point," says Marx, "the logical, pantheistic mysticism appears very clearly (262). The state, the incarnation of the Idea, is made the actor, while the concrete reality of the family and civil society is acted upon. "Reality is expressed not as itself but as another reality. The everyday empirical world no longer has its own but a foreign spirit as its law and, on the other hand, the actual [*wirkliche*] Idea does not have as its being a reality [*Wirklichkeit*] which is developed out of itself, but rather has as its being the everyday empirical world" (262). That is, continues Marx:

*The Idea is subjectivized, and the actual [*wirkliche*] relation of the family and civil society to the state is understood as its inner, imaginary activity. Family and civil society are the presuppositions of the state. It is they which are in fact active. But, in the speculation the relation is reversed. But, if the Idea is subjectivized, then here the actual subjects—civil society, family, "circumstances and caprice, etc." [as Hegel puts it]—become unreal [*unwirklichen*] objective moments of the Idea, having another significance. (P. 262)*

Hegel tries to impose the categories of his *Logic* on the real world, just as Marx had tried, in his legal treatise, to impose legal categories on Roman law. In this attempt, both the categories and the actual relations are violated, Marx is arguing, for when philosophy enters the world it loses its inner unity and must recover it dialectically in interaction with the world.

Hegel's esoteric concern leads him into a second problem. When the empirical facts are treated as predicates of the Idea, Marx argues, they lose their significance as empirical. Hegel had used

these empirical facts to mediate the development through the finite forms of family and civil society to the state. With the loss of their actual signification, the mediation which they achieve becomes a mediation in appearance only. It appears "that they are left as they are, while at the same time they contain the signification of a determination of the Idea, of a result, of a product of the Idea. The difference is not in the content, but in the way in which they are regarded—or in the mode of expression [*Sprechweise*]" (262–63). Hegel's system is thus a dualism, or, as Marx puts it later, it has a "janus-head" quality (372). On the one hand, empirical facts are treated simply as what they are in the phenomenal world, while on the other hand, they are also taken as rational mediations between the finite forms in which the Idea is said to posit itself. Thus,

empirical reality is taken up as it is; it is also expressed as rational, but it is not rational because of its own rationality but because the empirical fact in its empirical existence has another significance than its self. The fact from which we begin is not understood as such but as a mystical result. The real becomes a phenomenon, but the Idea has no other content than this phenomenon. . . . In this paragraph [i.e., paragraph 262] the whole mystery of the Philosophy of Right is laid down, and that of the Hegelian philosophy in general. (Pp. 264–65)

The inversion of subject and object gives the appearance of a real development to what is in fact a mystification. Even this mystification, Marx continues, is false because of the dual significance given to the empirical facts, making them at one time predicates of the Idea, and at another what they really are, depending on which aspect is needed for the formal mediation.

On the basis of Hegel's methodological errors, Marx undertakes a detailed refutation. In addition, he proposes an alternative model to the Hegelian state. For Marx, "the fact is that the state comes forth from the masses as they exist as parts of the family and of civil society. Speculation expresses this fact as an act of the Idea; not as the Idea of the masses, but as the act of a subjective Idea set apart from the fact itself" (264). It is the masses who are the active force which creates the state, and only in this way can the

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state be defetishized, understood as the product and the producer of individual human relations.¹⁶

Marx's refutation follows Hegel's text, copying each paragraph and subjecting it to criticism. He begins with Hegel's Paragraph 261,¹⁷ in which the state is said to be related to the spheres of family and civil society as both "external necessity" and as "immanent goal." This relation is antinomical; it shows a tension which runs throughout Hegel's theory. Any unity developed on the basis of this antinomical relation can only be an "external, forced identity in appearance only" (280). That is, Hegel's mediation

is not made in terms of the particular essence of the family, etc. and from the particular essence of the state, but from the general relation of necessity and freedom. It is exactly the same transition which is operated in the Logic from the sphere of essence into the sphere of the concept. The same transition is made in the Philosophy of Nature from inorganic nature into life. It is always the same categories which are given now as the soul of this, now for that sphere. (Pp. 265-66)

Hegel's construction is artificial because it treats the Idea as subject and the concrete reality as mere predicate. This formal development gives the appearance of a mediated advance when, in fact, the true subject does not itself allow for such mediation. By making empirical reality, the true subject, into a predicate of the Idea, it is possible to adduce mediations which have already been accounted for in the *Logic*.

Hegel considers the state as an organism whose various powers are related to each other and to the state as the parts of an organism relate to the whole. The whole, the state, determines the parts. This is a "great advance," avoiding the pitfall of mechanistic relation of separate entities, as in the theory of the division of powers, which is syncretic and not synthetic. Marx does not, however, approve of the way in which Hegel defends his position: once again, subject and object are inverted. The organism is not the subject, and the various powers are not its predicates. The organic unity must be developed out of the different powers in terms of their own essences. In the Hegelian development, there

is no *differentia specifica*; the organism in question could just as well be an animal organism as a political one.¹⁸ Hegel presents the parts of the state as predicates of the Idea which is incarnated in the state, giving no reason why these parts constitute an organic whole. The parts of an animal organism have the same logical relation as have the parts of the state in the Hegelian presentation. Nothing is won by the Hegelian argument—save that Hegel can, once again, “discover” the categories of the *Logic* in the world.

He has made into a product, into a predicate of the Idea, that which is its subject. [For Hegel] it is not a question of developing the determinate Idea of the political constitution; rather, it is a question of giving the political constitution a relation to the abstract Idea, of ranging this constitution as a part of the life-history of the Idea: an obvious mystification. (P. 272)

If the state is an organism, this must be shown in the internal development of the state, and not for external reasons (286). Hegel begins with the organic relation and then tries to show that this relationship in fact obtains. “But there is no bridge through which one can come from the general idea of the organism to the determinate idea of the organism of the state or to the political constitution, and in all eternity no such bridge can be hewn” (271). Hegel’s mediations, the different powers of the constitution, are taken up not in terms of their own essences, but as predicates of the concept. As Marx puts it, they are “predestined.” Whatever necessity appears is only external, formal necessity.

Marx insists that the state-organism be the result of and ruled by “conscious reason.” He is not rejecting Hegel’s idealism, for he too talks of the state as the “spirit which knows and wills itself,” and as the “goal” of the development of the spirit. Marx opposes the formalism which treats the actual determinations, the concrete content, as “logical-metaphysical determinations,” and which seeks to reproduce the *Logic* in a concrete domain (276). With Hegel, “the philosophical moment is not the logic of the thing [*Sache*] but the thing of the logic. The logic does not serve to prove the state; rather the state serves as proof of the logic” (276). Thus, the whole *Philosophy of Right* seems to be “only a parenthesis of the *Logic*” (277).

Marx cannot accept the Hegelian position, for his interest is in the philosophical development of the world:

The true starting point, the spirit which knows and wills itself, without which the "goals of the state" and the "powers of the state" would be unsupported fictions having no essence and thus unable to exist, appears only as the final predicate of the substantiality which has been previously determined as the universal goal and as the different powers of the state. If one had begun from the actual spirit, then the "universal goal" would be its content, and the different powers its manner of realizing itself, its real [reelles] or material being, whose determination would be developed out of the nature of its goal. But because the beginning is made from the "Idea" or "substance," treated as the subject, as the actual essence, the actual subject appears only as the final predicate of the abstract predicate.

The "goals of the state" and the "powers of the state" are mystified in that they are presented as "modes of being" of the "substance," and appear as separated from their actual being, from the "self-knowing and self-willing spirit, the developed [gebildeten] spirit." (Pp. 275-76)

The same is true of the way Hegel determines the constitution. Here, too, Marx finds that "instead of the concept of the constitution we receive the constitution of the concept [*Verfassung des Begriffs*]" (278). Subject and object, form and content, are manipulated into a schema whose validity is presupposed, since Hegel had shown it in the *Logic*. To this, Marx opposes his dialectic which deals with the development of the "actual spirit."

It would be incorrect to assume that Hegel's theory of the state remains aloof from the empirical facts. Marx admits, for example, that Hegel's discussion of the powers of the ministers of state is "wholly empirical" (301). But he is not satisfied by this sort of empiricism. "Hegel's proof is telling if one begins from the constitutional presuppositions. But Hegel has not proved these presuppositions simply by analyzing them as they fundamentally present themselves [*in ihrer Grundvorstellung*]. In this mix-up lies the whole uncritical nature [*Unkritik*] of the Hegelian *Philosophy of Right*" (302). Marx demands that the empirical data be re-

spected and that they be treated dialectically, not merely as predicates of the Idea.

Empirical detail is of no help because Hegel begins from a faulty premise.

Had Hegel begun from the actual subjects as the base of the state, then it would not have been necessary to let the state subjectivize itself in a mystical manner. "Subjectivity," says Hegel, "is in its truth only as subject, personality only as person." This too is a mystification. Subjectivity is a determination of the subject, and personality that of a person. Instead of taking these now as predicates of their subjects, Hegel makes the predicates independent and afterward lets them change themselves in a mysterious way into their subjects. (P. 264)

By splitting subject and predicate and treating the latter as independent, Hegel falls into a dualism. He regards "the universal not as the actual essence of the finite actuality [*Wirklich-Endlichen*], that is, of the existing determinate object . . ."; he does not take the actual *Ens* as the true subject of the infinite (284). This error is clear in Hegel's theory of sovereignty which, as the essence of the state, must be from the first an independent essence. This independent essence is then treated as subject, and as a subject it appears as self-creating sovereignty—the monarch. In one moment the monarch is subject, in another he is a predicate of the Idea. In each moment he is given different determinations. This is Hegel's dualism; its roots are in the subject-object inversion.

Monarchy or Democracy?

The Hegelian state is a constitutional monarchy. Hegel's presentation of the function of the monarch is vitiated, however, by the dualism which Marx has stressed:

Hegel makes all of the attributes of the constitutional monarchs of modern Europe into the absolute self-determination of the will. He does not say: the will of the monarch is the final decision, but rather: the final decision of the will is—the monarch. The first proposition is empirical; the second turns the empirical fact into a metaphysical axiom.¹⁹ (P. 287)

The monarch is necessary for Hegel because the Idea must incarnate itself in an independent subject. In this way, the state enters into a mediated relationship with the Idea, taking on the determination of concrete universality. However, when he has to define the nature and functions of the monarchy, Hegel falls back on empirical description. The monarch qua monarch is real only when he makes decisions. But, says Marx, this means that the decisions of the monarch are the result not of the absolute will but rather of the empirically existing monarch. The decisions of the monarch are therefore not the self-determination of the absolutely free will, as Hegel tries to show by treating the monarch as a predicate of the Idea; they are the result of individual will, and in the last analysis, of caprice.

To prove the "majesty" of the constitutional monarch, Hegel argues for a hereditary monarchy. The monarch is born a monarch; he is "a determination of the self-conscious will." "It makes a deep mystical impression," says Marx, "to see a particular empirical being posited by the Idea" (306). But the mystery is only a misunderstanding. To say that the majesty of the monarch resides in his body, scoffs Marx, is to put him in the same class as a cow.²⁰ Once again, Hegel has not provided a *differentia specifica*; he has not shown the majesty of the monarch to be a mediated, rational development, but has resorted to a magical *coup de théâtre* of the Idea. The monarch is given no other empirical determinations than the possibility of saying "I will . . ." and of dotting the *i*'s. These are indeed "very abstract, very poor empirical grounds" (302).

When he tries to parry the argument that the monarch might be subject to individual caprice, Hegel stresses the objectivity of the state and points to the fact that the state functions, though assumed by individuals, are not the property of those individuals. In so doing, comments Marx,

he forgets that the particular individuality and the occupations and activities of the state are human functions; he forgets that the essence of the "particular personality" is not its beard, its blood, its abstract Physis, but its social quality, and that the occupations of the state, etc. are nothing but modes of being and activity of the social qualities of man. (P. 281)

The individual is not a predicate of the Idea: he is an active subject who enters into social relations and is determined by those relations just as he determines them. As opposed to Hegel's formalism, Marx argues that "if the monarch is sovereign insofar as he represents the unity of the people, then he himself is only a representative, a symbol of the sovereignty of the people. The sovereignty of the people exists not through him but vice-versa, he exists through it" (290). Hegel contended that the state must be a constitutional monarchy in order that the personality of the state exist in the phenomenal world. Marx replies that "personality is, to be sure, only an abstraction without the person; but the person is only the actual Idea of personality in his generic being, as many persons [*als die Personen*]" (289). Hegel is correct in demanding that the sovereignty of the state be incarnated; but his formalist treatment of the individual as a predicate of the Idea leads him astray.

Marx's argument for a democratic state is based on a dialectical notion of individuality. It is "the persons who compose the state," not the abstract Idea incarnated in one individual (288). Without the many individuals, the monarch has no reality. Hegel's argument is that because subjectivity is existent, real, only as subject, and that the subject is existent only as One, therefore the personality of the state is actual only as a person. "A lovely syllogism," says Marx. "Hegel could just as well have concluded: because the individual man is One, the human genus is only an individual man" (289). For Marx, the individual alone, in abstraction, does not exist; the individual person is always the "many persons," a generic being.²¹

"The state," asserts Marx, "is an abstraction. The people alone is the concrete" (290). There are not two sovereignties, that of the monarch and that of the people. "Sovereignty of the monarch or of the people: *Das ist die question.*' It is like the question, Is God the sovereign, or is man the sovereign? One of them is an untruth, even though it may be an existent untruth" (291). Marx's argument is similar to the one he (and Hegel) used against the government's proposed divorce law. The real is not necessarily rational, but in order to be truly rational, the rational must be real. The only way in which the rational state can be achieved is through a development from the bottom up; the social individuals who

compose the state must give the state its rationality, for surely the state cannot lend its rationality to them, nor can it be rational without them.

The following paragraphs illustrate Marx's view of the relation between the monarchical and democratic state:

Democracy is the truth of monarchy; monarchy is not the truth of democracy. . . . Democracy can be understood in terms of itself [aus sich selbst begriffen werden], but monarchy cannot. In democracy none of the moments receives another signification than the one which is proper to it. Each moment is only a moment of the whole Demos. . . . Democracy is the genus of constitutions [Verfassungsgattung]. Monarchy is but a species, and moreover, an inferior species. Democracy is content and form. Monarchy should be only form, but it falsifies the content.

In the monarchy the whole, the people, is subsumed under one of its modes of being, the political constitution. In democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determination, and, moreover, as the self-determination of the people. In the monarchy we have the people of the constitution; in democracy, the constitution of the people. Democracy is the solved riddle of all constitutions. Here the constitution is not only in itself, essentially, continually referred back to its actual foundation, but rather according to its existence, its actuality, it is continually referred back to its actual foundation, actual men, the actual people, and is posited as the work of the people itself. . . . The specific differentiation of democracy is that here the constitution in general is only one moment of the being of the people, that the political constitution for itself does not form the state. (Pp. 292-93)

The stress here on actuality, on "actual men" and the "actual people," should not be taken to mean that Marx has given up the conceptual framework of philosophy and turned to a nominalistic anthropologism which takes isolated, individual man as the source of social institutions but which, because of its too strong insistence on the individuality and irreducibility of man, cannot develop any higher social unities than a nominalist free association. The burden of Marx's argument lies with his insistence on a concrete subject,

and his refusal of the Hegelian argument in terms of the self-determination of the Idea, posited as the Will which incarnates itself in the world. In the same way that Hegel's Will, at the beginning of the *Philosophy of Right*, has the character of a *rational* will, and hence develops itself in accord with the tenants of rationality, Marx employs the dialectic, saying that inasmuch as philosophy has become worldly the individual determines himself self-consciously in terms of rationality. Thus, the passages cited above continue:

Just as it is man who creates religion and not religion which creates man, so it is the people who create the constitution and not the constitution which creates the people. In a certain sense, democracy is related to all other forms of the state in the same way as Christianity is related to all other forms of religion. Christianity is religion κατ' ἐξοχήν, the essence of religion; it is deified man as a particular religion. In the same way, democracy is the essence of all state constitutions. Democracy is related to all other constitutions as a genus is related to its species. Only, in democracy, the genus itself is existent as a particular species, distinct from those existences which do not correspond to the essence. Democracy is the Old Testament of all other forms of state. Man does not exist for the law, but the law exists for man. In democracy there is human existence, while in the other forms of state man is juridical existence [gesetzliches Dasein]. This is the basic uniqueness of democracy. (P. 293)

Democracy is not a fixed, reified form imposed on the individual citizens. In fact, as will be seen, it is only by analogy that democracy can be considered to be a form of the state at all. Because it is lived by the citizens, Marx is arguing, democracy is not form, but content.

The democratic state achieves the unity of the formal and the material principle, the unity of the universal and the particular. Whereas Hegel could come to this unity only through the mediation of the monarch, Marx argues that not only is Hegel wrong, but he falsifies the content of the other moments of the state, the individual citizens and their life in civil society.²² These other moments must be actual moments; and they must be rational, for

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were they not, the state, as rational form, would be arbitrarily imposed on them. The arbitrary imposition of a form upon a content which is not adequate to it is condemned both by Hegel²³ and by Marx.

Marx's conception of democracy seems to have been influenced by the study of communism which he had promised his readers in the *Rheinische Zeitung*. He writes:

The modern French have conceived of this in such a way that in true democracy, the political state disappears. This is correct insofar as the political state as such, as constitution, no longer applies to the whole. (P. 294)

Democracy is the abolition of the state as a realm apart. In modern times, says Marx, there occurs a split, a tension between life in civil society and that of the state. The task of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* was to bridge this gap, to resolve the tension. Hegel attempts to keep both poles by mediating between them, preserving them as existent extremes. But, notes Marx, if state and civil society are true extremes, such as, for example, human and inhuman, and not simply opposed determinations of one essence, such as, for example, north and south poles, or man and woman, then no mediation is possible. If Hegel thinks that he can mediate between existent extremes, he is resorting to the mystical sleight of hand which changes existences into essences through recourse to the absolute subject, the Idea (374).

Marx insists on the distinction between the political state and civil society. He applies the Feuerbachian insight that religion is the creation of man, a product of his alienation from his own essence, and the negation of that essence. The state is like a religion; it is the "heaven of man's universality in contrast to the mundane existence of his actuality" (295). Hegel is in a perverse sense correct when he asserts that the political state is the constitution; this is one of Hegel's correct empirical observations, says Marx. The fact that property relations, legal relations, and even the state itself in the United States and in Prussia are quite similar, but that in the United States the *form* of the state is republican while in Prussia it is monarchical shows that the content of the state lies outside of its formal constitution. The material state is not political

(294-95). The political state is an abstraction; Hegel's model is the true description of a false reality.

Hegel does not see the difference between modern and medieval civil society, and the effect of this difference on the nature of the state. "The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to modern times because it is only to these times that the abstraction of private life belongs. The abstraction of the political state is a modern product" (295). Thus,

political life, in the modern sense of the word, is the scholasticism of the people's life. Monarchy is the completed expression of this alienation. The republic is the negation of alienation within its own sphere. It is obvious that a political constitution as such is formed only where the private spheres have achieved independent existence. Where trade and property are unfree and still not independent, the political constitution is also unfree and still not independent. The Middle Ages were the democracy of unfreedom. (P. 295)

In the Middle Ages there was no distinction between civil society and the state because there was no such thing as free trade and freely exchangeable property. In modern times, there has developed a separation between civil society and the state which cannot be bridged as long as the political life of society is imposed upon its private life. This is why even the republic is a "negation of alienation within its own sphere." "In democracy," on the other hand, "the constitution, the law, the state itself, are only a self-determination of the people and a determined content of that people" (294).

Hegel uncritically accepts the modern situation, and adduces formal mediations with the aid of this inversion of subject and predicate and the dualism which follows from it. Marx opposes this to his own method:

If, e.g., in the development of family, civil society, state, etc., these social modes of existence of man were regarded as realizations, objectifications of his essence, then family etc. would appear as qualities that are inherent in a subject. Man always remains the essence of these organizations [Wesen], but these organizations

appear also as his actual universality . . . If, on the other hand, family, civil society, state etc. are determinations of the Idea, . . . then they must have an empirical actuality. . . . It is in fact only a question of allegory, of putting the signification of the actualized Idea into no matter what empirical existent. . . . The universal thus appears throughout as a determined thing, a particular thing; just as the individual nowhere comes to its true universality. (Pp. 306-7)

Marx has to show how the democratic state—the disappearance of the state as an entity external and opposed to civil society—provides the dialectical mediations which bring the individual to its “true universality.” He begins negatively, by showing how Hegel’s formalism masks and mystifies the nature of the administrative branch of the state.

The Bureaucracy and Its Elimination in a Democratic Society

Hegel’s analysis of the nature and role of the executive power, says Marx, is but a “simple description of the empirical situation in some countries” (309). This gives a double actuality to Marx’s critique. Hegel’s system demands that the executive mediate between the opposed poles, state and civil society. But in fact, it is never proven to be more than one of the many functions of civil society. The tension between civil society and the state remains; the only mediation which is presented, argues Marx, comes through the strength of the state which forces the submission of civil society to its drives. The sole philosophical category which Hegel employs in his discussion is that of ‘subsumption,’ continues Marx. “Hegel gives his *Logic* a political body; he does not give the logic of the political body” (316). “What Hegel says about the “executive power’ does not merit the name of a philosophical development. Most of the paragraphs could stand verbatim in the Prussian provincial law code” (313).

Hegel falls victim to his own formalism. The executive is born out of the contradiction between the interests of the state and those of the Corporations.²⁴ But its function is not clear; Hegel himself speaks of the executive power (in his paragraph 288) as a

“mixture” [*Mischung*]. Rather than resolve the opposition, this attempted mediation confirms it (320). More, it does not try to change either the Corporations or the state, but makes a virtue out of necessity. Hegel argues, among other things, that everyone can become an official of the state if he passes the tests; in this way the executive power is said to relate to all the particularized citizens because any one of them can become a part of it. Marx mocks this idea of examinations: it is like the fact that every Catholic can become a priest, but in so doing he splits himself off from worldly life and still finds, in the Pope, a power beyond him of which he is not a part. The individual may become a part of the administration, but this demands that he shed his individuality; even this sacrifice does not make him universal, for he still serves a particular interest, even though that interest, the state, pretends to be universal. “The identity which [Hegel] has constituted between civil society and the state is like the identity of two enemy armies, where every soldier has the ‘possibility’ of becoming a member of the ‘enemy’ army through ‘desertion’ ” (321). The Hegelian formalism neglects the specific nature of the poles between which it tries to mediate.

The image of the relation of state and civil society as two opposing armies, “in all events . . . describes correctly the present empirical situation” (321). The executive power—the bureaucracy—is the representative of the state in its relations with the Corporations. Since the bureaucracy has only formal roots in either of the extremes which it is said to mediate, it becomes possible for “the bureaucracy [to take] itself as the final and ultimate goal of the state” (316). Thus:

Bureaucracy is the imaginary state beside the real one, the spiritualism of the state. Hence everything has a double significance, a real and a bureaucratic significance. . . . Bureaucracy possesses the essence of the state, the spiritual essence of society as its private property. (P. 316)

The bureaucracy is thus similar to the Hegelian philosopher: it inverts subject and object, means and ends, and in so doing it engenders a dualism in which the concrete facts are given a significance which is not their own.

Marx mocks Hegel's formalist attempts to avoid this state of affairs. Hegel argues that because the monarch is the ultimate decision maker, abuse is not possible. Marx answers that this means only that the monarch farms out his powers just as the *ancien régime* passed its powers of taxation to the *Fermiers généraux*. Hegel asserts that the hierarchy will keep the bureaucrats from misusing their powers. To this Marx replies that on the contrary, the hierarchy will protect the sins of its own, punishing them only when they go just a little too far. When Hegel adds that the "greatness of the state" will protect it from misdeeds by its bureaucrats, Marx points to the counterexample of nineteenth-century Russia. Hegel finally suggests that "the man in the bureaucrat protects against the bureaucrat." At this, Marx simply chuckles.

The bureaucracy likes secrets, mysteries, which it guards within itself as a closed corporation. This reflects "through and through a jesuitical, theological spirit. The bureaucrats are the Jesuits and theologians of the state. The bureaucracy is *la république prêtre*" (316). Like the priest—and the Hegelian philosopher—the bureaucrat thinks formally. The truth is taken as pregiven, as the subject whose fixed predicates must be found in the flowing, living social world. Committed to applying passively whatever is taken as true by the state, the bureaucracy can serve any and all masters. "The goals of the state transform themselves into goals of the bureaus, or the goals of the bureaus become goals of the state" (316). The bureaucracy identifies itself with the state, but rather than becoming the "universal class" that Hegel wanted to see, the bureaucracy makes the state into its own private possession. Supposedly mediating between the universal and the particular, the state and the private corporations, the bureaucracy in fact becomes another interest group, alongside and in competition with others: "the interests of the state become a particular goal opposed to the other private goals" (318).²⁵

The roots of the problem lie in the separation of the state from civil society, and in the formal structure of the bureaucracy which is supposed to mediate between them. Within the bureaucracy, "the top entrusts the lower circles with an insight into the individual affairs [*ins Einzelne*], while the lower circles entrust the top with an insight into the universal. Thus, they mutually deceive one another" (316). Because of the merely formal mediation, the

knowledge of the bureaucrat is abstract knowledge; it is knowledge for power, for the manipulation of things. The bureaucrat thinks in terms of reifications; he is separated from the real, fluid life of civil society, and can treat that life only by making it into a thing which fits into his pregiven categories.²⁶ Thus, "the spiritualism [of the bureaucracy] becomes a crass materialism, the materialism of passive obedience, of faith in authority, of the mechanism of a fixed, formal activity, of fixed rules of conduct, views and traditions" (317). Its abstract formalism turns into a crude, "jesuitical" behavior which ultimately treats the *human* relations with which it deals as merely the raw material to be ground up in a legal or administrative gristmill whose validity it never questions. Its supposed impartiality and universality can only result in a preservation of the polar opposites which it is supposed to mediate, providing an intellectual halo for that division. Marx, clearly, will have to show how the bureaucracy can be eliminated.

Marx's solution to the problem of bureaucratic deformation is presaged in his argument for democracy.

The elimination [Aufhebung] of bureaucracy can only take place in that the universal interest actually becomes the particular interest and not, as with Hegel, merely in thought, in abstraction. This is possible only inasmuch as the particular interests become actually the universal [interest]. (P. 318)

In democracy there is no opposition between the state and civil society; every individual is both *homme* and *citoyen*. There is no need for an artificial, formal mediation: actual, empirical man is the resolution of the historically posed antinomy. Marx's position is dialectical, as the stress on the necessity of the actual identification of particularity and universality indicates. The formalism of the bureaucratic attitude which can only deal with reified objects is dependent on the formal separation of the bourgeois state and civil society; with the elimination of the latter, the former must collapse as well.

The Legislature and the Changing Role of Civil Society

In Hegel's theory, the different Estates into which civil society is divided serve as political representatives, mediating from the side

of the people just as the executive power mediates from the side of the monarch. The organicity of the state is guaranteed by the constitution, which is presupposed. This, however, creates a problem, for if the constitution is the supreme principle of the state, then the actions of the legislative power are limited, and it is only a pseudomeditation. Hegel tries to escape this dilemma by asserting that the legislature does change the constitution, but only in its material detail, not essentially. But if the constitution is changed in fact by legislative action, while juridically (and philosophically) it still takes precedence over the legislative power, then Hegel is going against his dictum that for change to be rational it must be conscious change. The problem is that Hegel makes the constitution into the subject, treating the legislature as its predicate, as subordinate to it.

Hegel's starting point precludes any resolution of the dualism between the constitution and the legislature. To the Lockean question: "Have the people the right to give themselves a new constitution?" Marx's answer is unconditionally positive (330). "Whole state constitutions have certainly changed in such a way that by and by new needs arise, that the old falls away, etc.; but for the new constitution a revolution of form [*förmlichen Revolution*] has been needed" (329). Change must be conscious change. For this, it is necessary "that progress be made the principle of the constitution, that in this way the actual bearer of the constitution, the people, be made the principle of the constitution" (329). Marx made a similar statement earlier, remarking that an old constitution, the result of a past self-consciousness of the people, can become a chain on the present. What is needed is a constitution "which has in itself the determination and the principle to step forward with consciousness, to step forward with the actual man — this is first possible when 'man' has become the principle of the constitution" (279). Though Marx does not defend this position here, what he means is clear if one thinks back to his insistence on a democratic state.

Hegel's treatment of the "public affairs" [*allgemeine Angelegenheiten*] of society is vitiated by his idealistic reversal of subject and object. Instead of the real human subject finding his true being in these affairs, Hegel treats them as a subject in need of a predi-

cate in which to incarnate itself. The public affairs already exist in civil society, argues Marx; now Hegel wants to make them a symbol within the state. This is a formalism:

Hegel divides content and form, in-itself and for-itself, and lets the latter step in as an external, formal moment. The content is ready and exists in many forms which are not the forms of this content; on the other hand, it is clear that the form which is said now to be valid as the actual form of the content does not have the actual content as its content. (P. 336)

The content of which Marx is speaking is the public affairs of the state. The form which Hegel gives to this content is that of the Estates. But the Estates of civil society are private; treated as political, their role can only be formal, with the result that "the actual affairs of the people [*Volkssache*] come into being without any action on the part of the people" (336). But this goes against the logical need that "the free be done freely, that freedom not rule as an unconscious natural instinct of the society" (337). Thus, the Estates are "the political illusion of civil society" (337).

Again, Hegel's formalism is nothing but empirical description. "Hegel is not to be blamed because he describes the essence of the modern state as it is; he is to be blamed because he presents that which is as the essence of the state" (338-39). This is Hegel's "unconscious service": to have portrayed the illusory nature of the modern political state (400). The "illusion" that the public affairs are political affairs, formalized in the state, is a formalism which becomes a formality. The affairs of the state become a ceremony; for the people they are "an acknowledgement [*Bestätigung*] of its freedom without being an application [*Betätigung*] of its freedom" (342). A state may be formally adequate to the demands of reason without being adequate to its own content. Marx's claim is that a critical dialectical examination of the content of the state, the public affairs of its citizens, will show that the democratic state is the only way in which form and content can be made adequate to one another.

Marx attacks the uncritical empiricism which enables Hegel "to interpret an old *Weltanschauung* in the sense of a new one . . . wherein the form belies the signification and the signification

belies the form," and neither comes to its truth (365).²⁷ In the Hegelian edifice, the private Estates are given a political significance, while remaining at the same time private Estates. Hegel has in mind, says Marx, the medieval situation in which private and political Estates were one, "because the civil society was the political society, because the organic principle of civil society was the principle of the state" (350). In the Middle Ages, the private Estate was directly political, for there was in fact no private Estate in the modern sense. In modern times, there has come into being a private Estate whose interest in public affairs is limited to a concern with them only as private affairs for private profit. Modern civil society is an atomism in which each individual is concerned only with himself (352). Neither Marx nor Hegel can accept this state of affairs. For both, it is an irrationality. Yet their attempts to avoid it take very different directions.

Marx argues against Hegel that because of the division between civil society and the state, the atomism "returns again in the political state just because it is an abstraction from the family and civil society" (360).²⁸ Hegel's mediated development is an "artifice," a "show" (355). Hegel wants to make the private Estates perform political functions, but in order to do this he has to perform a "complete transubstantiation" on the Estates (357). "Civil society must completely withdraw from itself as civil society, as private Estate, and must make effective [*geltend machen*] a part of its essence which not only has nothing in common with its actual civil existence, but is directly opposed to itself" (357). Hegel is again resorting to a mystical inversion of subject and object, treating civil society first as subject, in order to subsume the particular individuals under it, and then treating it as object, in order to subsume it under the political state. As a consequence, the true citizen is split into two parts: he is a part of the organization of the state, to which he pays taxes, performs services, etc., providing it with material support; and he is a part of an organization of civil society, whose material nature has nothing to do with the state. The relation of the citizen to the state is "his pure blank individuality; for the existence of the state as government is there without him, and his existence in civil society is there without the state" (358).

Whereas formerly the Estates were predetermined from and by birth, at present it is money and culture which have become their criteria. It is especially money, as universal equivalent value, which defines the position and role of the Estates. Moreover, it is characteristic of the present society that "propertylessness and the Estate of immediate labor, of concrete labor, constitute less an Estate of civil society than the bottom on which the other circles of civil society rest and move" (362).²⁹ In modern times one becomes a member of an Estate either by chance or work. The relation to one's Estate is therefore only external, inessential. "The modern civil society is the completed principle of individualism; the individual existence is the final goal; activity, work, content etc. are only means" (363). Because of the external relation of man to his civil Estate, it appears that it is in his political life that he becomes a man in the fullest, most universal sense of the term, a part of the social community. Yet, though modern man appears to be truly human only in his political being, "his mode of living, acting, etc. instead of making him a part, a function of society, makes him into an exception from the society; it is his privilege. . . . Instead of the individual function being a function of the society, rather it itself becomes a society for-itself" (363). The principle of individualism is consecrated, splitting man's particular existence from his universal existence, and making any reconciliation of the two impossible.

In the Middle Ages, to which the Hegelian scheme returns, a man's Estate was determined from birth, like that of an animal. "The Middle Ages is the animal history of man, his zoology" (363-64). Here, "as the Christians are equal in heaven and unequal on earth, so the individual citizens were equal in the heaven of their political world and unequal in the earthly existence of society" (361). Modern society makes the opposite mistake: man is split from his objective universal essence as a social being, and related to it only externally. In this sense, Hegel's description of the role of the representatives of the Estates is accurate:

the actual subject, man, remains identical with himself in the different determinations of his essence; . . . but here man is not subject; rather, he is identified with a predicate (the Estate), and

conjointly it is asserted that he is [exists] in this determined determination [bestimmten Bestimmtheit] and in another determination. (P. 365)

The same subject is taken in different contexts, now as private man, now as member of the state. It is not that Hegel's description is inaccurate; Marx's objection is to the "allegorical," external way in which Hegel attempts to construct a mediated philosophical edifice which he then takes to be the essence of the state. If it could be shown that the twofold determination of man in modern society were an essential determination, a self-determination of the actual subject, then Marx would be content (366). As Hegel presents the matter, the determination is external; a different determination is "historically" possible, thinks Marx (365).

Hegel's error lies once again in the uncritical application of the categories of his *Logic*. The Estates must mediate between the prince and his regime, on the one hand, and the people on the other. Through a "mystical" recourse to the Idea, Hegel can treat the two extremes as opposite determinations of the same essence, the Idea. This, in Marx's eyes, is Hegel's major error.

He takes the contradiction of the appearance as a unity in essence, in the Idea, while, indeed, the contradiction has a deeper aspect as its essence: namely, an essential contradiction as, e.g. here the contradiction of the legislative power within itself is only the contradiction of the political state, thus also of civil society, with itself. (P. 377)

It is Hegel's "uncritical" handling of the empirical facts which enables him to treat them as predicates of the Idea, and then to discover a mediation between two extremes. Hegel is incorrect in presenting the modern predicament of man, his atomized life in civil society in opposition to his social life in the state, as a necessary and logically correct mediation.

Hegel makes a second, related error. "The 'mediation' which Hegel wants to bring about is not a demand which he derives out of the essence of the legislative power, from its own determinations, but rather one which he derives from reference [*Rücksicht*] to an

existence which lies outside of its [i.e., the legislature's] essential determination" (367). "This moment of the Estates," says Marx, "is the romanticism of the political state, the dream of its essentiality [*Wesenhaftigkeit*], of its correspondence with itself. It is an allegorical existence" (380). Hegel does not treat the empirical facticity of modern civil society with the respect which Marx's dialectical analysis demands. The legislature is not considered as a subject, but as a predicate which must be brought into the correct mediation as prescribed by the *Logic*.

Hegel's use of the medieval Estates as a mediation between the political state and civil society is a romanticism which ignores the nature of modern civil society. The Estates were always a function of private property, notes Marx. The different Corporations were the owners of different forms of trade and manufacture. Positions at court, judicial responsibilities, and whole provinces were the private property of various Estates. The labor of the serf was the private property of his lord; sovereignty was the private property of the monarch; even the Spirit was the private property of the priestly Estate. In the Middle Ages, the private sphere was also political; no differentiation between state and civil society existed in the "democracy of unfreedom." In modern times, private property has been freed from its political determination; it has become lord and master of its own domain, civil society. The representatives of modern civil society are not wrong to act as agents of interest groups. It is the syncretic nature of their function, which does not take into account social changes, that is responsible for the malfunctioning of the legislature, in Hegel's system and in actuality.

To Hegel's syncretism, Marx opposes his demand that philosophy develop its theories out of the nature of the thing itself, in terms of the dialectic. "It clearly follows [from the critique of Hegel] . . . that this state [portrayed by Hegel] is not a true state, because in it the determinations of the state, of which the legislative power is one, are not regarded in and for themselves, not theoretically but practically; not as independent powers, but as powers burdened with a contradiction, not out of the nature of the thing but according to the rules of convention" (368). Simply to criticize and to point to contradictions is not sufficient; this is the

erroneous approach of "vulgar criticism," which can only find hard and fast oppositions. Rather,

the true philosophical criticism does not point out the contradictions as subsistent; it explains them, comprehends their genesis, their necessity. It takes them in their specific signification. This comprehension [Begreifen] does not consist, as Hegel implies, in once again recognizing the determinations of the logical concept throughout, but in taking up the specific logic of the specific object. (P. 377)

This is a concise statement of the goals which Marx's positive criticism, his dialectic, must undertake. In Pierre Naville's succinct phrase, Marx is undertaking an analysis of "reason realizing itself, and not of realized reason."³⁰

Positive Conclusions

Hegel opposes universal direct participation in the affairs of the state. He would grant the landed aristocracy the right to participate directly in political affairs, each of its members inheriting his place in the Upper House. The members of the other Estate, the "mobile" Estate as Hegel calls it, are too numerous to participate individually. By having these members of civil society represented by their Corporations, Hegel establishes a mediation between them and the legislative power. This mediation is necessary for reasons similar to those which demanded that the landed aristocracy be considered as a private Estate on the one hand, and as a political Estate on the other; namely, that the individual qua individual cannot be considered directly political; his political quality must come to him as a result of his position as—to use Marx's language—a predicate of a political subject. This political subject is said to be the Corporation. But, again, Hegel's political mediation is a formation of civil society which in some "mystical" manner takes on political characteristics. The function of this Corporate mediation seems to be the protection of the state against the individual citizens. Marx finally loses his temper with Hegel: "Here, Hegel sinks nearly to servility" (422).

Marx's objection to Hegel's mystification is familiar. Hegel's

development of the legislative power "falls back from the philosophical standpoint to that standpoint which does not study the thing in relation to itself" (408). In his attempt to protect the state from the "caprice" of the individual members of civil society by having the representatives of the mobile Estate chosen by the Corporations, Hegel "does not describe the 'political state' as the highest actuality of social existence, as a being which is both in- and for-itself. Rather, he gives it a precarious actuality, *dependent on its relation to an other*" (408). If the state is dependent on the Corporations to mediate between it and its members, then the state is not the universal sphere, the organism which gives meaning to each of its parts. Hegel's attempt to protect the state against the masses leads him to falsify the nature of the state:

We have more than once indicated that Hegel develops only a formalism of the state. The true [eigentliche] material principle for him is the Idea, the abstract thought-form of the state as subject, the absolute Idea which has in it no passive, no material moment. In contrast to the abstraction of this Idea, the determinations of the actual, empirical state-formalism appear as content. Thus, the actual content appears as formless, inorganic matter [Stoff]. (P. 410)

For Marx, it is the content that is important. He adds a marginal note to the above citation: "here, actual man, actual society, etc.," indicating the further direction in which he wished to extend his manuscript.³¹

Hegel's philosophy is an accurate representation of the actual split between civil society and the state. It is necessary to take account of this state of affairs. For example, the dispute between the proponents of representative democracy and those who favor direct democracy concerns "a question within the abstraction of the political state, or within the abstract political state; it is an *abstract* political question" (411). As long as the diremption persists, the political sphere is only formal, allegorical.

In the actual rational state one could answer: "It is not the case that all individually should participate in the deliberating and deciding on the public affairs of the state," for the "individuals"

participate in these as "all," i.e., within the society and as members of the society. Not all individually, but the individuals as all.
(P. 411)

In the concept of "member of the state" lies the notion that the individual is a member of the state, a part of it, *and* that he takes part in it. Not only is the member of the state a part of the state; *caeterus paribus*, the state takes part in his life. This must be a conscious partaking; otherwise, the member of the state is but an animal. When one speaks of the "public affairs of the state," one should not make the mistake of differentiating between the "public affairs" and the "state." To take part in the one is the same as to take part in the other; they mutually complete each other—and in the last analysis they are the same. The content of the state determines its form. On the other hand, as concerns the specific affairs of the state, all individuals should not take part in these individually, for this would imply that the individual is sufficient unto himself and not a social being. Because the other represents me, and I represent him, we are mutually dependent on one another; our relations are social relations.

Marx's analysis is based on his dialectical interpretation.

We have seen: The state exists only as political state. The totality of the political state is the legislative power. To take part in the legislative power is thus to take part in the political state; it is to prove and to actualize one's existence as member of the political state, or as member of the state. The fact that all individuals want to take part in the legislative power is nothing but the will of all to be actual (active) members of the state, to give themselves a political existence or to prove and to effectuate their existence as political. We have further seen that the Estates are civil society as legislative power, the political existence of civil society. That civil society should wish en masse, wherever possible totally, to invade the legislative power; that the actual civil society should wish to substitute itself for the fictive legislative power—this is nothing but the drive of civil society to make itself into political society, or to make its political existence into its actual existence. The drive of civil society to make itself into political society, or to make the political society into the actual society shows itself as

the drive toward the most universal participation as is possible in the legislative power. (Pp. 413-14).

"The totality of the political state is the legislative power," Marx argues, because the other two powers of Hegel's organic constitution, the monarch and the bureaucracy, have been shown to be formal and inessential mediations which Hegel adduces in order to "rediscover the categories of the *Logic* in the world." The assertion that "all individuals want to take part in the legislative power" is not an empirical statement. Marx's point is that if in fact the citizens conceive of themselves as citizens, then they will want to take part in the public affairs of the state, to "give themselves a political existence." It is civil society which is the actual political society, for civil society is the content of political society, which itself is only a formal domain (418). This is why the question of representative or direct democracy is an "abstract question." Law-giving, says Marx, is a function of civil society in the same way as shoemaking; the lawgiver is the representative of the individual citizen in the same way as the shoemaker in his representative for the task of making shoes. "Each determined social activity as generic activity represents only the genus, i.e., a determination of my own essence, just as each man is the representative of the other. He is here representative not by virtue of something else which he represents [*was er vorstellt*], but through what he *is* and *does*" (415).

On the basis of this analysis, Marx turns his attention to the problem of voting rights, a contemporary political problem. His philosophical position determines his political perspective. "When one speaks of actual members of the state," says Marx, "one can not speak of participation as a *should be* [*Sollen*]. Rather, one would speak of subjects who *should be* members of the state, and who *want* to be members of the state, but who cannot actually *be* members of the state" (413). Marx demands an extension of the active right to vote. In this manner, he thinks, civil society would come to its true political form. "This is the precise point at issue in the political reform, both in France and in England" (416). This political reform, Marx implies, will have revolutionary consequences. If the vote is studied in its particular essence, it is seen

to be the "actual relationship of actual civil society . . . to the representative element. Or, the vote is the immediate, the direct, the not merely imaginary but existent relationship of civil society to the political state" (417). Through the unrestricted participation in the vote, civil society raises itself from its empirical particularity to the universality of the political sphere. The egoistic individual of the private sphere, with whom Hegel's state has to accommodate itself, is transcended by the political man who is created out of the renewed civil society. However, the realization of this new political sphere is at the same time its transcendence [*Aufhebung*].

At the same time that civil society actually makes its political existence its true existence, it also makes its civil existence unessential as opposed to its political existence. And, with the one thing separated, the other, its opposite, falls. Within the abstract political state, the reform of voting is the demand for the dissolution of the state; but at the same time, it is the demand for the dissolution of civil society. (P. 417)

This is a theoretical justification of the demands of the modern French, a reform which by incorporating civil society into the state eliminates the opposition on which their existence as separate domains was based. The logical structure of the argument parallels Marx's demand that philosophy become worldly once it has reached its theoretical completion in the Hegelian system. But, as with that argument, Marx's position is still idealistic insofar as he has not yet discovered the objective mediations which would enable him to overcome the separation of the 'is' and the 'should be.'



THE FOUNDATION OF THE
DEUTSCH-FRANZÖZISCHE
JAHRBÜCHER

The Political Practice of the Young Hegelians

It was his theoretical and practical experience in Paris which finally led Marx to clarify and elaborate his own notion of communism.¹ Before he moved to Paris and came into contact not only with the various communist and socialist theoreticians, but with the communist workers' societies as well, *communism* was an abstract, theoretical concept of which Marx knew little. He had heard about it from his friend Moses Hess, and had probably read Lorenz von Stein's *Sozialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs*, which Hess had reviewed in the *Rheinische Zeitung*.² Marx does not seem to have been overly impressed by the information he gleaned from these sources.³ In the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx had written that he could not "even concede theoretical reality to communist ideas in their present form, and [could] even less wish or consider possible their practical realization. . . ." But, he had also promised to "submit these ideas to a thorough criticism."

After the suppression of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, Marx saw "no room for a free activity" in Germany, and was easily persuaded to

move to Paris to found, with Arnold Ruge, the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. The title of the new journal is significant. The notion of a union of French political activism with German theory was very much in the air at the time. Heine had been one of the first to suggest it, just as he had been one of the first to criticize the Hegelian synthesis of the real and the rational. It was, however, Ludwig Feuerbach who had contributed the most to the popularization of this theme. In his *Provisional Theses for the Reform of Philosophy*, whose influence on Marx's methodology we have seen, Feuerbach took up the theme of a union of French activism and German philosophy. "The true philosopher," says Feuerbach, "he who is identical with life, with man, must be of the gallo-germanic race."⁴ He continues: "The heart—the feminine principle, the sense for the finite, the seat of materialism—is of French sympathies; the head—the masculine principle, the seat of idealism—of German [sympathies]."⁵ It was hoped that the union of materialism and idealism, of the French and the German spirit, would be the revolutionary combination which would avoid the errors of the French Revolution and at the same time escape the lethargy and philistinism of nineteenth-century Germany.

The foundation of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* culminated the split between the politically oriented Left Hegelians (Marx, Engels, Ruge, Hess, Bakunin, Hergwegh, Bernays, and Heine) and the idealistic individualists, centered around Bruno Bauer's *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (the three Bauer brothers, Stirner, Reichardt, Faucher, Jungnitz, and Szeliga). The split was consummated in the next two years when Marx and Engels wrote *The Holy Family* (1845) and the long, incomplete manuscript, *The German Ideology* (1845–46), in which the "critical criticism" of Bruno Bauer and his friends was submitted to a ruthless biting attack because of its tendency to create pseudo-Hegelian riddles which served only to obscure the actual social facts, and its purely negative criticism of the "massiness" of the common man. The logical conclusion of the "critical criticism," the absolute egoism of Max Stirner's *The Ego and its Own*, merits nearly five hundred pages of Marx's most biting satire in *The German Ideology*.⁶

The high hopes of the German founders of the journal, to unite German philosophy with French revolutionary practice, were short-

lived. Of the French radical or socialist thinkers contacted by the German editors, none accepted the invitation to contribute to the new journal. The ex-priest turned democratic revolutionary, Lamennais, and Louis Blanc, the future leader of the 1848 revolution, were opposed to the stress on the critique of religion which the Germans, following the lead of Feuerbach, considered the means to a revolution of consciousness. The two French socialists suggested skipping the humanistic stage of communism, with its concern for changing consciousness, and moving directly to the demand for socialism, which they understood as a change in the material conditions of society. Cabet too was against the stress on the critique of religion. The poet and politician, Lamartine, found the journal too revolutionary, while the pacifist, Fourierist, V. Considérant thought that the journal was overly oriented toward violence.⁷ The French and the German spirits thus proved themselves unable to unite around a common venture. German theory recognized the need for French practice, but French practice was not convinced that German theory was necessary to the success of its projects. The "union of the French and German spirits" proved to be the same kind of artificial mediation as Marx had criticized in Hegel's theory of the state. If the union were to occur, it would have to come as a development on the side of the object, as was later created by the development of capitalism, that economic system which knows no nationalities, and whose material conditions reproduce themselves in similar forms in each country in which it is implanted.

Among the German founders of the journal agreement could be reached only on very general ideals. Cornu notes that "the differences which were covered under and hidden by the common *mot d'ordre* 'humanism' did not yet appear clearly at that epoch in which each evolved toward new conceptions which none had yet precisely elaborated. Thus, the collaboration of all the progressive Young Hegelians remained possible."⁸ Agreement was easily reached, as Marx put it, on the "whence," on the negative judgment of the existent German circumstances; but about the "whither," the positive steps to be taken, there were only vague ideas. This was because the German contributors all based their critique, in one way or another, on the philosophy of Hegel. From

this vantage point, criticism was easy. The problem, however, was the way in which a solely theoretical critique could lead to a positive program entailing practical action.

The majority of the contributors to the first and only volume of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* agreed with the goals set forth in Ruge's editorial statement which demanded a revolution in consciousness through education, stating that "a people is not free before it has made philosophy the principle of its development, and it is the duty of philosophy to raise the people to this cultural level."⁹ Ruge called for theoretical study which would free the French from the chains of religion and the Germans from those of political oppression. "The effort in the domain of pure principles [made by the Germans] has not been in vain. The work realized in the supraterrrestrial regions to which we Germans have consecrated so much effort has not been lost. That work and that effort lead to the radical conquest of a new principle and, by making their results accessible to the French, permit the eternal assurance of the conquests which they have made by the philosophy of the eighteenth century, by their Revolution."¹⁰ The French, in turn, have their contribution to make. "Any realization of science [i.e., of philosophy], any union of it with politics, signifies in fact the close union with France. In Europe, to be against France and against politics is to be, in fact, against politics and against freedom. France and only France represents in Europe the political principle, the true principle of human freedom."¹¹

The sole contributor who did not share the philosophical view of revolution was Friedrich Engels, who contributed two articles which drew on his personal experiences working in his father's mills in Manchester. Engels had been won to a form of theoretical communism by Hess. His theoretical conversion was confirmed and strengthened by his experiences of the condition of the English working class. Engels agreed with the Owenists that the capitalist mode of production must be abolished. He differed with them, however, as to the means of its abolition, for he was not convinced that the Owenist utopia could be realized on a universal scale. He was impressed by the strength of the Chartist movement, and on the basis of the Chartist experience, argued that a mass movement was necessary if the working class was to free itself.

Engels supported the radical wing of the Chartist movement under the leadership of his friend, G. J. Harney, and contributed several articles to its paper, the *Northern Star*. In 1843 he wrote a series of articles for the Owenist journal, *The New Moral World*, in which he analyzed the nature and origins of European communism, stressing the theoretical nature of German communism and the political nature of the French variety. He too proposed that true communism would result from the union of German theory and French politics—and British economic and trade union practice.¹² This theoretical affirmation, Engels thought, was based on a practical reality in the process of development: the international rebellion of the proletariat against capital.

Engels's two articles in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* were an attempt to explain to a continental audience the nature of English conditions and English communism. In a review essay on two recent books by Carlyle, Engels wrote appreciatively of Carlyle's biting criticism of the conditions of working-class life in England. Carlyle recognized that these conditions had been created by the rapacious growth of capitalism in its first stages of accumulation. However, Engels disagreed strongly with Carlyle's aristocratic solutions to the problems of rising capitalism, for he clearly saw that it was not possible to return to a lost, glorious past. Engels saw that the roots of the present social conditions in England were to be found in the economic conditions which created and were created by capital.

In his second article, "Sketch of a Critique of Political Economy," Engels again denounced the material results of capitalism. Arguing that the liberal critique of these conditions by political economists did not get to the bottom of the question, posing only reforms of the system, Engels proposed a critique of the fundamental categories of political economy. The critique which Engels offered in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* was, of course, not so profound as the conception at which he and Marx arrived years later. In a letter to W. Liebknecht in April, 1871, Engels suggested that his "Sketch" was not worth reprinting as it was theoretically incorrect.

Though it is not necessary to go into detail concerning the economic argument which Engels presented in his "Sketch," it should

be stressed that Engels's influence on Marx's evolution was immense. John Lewis asserts that "it was this essay [the "Sketch"] that opened the eyes of Marx for the first time to the economic structure of capitalism and the contradictions which arise in an acquisitive society based on private property."¹³ M. Rubel insists that it is "a remarkable and often misunderstood fact" that it was Engels's "Sketch" "which inspired in Marx the theme of the sociological *oeuvre* whose elaboration would demand of him the efforts of his whole literary career."¹⁴ Cornu and Mehring suggest that at this time, Engels was in fact the master and Marx the disciple.¹⁵

The very different experiences of the world of these two young men¹⁶ made them perfect partners for a common revolutionary endeavor. In the preface to the 1859 *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx states that his own evolution through the *Rheinische Zeitung* experiences and the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," had led him to study the material relations which govern the life of civil society. Of Engels, he writes: "Friedrich Engels, with whom I maintained a constant written exchange of ideas from the appearance of his genial "Sketch of a Critique of Political Economy" (in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*), had arrived by another route (cf., his *Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*¹⁷) at the same result as mine."¹⁸ From the time of Marx's exile in Brussels (spring 1845), he continues, he and Engels worked constantly together in elaborating their ideas.¹⁹

What Is Radical Journalism?

The "Exchange of Letters" among the main founders of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, which was printed as the second article in the journal, is significant for two reasons. The first, which will be peripheral to the discussion presented here, is that it shows some of the differences which were to develop between Marx and his colleagues on the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, differences which were to lead to a parting of the ways between them. More importantly, the "Exchange" shows Marx making the transition from the theoretical criticism of Hegel's philosophy of

the state to the foundation of a journal whose purposes were expressly political. The "Exchange" shows how Marx attempted to apply the new ideas which his dialectical critique of the Hegelian state had won him.

Marx's letter to Ruge opens the "Exchange of Letters." Marx is writing from abroad, during a trip to Holland. He speaks despairingly of the political situation in Germany, and says that he feels ashamed of his nationality. "Compared with the greatest German, the smallest Dutchman is still a citizen" (427).²⁰ What is won, however, by shame? Marx asks rhetorically. "I answer: Shame is already a revolution; it is actually the victory of the French Revolution over German patriotism by which the Revolution was conquered in 1813. Shame is a kind of wrath which turns in upon itself. And, if a whole nation were really ashamed, it would be like a lion who draws himself back for the spring" (427-28).

In view of the concrete facts of the German situation, this motif of Marx's letter, the idealist theory that a revolution is a product of a change of consciousness, gives way to a second motif. The Germans are not yet ashamed; on the contrary, they are even patriotic. But the new regime (of Friedrich William IV) will change this. In many ways, this new regime reminds Marx of the Stuarts of England or the Bourbons of France before the Revolution. "The state is too serious a thing to be made into a harlequinade" (428). Change will indeed come to Germany following this new regime which treats the state like its private amusement park. Marx illustrates the kind of change he envisions: "A shipload of fools might drift in the wind for quite a time, but its destiny is working against it for the simple reason that the fools don't believe this. This destiny is the revolution which stands before us" (428). A revolutionary future awaits Germany whether the Germans are aware of it or not! This second, material motif in Marx's letter is still only a motif; Marx has not yet shown why he is so certain that the destiny of the German ship of fools is revolution and not shipwreck.

In Marx's first letter can be seen the contradictory motifs of an idealistic humanism whose "revolution" is a psychological phenomenon, and the dialectical motif which sees the revolution as inscribed in the becoming of the things themselves, in the social

interrelations of civil society with itself and the state. As long as the latter motif has not been thematized, Marx appears as an optimist who is unable to give sufficient reason for his hope.

Ruge's answer to Marx's letter shows the weakness of Marx's position. Ruge is a pessimist. He attributes his pessimism to the teachings of reason. "Your courage," he writes, "only discourages me still more" (428). Ruge does not want a revolution from shame. "I call revolution the conversion [*Umkehr*] of all hearts and the raising of all hands for the honor of free man, for the free state which belongs to no master but is itself the public organization [*öffentliche Wesen*] which belongs only to itself" (429). The Germans, argues Ruge, are not capable of such a revolution, a "humanist" revolution. They are historically defeated; they may fight, but their fight is like that of gladiators who struggle for the goals of another; such is the lesson of their victory over the French in 1813, which defeated the comparatively liberal regime of Napoleon in favor of the reactionary Prussian system. True, under the new monarch, the illusions of the liberals have finally come to an end; everyone criticizes the present social order, but in words only. No one any longer hopes that the new monarch will bring a change in the old society. The German answer to oppression is not just to suffer under the despotism, but rather to turn the tables and to become patriotic. Once, German philosophy preached Freedom and argued, with Kant, that man is born to be free. Now, Ruge wonders, is it not the case that man is not in fact born to be free but to be a servant. The Germans of today are finding their happiness in the reconciliation with their fate through thought. The ship of fools metaphor is misleading, says Ruge. Such a revolution is not the curing of the fools but, on the contrary, their ruin.

Marx's reply attempts to give grounds for the optimism of his first letter. "Your letter, my dear friend, is a good elegy, a breathtaking dirge," he begins, "but it is not political at all" (432). True, the old world belongs to the philistines, says Marx; we cannot ignore that fact. "We must rather look them straight in the eye. It is worth studying these masters of the world" (432). The philistines are masters of the world only "in that, like the worms a corpse, they fill it with their society" (432). The world of the

philistines is "the political animal world," says Marx, picking up a metaphor from his critique of Hegel's state. In this world, man wills only to live and to procreate, to which, Marx comments mockingly, the German politician would add that man "knows" that he so wills. But, says Marx, "freedom, the feeling of one's dignity, must once again be awakened in the breast of these men. Only this feeling, which disappeared from the world with the Greeks, and with Christianity vanished into the blue haze of heaven, can again transform society into a community of men whose highest goal is a democratic state" (433). Social change, Marx seems to imply, demands psychological change.

Marx is returning to themes developed in his critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state. The "political animal world" of the philistines is the product of "barbaric centuries"; it is the consistent result of the dehumanized world of despotism (433). "Despotism's sole idea is contempt for man, dehumanized man; and this idea has the advantage over many others that it is equally a fact" (434). In France, the situation is different. There, the revolution recreated man, created a new man. Germany, however, is still a monarchy, and can continue to be one as long as the dehumanized man who is its foundation exists. Men, in Marx's opinion, exist only when they begin to doubt the all-embracing power of the monarch, of the political state. Since the Germans have not arrived at this point, there is no reason for the king of Prussia not to follow his every whim; "the king of Prussia will be a man of his times so long as the perverted world is the actual one" (435).

It is important to study the philosophical foundations of the monarchy in order to understand modern German society. The king cannot change society, for his very existence is based on the continuation of a society of philistines. Friedrich William IV did, in fact, want to change the old state, notes Marx; this explains his seeming liberalism when he first came to the throne. But his efforts came to naught. The reason for this failure can be explained by the principles formulated in the critique of the Hegelian state. Change cannot come from the top, through the institution of new formal relations; it must have its source in the foundation of the state, hence, in civil society. The king can no more change the state than could Hegel's bureaucracy; both are based on the formal

domination over a reified civil society. By trying to transcend the philistine state on its own basis, without changing that basis, the monarchy shows itself to be in fact a despotism; it is forced to resort to brutal measures in order to make civil society conform to its whims and wishes. The psychological change needed for social change has to come from the social sphere where men live, civil society, and not their "illusory life," the state.

Marx's optimistic view of the German future is based on his dialectical analysis. "All thinking and suffering men" have been led to open their eyes to the real state of affairs in philistine Germany. More than just a revolution in consciousness is in the offing, thinks Marx. The contradictions within civil society, and between it and the state, give grounds for optimism. "The system of industry and commerce, of property and the exploitation of men, however, leads much more rapidly to a rupture within the present society than does the increase in population.²¹ The old system cannot heal this rupture because it does not heal or create but only exists and enjoys" (438). The philosopher must expose the old world in all its contradictions and show how a new world is being shaped out of the old. In this way the philosopher will contribute to the psychological change which should accompany the changed social relations in modern society.

Though Marx talks about the duty of the thinker to shape positive directions for the new world, it is clear that, at this time at least, he does not have more than a vague idea of what these directions would be. He concludes his second letter by stressing that the present world carries within its womb a new world (438). This "new world" seems to be the one which would come about when civil society is reshaped in such a way as to abolish the political state and to create a new, democratic state. At this stage in his development, that is all Marx can say.

Mikhail Bakunin ²² also replied to Ruge's pessimistic letter. His enthusiasm and metaphorical style seem to have impressed Ruge more than Marx's analytical reasoning. Writing from the Peterinsel, where Rousseau had once worked, Bakunin, in effect, urged Ruge to keep the faith. "Rousseau and Voltaire, those immortals, will once again be young; in the most gifted heads of the German nation they celebrate their resurrection . . . Philosophy will once

again play the role which it performed with so much glory in France" (439). The French are more advanced than the Germans; it is necessary to work hard, to catch up and to make it possible for men to be free and to live with their fellows. Bakunin insists that poets and thinkers can see the future and can build a new world of freedom and beauty in that desert of destitution which is present-day Germany. Doubt in the future of Germany is doubt in Reason, in the power of the truth to which the philosopher has dedicated himself. Though Bakunin's Reason is as much poetic as philosophical, he retains a grasp on the concrete necessity of the situation: the people must be won over. It is wrong to despair in Germany's future. France too was once a nation whose private life dominated her public life, and whose private life was unfree. Ruge's pessimism strikes Bakunin as misguided: "You say only what the people is; how do you wish in that way to prove what it will be?" (441) There is much to be learned in France, says Bakunin. The journal should be founded there, in Paris. The important thing is to win the hearts of the people: "Who shall win the people, we or they?" (441)

Ruge's reply to Bakunin shows that he was swayed by the latter's optimism, especially by the idealistic, romantic strain in Bakunin's effusions. The winning of the people, which Bakunin stressed, is transformed by Ruge into the demand for the production of a "human literature . . . in order to win the world theoretically so that from now on it will have thoughts in accordance with which it acts" (442). Ruge still defends the tenor of his last letter as being not pessimism but realism, the honesty which refuses self-deception.

Feuerbach too replied to Ruge's queries concerning the possibility of founding a new journal (though Ruge's letter to him is not printed in the "Exchange of Letters"). Feuerbach sees the demise of the *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, which Ruge had edited until the censorship forced him to stop publishing it, as comparable to the demise of Poland. A few men struggle vainly for a goal, but are defeated because of the rotten life of the people (445). In order for those few to succeed, "new men" are needed. These new men will not come out of the woods, or via immigration; they must be created. This is a giant task, fit for the strengths of many

united powers. "New Love, New Life, says Goethe; New Teaching [*Lehre*], New Life, is our motto [*heisst es bei uns*]" (445). Feuerbach, too, stresses a revolution in consciousness. The head, he says, always leads; but though the new takes root in the head, the old also remains entrenched in the mind. The head must be purged. "The head is a theoretician, a philosopher. It must carry the bitter yoke of praxis into which we draw it, and like a man it must learn to dwell on the shoulders of active men" (445). The theoretical revolution, stresses Feuerbach, must reach the masses. "Theoretical is that which is only in my head; practical is that which haunts many heads" (445).

Ruge's final letter to Marx shows that he was influenced by Feuerbach's idealism just as he was by that of Bakunin. He uses Feuerbach's Polish metaphor, and suggests that "Poland" can be reconstructed through reason and democracy. In this manner, however, it would cease to be Poland, he observes. A break with the past is what is needed, insists Ruge, citing Feuerbach's "New Teaching, New Life" motto. The new journal will be founded in Paris; Ruge promises to handle the business end of it, and says that he counts on Marx's participation. "We must establish an organ here in Paris in which we can criticize ourselves and all of Germany with complete freedom and relentless honesty" (446).

Marx's reply, which concludes the "Exchange of Letters," elaborates the positive direction he intends to give the new journal. He recognizes that among the contributors to the journal there is no doubt as to the "whence," the need to change the present social circumstances, but there is great confusion as concerns the "whither." This, however, is the great advantage of the new direction which the journal hopes to open: "we do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the critique of the old" (447). Previously, philosophers have solved riddles seated at their desks, and waited for the rest of the world to swallow their solutions "like roasted pigeons." Now, however, philosophy has become worldly. "The most striking proof of this is that the philosophical consciousness itself is drawn into the torment of struggle not only externally but inwardly as well" (447). In these conditions, the task of philosophy is not to anticipate the future, but to criticize relentlessly the existing conditions. This critique is none other than the dialectic.

It would be incorrect, continues Marx, to begin by planting a dogmatic flag; the journal must be an organ which will help the dogmatists understand what it is that they are saying. This can be done by seeking out the critical moment in these dogmas, by showing what their principle really is. "Communism," for example, is one such dogmatism. "By communism I do not mean some imagined or possible communism, but the actually existing communism such as Cabet, Dézamy, Weitling, etc. teach" (448). There are many kinds of communism, each different from the other. "Dissolution [*Aufhebung*] of private property and communism, therefore, are in no way identical, and communism saw the development of other socialistic doctrines such as those of Fourier, Proudhon etc., as not accidentally but necessarily in opposition to itself because it itself is only a particular, one-sided realization of the socialistic principle" (448).²³ What is important is to discover the "socialistic principle," and then, through the dialectic, to show how it will realize itself.

Not only is communism a dogmatism within the forms of socialism; "the entire socialistic principle is, again, only one side of the reality of the true human essence" (448). The other side, the theoretical life of man, is also important; religion, science, etc. must also be the objects of criticism. In other words, not only does the world have to become philosophical; philosophy, on entering the world, has lost its former unity and it, the subjective side, must be reconstituted. The goal of the journal is to effect a change in society, especially in German society. Inasmuch as in Germany politics and religion are the two subjects which generate the most interest, they too must be discussed, but not dogmatically, as in Cabet's *Voyage en Icarie*. Marx insists that criticism must have its origins in the real, and must avoid a one-sided approach.

The origins of Marx's position here lie in the method developed previously. Marx suggests that "*reason has always existed, but not always in rational form.* [My stress.] The critic, therefore, can attach himself to any form of theoretical or practical consciousness and can develop from the inherent [*eigenen*] forms of existing reality the true actuality as their 'should be' [*Sollen*] and their final goal" (448). This is the same task Marx had suggested in the letter to his father. In the modern political state, says Marx, the

demands of Reason are implicitly present. But the political state is not yet conscious of the socialist demands which would actualize its rationality. It claims to be the incarnation of Reason yet, as Marx had shown, there is a contradiction between its ideal determinations and its real presuppositions. Out of this conflict of the political state with itself new social truth will develop. Just as religion reveals the true nature of the theoretical struggles of man, so, says Marx, the political state reveals the true nature of his practical struggles. The practical consequence of this politico-philosophical position, says Marx, is that it is not beneath the *hauteur des principes* to treat specific political problems, such as the difference between the Estate system and the representative system. Though the "crass socialists" refuse to treat such questions, the true critic, as Marx sees him, must take them up. Only through the mediation of the "true critic" does the public become "practically" interested and capable of achieving the new completion of the now-worldly philosophy. "By elevating the representative system from its political form to the universal form and by validating the true significance which grounds this form, the critic at the same time forces this party [i.e., 'part,' of the public] to go beyond itself, for its victory is at the same time its loss" (449).²⁴

The journal must be an active political force, applying the philosophical critique to actual struggles and identifying itself with these struggles. Again, this cannot be a doctrinaire *prise de position*.

We do not face the world in doctrinaire fashion, declaring, "Here is the truth, kneel here!" . . . We do not tell the world, "Cease your struggles, they are stupid; we want to give you the true watchword of the struggle." We merely show the world why it actually struggles; and consciousness is something that the world must acquire even if it does not want to.²⁵ (P. 449)

The function of the critical, dialectical theory is not to elaborate abstract schemata which can serve as paradigms, nor is it to tell the masses what they *should* be doing. Such a position would be idealistic insofar as it ignores the necessary mediations on the side of the object, the world.

However, Marx still seems influenced by the goal of a "reform

of consciousness" as a means to political change. He wants to "awaken the world out of its dream of itself," and to "explain to it its own actions" (449). "Our entire purpose consists in nothing else (as is also the case with Feuerbach's critique of religion) than in bringing the religious and political questions into self-conscious human form" (450). Through a reform of consciousness, thinks Marx, mankind will become aware of its own nature, and in so doing will take actual possession of that which previously it had only implicitly. The great thoughts of the past will be realized in the present, for "mankind does not begin any *new* work but completes its old work consciously" (450). The journal must have as its intention [*Tendenz*] "the self-understanding of the times concerning its struggles and wishes" (450). This is "critical philosophy," the dialectic. Expressed in another way, Marx concludes his letter, this is nothing but a "confession."²⁶ "To have its sins forgiven, mankind has only to declare them for what they are" (450).

Though these last lines of the political declaration of the new journal seem to have an idealistic ring, they foreshadow the future direction of Marx's evolution. What can be seen beneath the surface is that Marx's adherence to the dialectic, and to the results of his analysis of the Hegelian state, led him necessarily to a study of the real nature of the world in which he lived, and more specifically, to a study of political economy. Marx's ship of fools image in the first letter indicated already that in his analysis, the conditions of civil society were necessarily pointing toward a revolution. In his second letter, Marx went into more detail, concluding that the new world is carried in the womb of the old. Finally, in the third letter, the demand for actual participation in the struggles of the real world, the claim that critical philosophy must show the world why it actually struggles, and the final confession metaphor all point to a tendency in Marx's thought which more than counterbalances the idealistic standpoint of the "Reform of Consciousness," indicating the direction his thought will take in the search for real, worldly mediations.



FROM THE PRIMACY OF THE STATE TO THAT OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Though Marx's article, "On the Jewish Question," was occasioned by the political events of the times, it contains an important restatement and development of his philosophical and political position.¹ The question of political and civil rights for the Jews had been one of the main battlehorses of the Prussian liberals ever since the Edict of May 4, 1816, which took these rights away from the Jews. The tenor of the agitation had been mounting rapidly under the new monarch, Friedrich William IV, who insisted that he would rule a Christian state. Marx had thought of writing an article for the *Rheinische Zeitung* on the Jewish question as early as August, 1842.² It was, however, only after his ex-friend, Bruno Bauer, published an article and a pamphlet on this subject that Marx actually took up the gauntlet. Cornu is probably correct when he asserts that the reason Marx finally wrote this article was to attack the position of Bauer which, no matter what its intentions, was objectively reactionary and served the interest of the monarchy.³ Moreover, Bauer was the leader of the other group of Young Hegelians; by attacking him, Marx was able to present his own position more clearly.

Religious, Political and Human Emancipation

Bauer's argument begins by rejecting a series of possible solutions to the Jewish question. How can the Germans emancipate the Jews when the Germans themselves are not free? Why should the Germans emancipate the Jews if the Jews do not in turn want to work for the emancipation of the Germans, for that of all mankind? Why exchange a Jewish yoke for a German or a Christian one? If the Jew wants the German state to divest itself of its religious prejudice, why should the state not demand of the Jew that he divest himself of his own religious prejudices? "On what justification [*Titel*]," paraphrases Marx, "do you Jews desire emancipation? Because of your religion? It is the mortal enemy of the religion of the state. As citizens? In Germany there are no citizens. As men? You are not men, any more than those to whom you appeal" (452).⁴

Bauer's starting point is thus a radical critique of the existing German social and political relations, very much in the style of the absolute idealism of the Young Hegelian school which felt that it alone understood the needs and drives of the Spirit. Bauer then formulates the Jewish question in what he thinks is a new way. What is the nature of the Jew who demands to be emancipated, he asks; and what is the nature of the Christian state which is to emancipate the Jews? Bauer's solution is found through an analysis of the religious antagonism between Judaism and Christianity.

The proposed resolution of the antagonism between the Jewish and Christian religions is not a move to a synthesis; rather, Bauer argues, the antagonism is resolved by being made impossible. Once both Jews and Christians recognize that their religions represent different stages in the evolution of World History, in the movement of the Spirit affirming itself in time, the antagonism is removed. Both Jews and Christians will shed their religious "snake skins" and recognize that it is man who is beneath them, who is their soul and essence. In this way, both Jews and Christians will see that their differences can be resolved not doctrinally but "scientifically," within the context of the science of the Spirit which Hegel had inaugurated, and which Bauer thought he was continuing in a more radical fashion.

Marx's first objection to Bauer's procedure is that it is too abstract. Bauer thinks that his solution is universal because the Spirit is universal. In fact, however, the situation of the German Jews differs from that of the Jews in other countries where different institutions are dominant. In Germany, the state is a self-proclaimed Christian state; consequently, in it the religious and the political moments are conflated. Unless the different empirical situations of the Jews are distinguished, the issue is confused; "however critical we are, we are still in the domain of theology . . ." (456). As it stands, Bauer's position comes down to this: "on the one hand, the Jew must give up Judaism and man must give up religion in order to be emancipated as a citizen. On the other hand, for Bauer it follows that the political abolition [*Aufhebung*] of religion is also the abolition of religion altogether" (455). Bauer thinks that it is the state which, by giving up its "Christian" nature, will politically emancipate the Jews, and, further, that in so doing, it will emancipate mankind from religion in general.

Bauer is abstract and one-sided. It is not sufficient to ask who should do the emancipating and who should be emancipated. The true function of criticism, asserts Marx, is to pose a third question: "What kind of emancipation is involved? What conditions lie in the essence of this demanded emancipation?"⁵ (455) Inasmuch as Bauer does not push his inquiry to the point of determining the essence of emancipation, he finds himself shuttled off the main path into byroads which, though quaint and interesting, end in a cul-de-sac. Bauer argues against the opponents of Jewish emancipation who assume that the Christian state is the only true state. But he goes no further than simply criticizing the nature of this state qua Christian; he does not analyze the nature of the state as such. Consequently, he neglects the relation between political and human emancipation; he conflates the two because of his one-sided reference to the German state. Whereas Bauer asks whether the Jews have the right to demand political emancipation while still remaining Jews, Marx, on the contrary, asks why it is necessary for political emancipation to demand of the Jews that they give up Judaism and, indeed, that man give up religion altogether.

Marx stresses Bauer's dependence on the hypostatization of the

German situation. In Germany, the Jewish problem is posed in a theological manner because Germany has no true political state;⁶ the opposition between the Jew and the "state" is thus purely religious. Criticism of the German situation, however "critical" it may be, still remains "theological criticism." In France, on the other hand, where there is a constitutional state with some vestiges of a state religion, the Jewish question is posed partly in constitutional terms and partly in theological terms. Still, in France the problem is basically one of the incomplete political emancipation of the Jews. The vestiges of religious oppression which still exist in France must be eliminated by political means. It is in the "Free States of North America" that the Jewish question is posed in its most basic form, for it is there that the state is completely political.

The Jewish question and, indeed, the religious question in general, can only be correctly posed where the political state has reached its complete development. Only then does criticism leave the theological plane and become political. Criticism then is no longer a criticism of religious consciousness, as was the case with Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians; it becomes criticism of the political state, of its nature and its presuppositions. Bauer's error is thus evident: his universalizing of the German situation with its conflation of the political and the religious led him to pose the problem of emancipation in a theological manner.

Taking the American example of the complete development of an autonomous political state, on the basis of his reading of "Beaumont, Tocqueville and the Englishman Hamilton," Marx examines the place of religion in American society. Religion flourishes in the United States; as Beaumont puts it, "no one in the United States believes that a man without religion can be an honest man" (457). This is proof that religion can still exist, even become vigorous, where the political state is fully developed.

The existence of religion implies for Marx, as for all of the Young Hegelians, a defect. It indicates that man is not self-sufficient, feels himself dependent on an external force which he can neither know nor control.⁷ The source of this defect must be discovered in order that it may be transcended. That religion still exists in the completely political United States means that, whereas for Bauer the existence of religion was to be explained by a lack in

the state, by the fact that it was still a "Christian state," Marx will have to explain the existence of religion from the worldly existence of the citizens, from the nature of civil society. His goal is not to "convert worldly questions into theological ones. We convert theological questions into worldly ones" (458). The question is no longer posed, as with Bauer, as the relation between religious and political emancipation. The question has now become that of the relation between political emancipation and secular or human emancipation. The analysis of the antagonism between a particular religion and the state becomes the analysis of the relationship between the state and its presuppositions within civil society. Marx is thus returning to the insights developed in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State."

Though the first condition for the political emancipation of the religious man is that the state give up its religious bias, the example of the United States shows that political emancipation does not guarantee human emancipation. Religion is a defect from which the state may free itself without necessarily freeing the citizens from that same defect. Marx sees a contradiction here. The state, after all, is made up of its citizens; if it is free, its citizens too should be free. The problem lies in the fact that it is the state which is doing the "freeing." The state plays the role of mediator between man and his own freedom. Or, to use a now familiar locution, the state is made the subject whereas the real subject, man, the citizen, is made into a predicate.

The analogy of religious freedom and freedom from the domination of private property illustrates Marx's point. The political victory which overcame the property qualification for voting in the United States was a victory over the political power of private property. But the secular power of private property was left intact in the realm of civil society. Private property, and indeed all of the distinctions which exist within the sphere of civil society, are presuppositions for the existence of the state. The political victory was not sufficient.

Marx returns to the notion of "generic being" which, as asserted in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," is man's true life and is found in his life within the true state. In civil society, man exists as an egoistic being, a private individual. When the

political state is fully developed, its citizens lead a double life: they are communal beings qua citizens, while, qua private individuals, they exist as the egoistic "man" who "sees other men as means, reduces himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers" (461). Even man's relation to the perfect state is, therefore, a religious relation. "The political state relates to civil society in just as spiritual a manner as does heaven to earth" (461). This is an alienated relation which Marx calls "the sophistry of the political state itself" (461).

This analysis, clearly indebted to Feuerbach, reduces the Jewish question to a secular question. As Marx puts it, "the difference between the religious man and the citizen is the difference between the shopkeeper and the citizen, between the day-laborer and the citizen, between the living individual and the citizen. The contradiction in which the religious man finds himself in relation to political man is the same as that between *bourgeois* and *citoyen*, between the member of civil society and his political lion skin" (462). Religious man is nothing but man in civil society. Bauer's exposition of the relation of civil society to the state follows that of Hegel, says Marx, implying that this is incorrect but not explaining why, though he obviously is thinking of the analysis of Hegel's state which he had recently completed. The Jewish question can only be understood as a question which concerns the relation between civil society and the state.

The political emancipation by which religion has been banished from the sphere of the state is "indeed a great step forward," but it is not the final form of human emancipation; it is only the final form "within the present world order" (462). Once it finds itself within the sphere of civil society, of the *bellum omnium contra omnes*, religion becomes what it was at its origins: "It is the expression of the *separation* between man and his communal nature [*Gemeinwesen*], between man and himself, and between man and other men" (463). This separation, or alienation as Marx calls it, following Hegel and Feuerbach, shows the limits of a merely political emancipation from religion: such an emancipation creates the same state of affairs as that within which the individual in the Hegelian state found himself. The early Christian became a believer because his earthly life seemed incomplete and unfulfilling,

and the belief in a transcendent God seemed to give meaning to his existence, to complete it. In the same way, the individual in modern society feels that his life in civil society is incomplete, and finds completion in the fact that he is a citizen, a member of the state which, like a Church, pretends to give meaning to the life of the isolated individual. This is a medieval vestige which must be swept away.

The perfected state in which political emancipation has occurred is not the Christian state, and certainly not the Germano-Christian state of Frederick William IV, but is a democratic state where religion is but one facet of civil society. The perfected state, argues Marx, has religion as one of its prerequisites existing within civil society; the imperfect, so-called Christian state, on the other hand, considers religion as its foundation. "In the Germano-Christian state the dominance of religion is the religion of dominance," says Marx (466). Were the so-called Christian state to accept true Christianity, it would dissolve itself qua state, for the true foundation of Christianity is man, individual man,⁸ while the citizen is man in his universal, or as Marx likes to call it, generic being. The realization of true Christianity is the democratic state, for in it each and every man is regarded as "sovereign and supreme." In a word, the victory of the true Christian state is at the same time its loss as "state."

Marx has made another step forward here, moving beyond the purely political consideration of democracy expressed in his essay on Hegel's state. He is looking beyond the political considerations which heretofore he had approached from the point of view of the state. The discussion of Bauer's position forced Marx to look at the Jewish question from the vantage point of civil society. When he writes that the "sovereign and supreme" man of the democratic state, is "man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, in his accidental existence; man just as he is, man corrupted by the entire organization of our society, lost and alienated [*veräussert*] from himself, dominated by inhuman relations—in a word, man who is not yet an actual generic being" (468), Marx indicates still another new direction. Since this man is not yet a generic being, the form of state under which he lives cannot be the one which Marx demanded, and thought achieved in democracy. The desired union

of the particular and the universal has not been attained. Because man is still an alienated, nongeneric being, even within the democratic state, it is possible for religion to exist, grow, and even flourish. Democracy, then, is not a panacea. A more basic change is needed.

The Rights of Man and of the Citizen

Bauer argues that as long as the Jew remains a Jew, he cannot attain to the universal Rights of Man. These Rights are not something innate, nor a heritage of the past; they must be earned through the struggle of the Spirit which must move beyond religious consciousness in order, in finding itself, to attain these rights. In Bauer's analysis, as long as the Jew does not give up his religion, he cannot claim the Rights of Man.

Marx considers first the historical origins of the doctrine of the Rights of Man. These rights are both political rights and rights of the member of civil society. The political freedoms, Marx has shown, by no means exclude religious belief. In fact, as Marx illustrates with citations from the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen" of 1791 and 1793, as well as from the constitutions of Pennsylvania and New Hampshire, the privilege of faith is considered one of the rights of man. "The privilege of faith is a universal human right" (472).

The Rights of Man are different from the "rights of the citizen." Who is this "man" who is distinguished from the citizen? He is the member of civil society. The division between his rights and those of the citizen can be explained in terms of the relation of the political state to civil society, and by the nature of political emancipation.

The Rights of Man are the rights of the egoistic member of civil society, of man as separated from his fellows and from the community. In "the most radical constitution" of the French Revolution, that of 1793, these Rights are "equality, liberty, security, property." The analysis of these rights gives interesting results. The right to "liberty" is the right to do anything which does not harm others. But this is "the freedom of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself" (472). "Liberty" is thus the consecra-

tion of the "right" to exist as a "*limited* individual limited unto himself" (473). Furthermore, "the practical application of the right of liberty as the right of private property" (473). The Constitution of 1793 defines the right of property as the right to use and to dispose of my goods, revenues, and the fruits of my labor and industry *as I will*. This is, in effect, the right of self-interest. Its application means that my fellow men limit my individual freedom. The right of property is only a confirmation of my own egoism. The same is true of "equality," which is simply the right to liberty as described above; it is the consecration of the self-sufficient monad. In the Constitution of 1795, the right of equality is defined as "the fact that the law is the same for all, whether it protects or whether it punishes" (473). In practice, this "equality" consecrates the inequality of civil society and becomes the right of security, the "protection accorded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights and his property," which "is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of the police, the concept that the whole society exists only to guarantee to each member the preservation of his person, his rights and his property" (474).

The Rights of Man do not deal with man as Marx understands him—as generic being, social men and women living in community. "Society [appears] as a framework external to the individual, limiting his primal independence. The only bond holding men together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the maintenance of their property and of their egoistical persons" (474). But a society which is "a framework external to the individual" does not fulfill the demands of rationality; nor is a society based on "natural necessity, need and private interest" governed by the laws of conscious Reason.

It is curious that a nation in revolution, tearing down all the barriers of an old society, should proclaim and consecrate egoistic man (the Constitution of 1791), and then again, in the throes of revolutionary war, should reaffirm his primacy (the Constitution of 1793). The French revolutionaries seemed to consider the political as only a means to that end which is life in civil society. True, notes Marx, revolutionary practice violated its theory: letters were opened, censorship was exercised, and civil rights were

violated in order to defend the life of the state. The theoretical problem, however, is how and why this inversion of consciousness which put civil society above political life could occur.

A glance at the society which was being destroyed provides an explanation of the seeming incongruity of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." The old society was a feudal society. As was observed in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," under feudalism civil society was directly political through the mediation of the Estates, the Corporations, and the other integrative structures. Political life was determined by one's position in civil society. But, at the same time that the individual's civil life was political, it was also separated from the other sectors of the political-civil society of feudalism; and the state rested on top of this rigorously compartmentalized structure as the special business of the ruler and his servants. This was the "democracy of unfreedom."

When feudal society was overthrown, the revolution attempted to make the business of the state into the business of all the citizens. To this end, it destroyed the Corporations, the guilds, and other privileges which had separated people from one another, abolishing the political character of civil society and breaking it up into its individual elements. The state was to be the business of all, while the particular occupations of individuals were given no general significance for the state as a whole. Marx calls this the "idealism of the state" (477), indicating that it is a positive advance, but one which is still incomplete because it is based on purely political considerations.⁹

At the same time that the revolution tried to make the political concerns universal by ridding society of its feudal yoke, it broke the bonds which had fettered the egoism of civil society. "Political emancipation was at the same time the emancipation of civil society from politics, from the appearance [*Schein*] of a universal content" (477). Feudal society was dissolved into its human foundation; but its foundation was still egoistical man. It was this man whom the French revolutionaries canonized in the "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen." "Thus man was not freed from religion; he received religious freedom. He was not freed from property. He received freedom of property. He was not freed

from the egoism of trade but received freedom to trade" (478).

At one and the same time, the Revolution constituted the true political state and dissolved civil society into a seriality of independent individuals whose sole relation is impersonal law. The member of civil society was seen as nonpolitical man. He appeared to be "natural man," the foundation of the political state. His rights were seen as natural rights, because all self-conscious activity was devoted to the political sphere.¹⁰ The error was that "the political revolution dissolves civil life into its constituent elements without revolutionizing these elements and without subjecting them to critique" (478). Thus, "man as a member of civil society is regarded as authentic man, as *homme* as opposed to *citoyen*, because he is man in his sensuous, individual and most *immediate* [*nächsten*] existence, while political man is only the abstract and artificial man, man as an allegorical, moral person. Actual man is recognized only in the form of the egoistical individual, true [*wahre*] man only in the form of the abstract *citoyen*" (478). It is in this sense that the French Revolution can be called a bourgeois revolution, though Marx does not yet use this term.

Marx cites Rousseau's *Social Contract*, which stresses that the founding of a nation requires a transformation of the individual from an isolated atom into a part of something greater than himself in such a way as to take from him his own powers and to give him new ones which derive from his relations with others. Political emancipation alone is not sufficient for this task: "Only when the actual individual man has taken back into himself the abstract citizen and, in his individual empirical life, in his individual work and in his individual relations has become generic being, only when he has recognized and organized his '*forces propres*' as social powers so that social power is no longer separated from him as political power, only then is human emancipation completed" (479). The political and social must be one and the same.

The Jewish Question and Civil Society

In the second section of his article, Marx treats another essay by Bauer which attempts to determine the relative "capacities" of Jews and Christians to be emancipated. Bauer's way of posing the

question transforms the old theological problem, whether the Jew or the Christian has a better prospect of salvation, into a more "enlightened" problem which asks not whether one or the other religion emancipates but which is more emancipating, the negation of Judaism or the negation of Christianity. The answer, of course, is that because Christianity represents a higher stage in the march of the Spirit through history, the Jew will have to pass through a Christian stage after he has negated his Judaism. Therefore, the Christian is more capable of emancipation.

Marx, again, "will try to break with the theological formulation of the problem," and to move it to the social plane (481). Bauer considers "the ideal and abstract essence of the Jew, his religion, as his whole nature [*Wesen*]" (480). By treating "the actual, secular Jew and not the sabbath Jew, as Bauer does," it will be possible to discover the nature of Jewish emancipation in the present historical moment. "Let us look for the secret of the Jew not in his religion, but rather let us look for the secret of his religion in the actual Jew" (481).

Marx sums up the social situation of the Jew:

What is the secular basis of Judaism? Practical need, self-interest.

What is the worldly cult of the Jew? Bargaining. What is his worldly god? Money.

Very well! Emancipation from bargaining and money, and thus from practical and real Judaism would be the self-emancipation of our era.¹¹ (P. 481)

Bauer himself saw that though the Jew may not be emancipated politically, his financial power gives him control over empires. This, says Marx, is simply the "Jewish way" of self-emancipation. More important, with or without the Jew, money has become a world power. The "practical spirit" of Judaism has become the spirit of the "Christian" nations. "The Jews have emancipated themselves insofar as the Christians have become Jews" (482). Marx cites descriptions of the United States, where the world is seen as "nothing but a stock exchange," and where "the preaching of the Gospel itself . . . has become an article of commerce" (483). Hence, "in the last analysis, the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation

of mankind from Judaism" (482). The question is not theological but practical.

Marx elaborates on the "Jewish" nature of civil society. Civil society is the state of need and of egoism. Its god is money. "Money is the jealous god of Israel before whom no other god may exist. Money degrades all the gods of man—and converts them into commodities. Money is the universal, self-sufficient [*für sich selbst konstituierte*] value of all things. Hence it has robbed the whole world, the human world as well as nature, of its own value. Money is the estranged [*entfremdete*] essence of man's work and of his being; this foreign essence dominates him, and he worships it" (484). All of this is contained, to be sure, only abstractly in the Jewish religion; but it is the actual viewpoint of real man in civil society. The relation between man and his fellows, and even between man and woman, is transformed into a commodity relation.¹² As in the Hegelian philosophy, subject and object have been in fact inverted in civil society. Money, the object, takes on the reified determination of a subject before which men pay homage.

The analysis of the "Judaism" of civil society illustrates the actual relation between the Jewish and the Christian religions. Judaism could not develop further theoretically because as a religion of practical need it could not be fulfilled in theory but only in practice. The truth of Judaism is its practice. This is why the Jews are able to adapt to changing social conditions. In the Christian world all moral and theoretical relations are external to man. The Christian God is separated from the individual believer and external to him just as the political state is separated from the individual in civil society. Judaism reaches the height of its perfection only within the Christian world wherein free play is given to individual life. Thus, "Christianity arose out of Judaism. It has again dissolved itself into Judaism" (486). Judaism is the practical application of the "sovereign and supreme" Christian man. It is the symbol of life in actual civil society, of its heterogeneity.

The relation between Christianity and Judaism is simply that, in the actual world, they are one and the same. "The Christian egoism of eternal bliss [*Seligkeitsegoismus*] in its completed praxis necessarily becomes the material egoism [*Leibesegoismus*] of the Jew; heavenly need becomes earthly need, and subjectivism be-

comes self-interest" (487). This is necessary because of the nature of civil society. Until it is changed, the Jew has every reason to cling to his religion.¹³ Marx concludes that "the *social* emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism" (487).

Marx's Changed Perspective

In *The Holy Family*, which Marx and Engels wrote in 1845, and of which Marx later said that it was their first expression of the "materialist theory of history," Marx refers with approval to the analysis presented in this essay. The discussion of the Jewish question in *The Holy Family* does not really go beyond the presentation just discussed. It is mainly a polemical attack designed to show that the "Critical Critique," as Bauer and his circle called themselves, falsifies real problems by turning them into speculative mysteries whose resolution is considered by their authors to be revolutionary. The burden of Marx's and Engels' argument is that the notion of freedom to which the "Critical Critique" adheres is so ethereal as to be meaningless. To will that man be free is not the same thing as to give him the capacity to be free. The capacity to be free is a product of the relations within civil society, whose analysis Marx began in "On the Jewish Question."

There is no need to cite the retrospective judgment in *The Holy Family* to assert that Marx has moved beyond the analysis of the Hegelian state, despite the fact that in the latter analysis the fundamentals of Marx's further development could be ascertained. But, is the advance a change either of method or of essential positive results; or is it only a modification whose origins are found in the earlier position? A comparison shows that the modifications result from Marx's shifting from the purely political perspective to one which concentrates on civil society.

Methodologically, Marx had elaborated his dialectical method, and had achieved a positive understanding of critical philosophy. He had used Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel's speculative idealism, and had applied it to the interrelated spheres of civil society and the state. Though he had made use of Feuerbach's notion of alienation, he did not restrict it to religious consciousness but applied it to the political phenomena he was studying. The results were,

first of all, the elaboration of the notion of man as generic being. This notion is, certainly, present in Feuerbach's "materialism," though in so abstract a manner as to be stripped of all meaning. Marx laid the groundwork for putting flesh on its bare bones by turning the direction of the inquiry from the abstract realm of the "religious" phenomena of politics to the concrete daily life of civil society. Thus, *generic being* does not refer to an abstract paradigm, a fixed essence, but is made concrete and historical.

Though Marx had not yet pushed the analysis of civil society to any great length, his critique of Hegel's state concluded with the positive affirmation that only in a democratic state, a state which is the abolition of the state as a realm apart, can man realize himself as a generic being. The path to the achievement of the democratic state passes, Marx asserted, by way of the universalization of the active right to vote. Marx had not yet realized that in virtue of the very distinctions between civil society and the state that he had discovered, he should have been applying the dialectic to civil society itself. His error was that he saw the "political" as a realm distinct unto itself in which the particular individual comes to his universality, whereas he himself had shown that such an assertion was only a "mystification," a "sophistry" of speculative reason.

It was evident in the "Exchange of Letters" that Marx was moving beyond his criticism of the Hegelian state, toward an analysis of the concrete social situation. He recognized the need to apply his method to the realm of civil society itself. This was implicit in the ship of fools metaphor and in the assertion in the second letter that the new world is already carried in the womb of the old. It became explicit in the third letter with the demand that the journal enter into actual political conflicts, that it teach those who are actually struggling why they struggle, and in the final assertion that all of this is nothing but a "confession."

"On the Jewish Question" carries over the methodological position at which Marx had arrived, and uses it to investigate a different domain. After showing the inadequacy of Bauer's position, Marx points to a new complex of problems. Three important developments are thus made.

As a result of the shift from a political analysis to the analysis

of society, Marx's use of the concept of alienation moves further than ever from that of Feuerbach. The most striking example of this occurs in the discussion of the role of money. Another example is the analysis of Judaism as a phenomenon of civil society alongside the various other strands which compose that sphere in which daily life is lived. This extension of the notion of alienation was implicit in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," and it is only natural that "On the Jewish Question" should carry through the new possibilities.

A second advance concerns the "flesh" Marx has begun to put on the bare bones of the generic being described abstractly in the essay on Hegel's state and the discussion of egoistic man in civil society. Again, there is nothing surprising here; the development could well have been foreseen. With the shift from a political perspective to an analysis of man in civil society, it is logical that new concreteness be added. The discussion of the nongeneric being of man in civil society and the analysis of the "Jewish" nature of that society are the first stammerings of a more complete analysis which will come later.

The most important difference between "On the Jewish Question" and the critique of Hegel's state is the rejection of the democratic state as a panacea for the political and social ills of society. The reason for this rejection is quite explicit: for all of its virtues, the imposition of a democratic state on a corrupt civil society will not lead to what Marx here calls "human emancipation."¹⁴ Marx's defense of democracy was based on an argument which looked only at the political forms and examined them in too abstract or "idealistic" a manner, and which could not possibly have correctly analyzed the nature of, or the changes which had to be introduced into civil society. The changed position has its grounds in Marx's critique of Hegel's state. It is important to recognize this, and not to be deceived by what seems to be a new, rich concreteness, but is in fact only the necessary filling-in of the blanks left by the earlier essay. Thus, again, there is only a modification of the basic position; and the modification is the result of a corrected application of the conclusions already reached.

The major differences between Marx's position the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," and that developed in "On the

Jewish Question" are only variations on one and the same theme. Auguste Cornu does not agree with the analysis presented here. He suggests that

by thus posing as the necessary condition of human emancipation the abolition of private property and of the reign of money, Marx, taking the defense of the class interests of the proletariat—still without expressly stating it—passed from the plane of humanity conceived in its general aspect to the plane of humanity as socially differentiated, and, in this movement [he passed] from democratism to communism. At the same time, he accentuated his tendency toward materialism by the more and more minute and profound analysis which he made of political and social relations and the reasons for their transformation. This article contained still, however, the remanents of idealism; this is explicable by the insufficiency of his economic and social analysis because of the fact that, not yet deliberately, by an active participation in the combat of the proletariat, placing himself on the plane of the class struggle, he did not yet realize that the proletariat was the necessary instrument for human emancipation, and did not yet introduce into the solution of that problem the internal contradictions of the capitalist order, nor class oppositions and the struggle of the proletariat.¹⁵

Cornu's assertion that "without expressly stating it" Marx took up the defense of the interests of the proletariat is borne out only by a very imaginative reading of the text—or by hindsight. As for Marx's passing "from democratism to communism," it is difficult to understand how he could have done so before he had discovered the role of the proletariat, as Cornu recognizes at the end of the citation. More interesting is Cornu's assertion concerning Marx's "tendency toward materialism" and "the remanents of his idealism." In my analysis I have deliberately avoided the terms *materialism* and *idealism* because of the confusion they invariably occasion in relation to Marx's evolution, largely due to the polemical usage made of them later. Such a confusion is evident in Cornu's implication that one is a "materialist" if one makes a "minute and profound analysis" of "political and social relations and the reason for their transformation," or if one takes the side of the proletariat. A word about the materialist and idealist sides of "On the Jewish

Question" will help clarify the changed perspective which shows itself in this essay.¹⁶

The theme of Marx's work has been shown to be the theory-praxis problem, the problem of making philosophy worldly and the world philosophical. The two facets of this endeavor can be respectively designated by the terms *idealist* and *materialist*. The problem for the idealist Marx is to show how philosophy must enter into the world, how that which is theoretically perfect discovers its own imperfection, senses the need to enter into the world to find a new, real completion. The problem for the materialist Marx is to show how the world becomes philosophical, how the particular existences develop toward their universality. It was only natural that, following the Hegelian synthesis, Marx concentrated on the idealist problem in his early work. Marx's work on the *Rheinische Zeitung* has to be seen as idealist from this perspective, despite its concern with the concrete detail. The "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State" marks the end of the emphasis on the purely idealist phase of Marx's development and, with its discovery of the importance of civil society, opens the materialist phase. However, it should be stressed that *the idealist phase is the condition of possibility of the materialist phase*. If philosophy does not enter the world and make demands on it, then only a mechanistic determinism can argue that the world will, of its own inclination, become philosophical.

The critique of Hegel's state was written from a "political" perspective. A political perspective and an idealist perspective, at this stage of Marx's development, share in the attempt to demonstrate the imperfection of that which passes itself off as perfect, whether it be the Hegelian-Prussian state or philosophy. The demonstration of the imperfection of the Hegelian state led Marx to his understanding of civil society as the key to the positive development on the side of the world, at first through the extension of the democratic state by means of the active right to vote.

Marx's materialism, the accent on the world's becoming philosophical, begins with the conclusions of the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State." In the "Exchange of Letters," Marx's ship of fools metaphor, his insistence that the new world is born in the womb of the old, and his confession metaphor point to a

shift in accent. "On the Jewish Question" confirms the changed accent both in its conclusions and in the empirical material which Marx brought to bear on his subject (his detailed knowledge of the French Revolution and his study of the "Free States of North America"). However, Marx's efforts on the materialist side were only beginning; he had not found a mediation which would enable him to account for the world's becoming philosophical, and he was not affirming that such a development would, mechanistically, take place by itself. Marx's second essay in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* offered the outlines of a solution: the proletariat.



THE PROLETARIAT: SOLUTION OF THE THEORY-PRAXIS PROBLEM

The "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*" was to have introduced a longer study of which the earlier criticism of Hegel's theory of the state was but one part. Though the "Introduction" was published in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, the demise of that journal in which the rest of the study would have appeared no doubt prevented the publication or continuation of the essay. Auguste Cornu suggests that Marx never completed the essay because he decided instead to write a history of the Convention, the most radical stage of the French Revolution, though he never completed the latter work either.¹ The section of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* which Marx's editors entitle the "Critique of Hegel's Dialectic and of his Philosophy in general" may have been intended as a part of the longer study. In fact, much of the material in the *Manuscripts* dealing with economics may have been intended for use in the never-completed longer study, which surely would have discussed Hegel's presentation of the relations obtaining in civil society.

The "Introduction" "sparkles with phrases which have become some of the most precious jewels of Marxism," notes John L. Lewis.² It is in this essay that one finds such famous passages as: "for man the root is man," "the Germans have *thought* in politics

what others have *done*,” “religion is the opium of the people,” “the head . . . is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat,” and so on. More important, it is here that the proletariat makes its entrance into the fabric of Marxism.

One must not be blinded by Marx’s scintillating aphorisms, but rather try to discover what lies beneath them, and to see whether and how his thought grows and advances. Judgments as to the theoretical importance of this short essay vary from those who, like Cornu, see it as an embryonic version of the 1848 *Communist Manifesto*³ to those who, with Friedrich, would assert that the theoretical abstractness and lack of concrete sociological analyses point to a fundamental weakness and the ultimate failure of the Marxian revolutionary endeavor.⁴ Our exposition will show that the essay can be understood correctly only within the context of Marx’s emerging dialectical theory, posing the resolution of the theory-praxis problem, and showing how in fact the world becomes philosophical and philosophy becomes worldly.

The Situation of the Critique

Marx begins with the now-familiar notion of the critique. “For Germany,” he writes, “the critique of religion has been essentially completed, and the critique of religion is the premise of all critique” (488).⁵ There is no doubt that in the article “On the Jewish Question” Marx’s notion of the critique extended beyond the critique of religion. The critique of religion had shown its own limitations; it had pointed the direction and cleared the path for the next extension of its object, posing the question of the “kind of emancipation” which was sought. The critique of religion can never come to a positive solution. Because of its object, it is necessarily self-negating, and, in negating itself this critique moves beyond itself, opening new domains. However, the negated moment—the critique of religion—remains present in the higher moment. It is in this sense that the critique of religion has been “essentially completed”: it has led to a new object of inquiry (“human emancipation,” as opposed to religious or political emancipation); and at the same time, it remains a premise for further critique inasmuch as the new object is revealed only after and through the application

of the critique of religion. In this sense, the "critique of religion" could be taken to mean, more generally, the critique of philosophical speculation, of the position which, by reifying or hypostatizing the givenness of the phenomena, is unable to fulfill the task which Marx attributes to the "true philosophical critique" in opposition to Hegel: "to explain the contradictions, to comprehend their genesis, their necessity" (377).

The critique of religion showed that man, seeking an Overman [*Übermensch*] in heaven somewhere, found in fact nothing but the appearance of himself, an Unman [*Unmensch*]. The next step is for man to seek himself in the real world. This is the "irreligious critique." "The foundation of irreligious critique is: *man makes religion*, religion does not make man" (488). Man's search for himself is not accomplished on the atomistic plane of individual psychology. On the contrary, "man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the *world of man*, state, society. This state and this society produce religion, an *inverted consciousness* of the world, because they are an *inverted world*. Religion is the generalized theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic *point d'honneur*, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its general ground for consolation and justification" (488). The search is social; and it takes place in an historically determined society.

With this extension of the critical philosophy, Marx moves beyond his Young-Hegelian origins in two important senses. First his notion of man as generic being, borrowed from Feuerbach, is made still more concrete, following the line of development already inaugurated in "On the Jewish Question." Whereas Feuerbach's generic being is, in the last analysis, only abstractly determined as social being, as a "being-with" others and with nature, Marx's interpretation is more concrete, insisting on the fact that "man is the *world of man*, state, society." ⁶ Secondly, Marx does not stop with the negative critique which shows religion to be a form of false consciousness that must and can be eliminated. Religion is the false consciousness of an "inverted world." Marx had shown that the Jewish religion has its roots in the "Jewish" world, and had argued that the emancipation from Judaism, and from religion in general, could be accomplished only through a change in this

world. Judaism is only one variety of the ideological false consciousness which is religion. The "inverted world" from which religion springs must be changed if man is to be emancipated "humanly."

It is important to understand Marx's move beyond the negative criticism offered by the Young Hegelians. The abolition of religion is the end of the illusory happiness of mankind; this is the first step. Along with this goes the demand that a new happiness be found. But, "religious suffering is at one time the *expression* of actual suffering and the *protest* against the actual suffering . . . [Religion] is the *opium* of the people" (488). Once the people have been disintoxicated, they awake to the real sufferings of the real world which are no longer hidden by ideological glasses. The service of the negative critique, says Marx, is to have plucked the imaginary flowers off the chains so that man will know his chains, will throw them off, and will pick the living flower (489). But, simply being freed from illusions is not to achieve positive freedom. This is the "revolution of shame" of which Marx spoke in the first of the "Exchange of Letters." Here, he recognizes that the negative must lead to a positive critique. "Thus, the critique of heaven changes itself into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, and the critique of theology into the critique of politics" (489).

It is relevant to recall here the passages from the *Vorarbeiten* in which Marx was trying to understand his own position as a post-Hegelian in relation to the post-Aristotelian situation. There, Marx described the history of philosophy as a succession of nodal points and practical movements. Ultimately, he was unable to explain why this succession took place; he was not able to understand the movement from one phase to another, and had to fall back on a "law of the will" which explained the turn to practice. It was clear to Marx that the history of philosophy showed cases where the philosopher defined his task as the making worldly of philosophy conjointly with the making philosophical of the world. This was the goal which Marx set for himself. His first attempts were unsuccessful; this was one of the reasons for his move to political journalism. In the early attempts, however, Marx set about developing the dialectic which was his positive extension of the critique

of his Young Hegelian friends. The developed sense of the term *critique* in the "Introduction" thus becomes doubly significant for the interpretation of Marx's development.

It should also be noted that Marx's dialectical interpretation of history plays a key role here. He speaks of the "task of history" as being the establishment of "the truth of this world," and insists that philosophy must put itself "in the service of history" (489). The "history" which philosophy serves is not the solidified past which the Historical School glorifies; nor is it simply a mechanical succession moving forward in accordance with objective laws. What is implicit here, and will be clearer when the nature of the proletariat as subject-object of history is explained, is that history is human history, the product of human praxis. History is not a demiurge, external to and other than human action; history is a possibility, and the critical philosophy in its service must help it realize itself, not from without but from within.

The Critique and Germany

Throughout the "Introduction," Marx refers to the conditions in the Germany of his time. Referring to the calendar of the French Revolution, Marx argues that a negative revolution destroying Germany's past would not even get Germany to the stage of France in 1789. Germany has shared with other nations their Restorations, but never their revolutions. Germany, he says, is in the company of Freedom only on the day of its burial. Marx again attacks the Historical School of law for justifying these German conditions on the grounds that "history" has created them. The Historical School, he remarks, might have invented German history were it not itself an invention of that very history. The liberals and chauvinists who think that Germany should find her own historical freedom deep in the Teutonic woods, in the ancient German conditions, come under attack as well. The kind of freedom they demand is the same freedom as that of a wild boar. It is not possible to return to the old conditions; the new must be developed by means of the critique and the dialectic.

Therefore, "war on German conditions! By all means! They are under the level of history, beneath all critique; but they remain

an object of the critique just as the criminal who is under the level of humanity is still the object of the executioner" (491). The critique is not a "passion of the head but the head of passion"; it does its work not like a fine-honed knife but like a gross weapon. The function of the critique is not to refute the enemy with subtle arguments. The enemy must be destroyed! The spirit of the times has already refuted the most subtle of intellectual defenses. As thought-forms the present conditions are not even worth thinking; but they do exist, and as existences they are despicable.

The critique must be put into action. German conditions obviously demand of philosophy that it enter into its period of practical movement. "Critique is no longer an end in itself but simply a *means*" (491). Because of the nature of the times, the search for truth is not permitted to rest in splendid isolation; philosophy becomes worldly, and has as its task the making philosophical of the world. But how is this to be done?

The first active function of the critique is to describe the suffering, the dejection and oppression of Germany, and then to show the interrelation between the different social spheres and their relation to the government. Marx's metaphors are quite physical and violent. His conception of the critique returns to the "revolution of shame" of which he spoke in the first of the "Exchange of Letters." "The point," he says, "is to permit the Germans not even a moment of self-deception and resignation" (492). The critique must "publicize" the shame of German conditions. Every sphere of German society must be criticized. "One must make these petrified relations dance by singing before them their own tune" (492). The things themselves, the petrified social relations, are doomed just like the ship of fools; in their womb, however, they carry a new society. The critique must teach those who struggle within these relations why they are in fact struggling. The forces of change must call things by their proper names; they must use the shame which the German people cannot help but feel in order to give them the courage to drive beyond their present conditions. This is the "confessional" function of the critique, with which Marx's programmatic third letter in the "Exchange of Letters" concluded.⁷

This first function of the critique is quite ambiguous, however, and appears to accord to philosophy—of course, in its critical

garb—a greater role than might be justified. Marx seems to think of philosophy as a paradigm in terms of which the world can be criticized and therewith, changed. Yet, as has been seen, philosophy is a part of the world, not an external observer knowing the truth of the whole; its function is to aid in the realization of internal possibilities, not to interject an external goal (as in the traditional Leninist view of the political party). This is why Marx does not stop here, insisting that “revolutionary energy and intellectual self-confidence alone are not sufficient” for the task (501).

Germany and Its Philosophy

If the critique is to be applied to really human problems, to modern conditions and their effects on man, it must leave Germany says Marx. For example, a major problem is the relation of industry to the political sphere. In Germany, this is discussed in terms of protective tariffs, trade prohibitions, and the like. German political economy, says Marx, is just now beginning, and it begins at the point at which the French and English political economy have ended. “Thus, in France and England it is a question of abolishing monopoly which has developed to its final consequences; in Germany it is a question of proceeding to the final consequences of monopoly” (494).⁸

The problem is that on the one hand the critique must turn toward action, and indeed has an object for its action, at least on a first level, in the form of the present German conditions, while, on the other hand, Marx has seen that even the total negation of German conditions is insufficient to create a modern, truly human society. The question is, in Germany, can a revolution get not merely to the level of modern nations but beyond that, to a “human level” (497)? What can the critique, the philosopher, do?

Marx observes that “German philosophy of law [*Recht*] and of the state is the only German history which stands *al pari* with the official modern present” (495). For this reason, the critique must be directed not at the actual German conditions, but at their modern abstract formulation by German philosophy. “As the old peoples lived their prehistory in imagination, in mythology, so we Germans have lived our posthistory in thought, in philosophy.

We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the ideal extension of German history" (494).

Marx's position here is similar to the approach in the second part of "On the Jewish Question." Philosophy in Germany is a kind of religion. But, whereas Judaism correlated well with the real world in which it found itself and, therefore, there was no reason to demand that the Jews abandon it, there is a dysfunctional relation between German reality and the state-religion which German philosophy tried to justify. The solution to the German problem cannot be simply to change reality in order to make impossible the German state and its philosophy. In effect, no correlation between German civil society and its state exists: theoretically the German state should be impossible. Marx's solution will have to be double-pronged: the critique will have to remain philosophical, and through this, in a second step, a way will have to be opened for a change in reality as well.

Marx speaks of two "parties" which attempt to deal with German liberation: the "practical party" and the "theoretical party."⁹ It will be recalled that in one of the notes appended to the dissertation, Marx had designated two streams of contemporary philosophicopolitical endeavor, the "liberal party" and "positive philosophy," and had pointed out that, paradoxically, each did precisely the opposite of what it intended to do: positive philosophy begins from the fact that the world does not correspond to the philosophical system, but instead of changing the world strives to reconstruct a better philosophy; while the liberal party "adheres to the concept," to philosophy, and from this vantage point strives to change the world. The analysis of the two parties that Marx gives in the "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*" is more sophisticated, for he is more certain about the way in which philosophy should be understood during the stage of practical movement.

The practical party demands the negation of philosophy. In itself, this demand is not wrong. However, the method adopted precludes the realization of the project. Philosophy cannot be negated by being ignored; to look away from it is not to negate its existence. The practical party argues that philosophy does not form a con-

crete part of the German actuality which it wants to change. Yet, Marx's whole point has been to argue that, on the contrary, philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of the state, plays a concrete and important role in German society. The practical party argues that philosophy must deal with real conditions, not with philosophers' dreams. Yet, insists Marx, philosophy (or *ideology*, we might say) is part of these real conditions. Marx therefore admonishes the practical party: "*You cannot transcend [Aufheben] philosophy without actualizing it*" (495).

The theoretical party falls victim to the same one-sidedness, but inverts the form. It looks only at the "critical struggle" of philosophy against the German world, not seeing that though philosophy belongs to the world, it is still only its ideal prolongation. This means that the theoretical party, for all its "critique," is not critical of itself. It uses the presuppositions of philosophy, but it either stops with them, or else introduces demands which philosophy cannot legitimate. These demands can be made valid only through the negation of a previous philosophy, or, in the present case, by the negation of philosophy altogether. The problem of the theoretical party is that "it thought that it could actualize philosophy without transcending it (496).

What Marx is demanding is, in effect, the unity of the two parties in *one* critique.¹⁰ It is noteworthy that he rejects the simple *option* for a world-changing praxis, insisting that while praxis is indeed necessary, it must be a praxis which grows out of philosophy's self-transcendence. This is an important qualification to the first function Marx gives to the critique, and points to his dialectical understanding of a reality infected with the demands of rationality, and a philosophy which has become worldly. The unitary critique can start from reality or from philosophy; in both cases, so long as it remains critical (i.e., dialectical), the results will be the same.

What Is to Be Done: Praxis

Marx observes that "in politics the Germans have *thought* what other nations have *done*. Germany has been their theoretical consciousness" (496). It has already been argued that a part of the

lived world of German society is its philosophy, and that "German philosophy is the ideal extension of German history" (494). In trying to understand the role of the critique, Marx recognizes that in addition to the concrete actuality of German society, which is "beneath the level of the critique," there exists a kind of false or religious consciousness which disguises and embellishes the actual situation, giving it a certain modernity and intellectual respectability. This is one of the aspects of the philosophy of the state elaborated by Hegel. Further, however, Marx has to take into account the fact that the Hegelian model is not a perfect reflection, but is based on conditions in those modern states where there does in fact exist a truly political state. This means that Marx's analysis has a relevance which goes beyond the German context. The Hegelian model is built upon the separation of the political state from actual man and his real life in civil society. This is not the case in Germany, for there the state does not exist as such. Hence, "if the *status quo* of the German political system [*Staatswesen*] stresses the completion of the *ancien régime*, the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, the *status quo* of German political science [*Staatswissen*] expresses the incompleteness of the modern state, the damage to the flesh itself" (496). German reality is a negation of the modern idea of the state. Still more significantly, German political theory shows that the modern state itself is a negative or incomplete phenomenon.

Marx's statements about Hegel's philosophy reflect the fact that he considers it a "nodal point" which must lead to a "practical movement." "The critique of the German philosophy of the state and of law [*Recht*], which attained its most consistent, profound and final formulation with Hegel, is at once a critical analysis of the modern state and the actuality connected with it and also the decisive negation of all previous modes of German political and legal consciousness whose most prominent and general expression at the level of science is precisely the speculative *Philosophy of Right*" (496). Hegel's philosophy of the state is seen as having three facets: it is the negative critique of the German *status quo*; it offers a positive analysis of the modern state; and, simultaneously, it is bound by the inherent limits of speculative philosophy which force it, in the last analysis, to reduplicate the flaws of the

status quo of which it was the decisive negation. This latter feature determines the approach Marx takes to it and to philosophy in general. If so critical a philosophy as Hegel's is unable to resolve the problems of the modern state and its relationship to civil society, and is doomed by its very nature to fall back into a speculative mysticism, then this must mean that it is necessary for philosophy to enter into its period of "practical movement." This is a theoretical necessity, inscribed in the nature of philosophy itself. Marx's prescription is that "as the resolute opponent of the previous mode of German political consciousness, the critique of the speculative *Philosophy of Right* does not take place in its own sphere but in tasks for whose solution only one means is given: *praxis*" (497).¹¹

The movement of praxis which Marx considers the correct approach for the philosophy of his time is not simply the denial of philosophy. This was clear in the discussion of the practical party. Marx's approach to philosophy is the same as his approach to the critique of religion: philosophy is essentially completed with Hegel; yet it remains the premise of the praxis which follows on that completion. It must continue to be applied during that praxis in order to make possible the praxis, to make it rational. The completion and transcendence of philosophy which Marx demands, and which premises the turn to praxis, is accomplished by a reinterpretation of the Hegelian "nodal point," and an application of this reinterpretation in order to define the "tasks" for whose solution praxis is necessary. To use one of Marx's favorite metaphors, the victory of philosophy is simultaneously its loss.

In his "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," and in "On the Jewish Question," Marx had already been using the dialectic to define the tasks which praxis will have to resolve. But he did not resolve the difficult problem of the *means* necessary for their solution. The demand for democracy and then the demand that the social conditions which engender the "Jewishness" of civil society be changed both presage the search for an instrument, a mediator, by which the world can be made philosophical and philosophy made worldly.

To resolve the problems which the critique uncovers, "a passive element, a material basis" is needed (498). "The weapon of

the critique clearly cannot replace the critique of the weapons; material force must be overthrown by material force. But, too, theory becomes a material force when it demonstrates *ad hominem*,¹² and it demonstrates *ad hominem* when it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp things by the root. For man, the root is man himself" (497).

There is nothing extraordinary in these statements, despite their ringing rhetoric. It would be erroneous to think that the position taken here is a "democratic humanism" simply because of Marx's appeal to the masses, and his "for man, the root is man himself" statement. It will be recalled that a very similar rhetoric was used by Feuerbach and Bakunin in their contributions to the "Exchange of Letters." This type of language, and this interpretation of the function of philosophy, were very much in the air among the Young Hegelians. Another statement in this essay demonstrates this point. Marx speaks of the radicality of German theory, which does not just negate religion but transcends it positively. He says: "The critique of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man, hence, with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, contemptible being" (497). Marx is only restating the results of the collective critique of religion which had occupied the Young Hegelians. The next step is to use these conclusions in order to transcend them.

The difficult and politically crucial problem which remains to be solved is to determine how the theory can grasp the masses. In its past, Germany had theoretical revolutions which also had practical consequences; such was the Reformation, Germany's true revolution. But Luther's revolution was incomplete. It replaced one kind of slavery by another: universal priesthood replaced the clerical class; religion ceased to be externally manifested but remained internally; the body was freed but the heart was enchained. Luther freed the layman from priestly domination; but at the same time his doctrine put the priest inside every layman. A second revolution is needed. "As the revolution at that time began with the brain of a monk, now it begins with the brain of the philosopher" (497). In Luther's time, Germany was the vassal of Rome; today, she is the vassal of Russia and of Prussia, and of the philis-

tines who govern her. Philosophy must emancipate Germany. How?

"Theory is only actualized in a people," affirms Marx, "inasmuch as it is the actualization of their needs. Will the enormous gap between the demands of German thought and the answers of German actuality correspond to the gap between civil society and the state and of civil society with itself? Will the theoretical needs become immediate practical needs? It is not sufficient that thought should seek its actualization; actuality must itself strive toward thought" (498-99). It is necessary that Marx be able to show, dialectically, that there exists in the logic of the things themselves a tendency which moves them toward the demands of thought. It is not enough that philosophy "will" that it become worldly; the world too must want to become philosophical. The analyses in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State" and in "On the Jewish Question" concerning the nature of the state and of the civil society which is the prerequisite of that state lead to the conclusion that there is indeed such a movement in reality. Marx will have to show more precisely in what it consists. It will have to be an objective movement, but at the same time, one which has subjective results: the creation of revolutionary needs.

Praxis and the Proletariat

German actuality does not seem up to the task with which the philosopher confronts it. Its practice is still lingering at stages which theory has long since left behind and judged inadequate. How can Germany move toward a truly modern revolution which would eliminate not only its present oppression, but which would move beyond the contradictions which plague modern states as well? "A radical revolution can only be a revolution of radical needs, whose presuppositions and birthplaces seem precisely to be lacking."¹³ Marx has to show, both in theory and in concrete terms, that a revolutionary future awaits the Germans.

Germany has not even had the partial emancipations which have taken place in other countries. It has all the deficiencies of the modern state but none of the advantages. This situation has both positive and negative aspects. "It is not *radical* revolution,

universal human emancipation which is an utopian dream for Germany. What is utopian is the *merely* political revolution, the revolution which would leave the pillars of the house standing" (500).¹⁴ A merely political revolution would be utopian first of all because even the most perfect political state does not achieve the desired union of the particular citizen with the universal which is the state; human emancipation and political emancipation do not necessarily coincide, for, as Marx saw in "On the Jewish Question," "*political* emancipation . . . is but the final form of human emancipation within the present world order" (462). Second, a political revolution takes place when "a particular class by virtue of its particular situation undertakes the universal emancipation of society" (500). Such a revolution could emancipate the society only if the whole of the society were in the position of the particular class, which, in the case of Germany with its need of a bourgeois revolution, means having or having access to money and education. If the particular class were to create the conditions for universal emancipation then by this very act it would transcend itself as particular and become universal.

Historically, the particular class which tries to make the revolution becomes identified with the whole of society and, indeed, identifies itself with that whole. "Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class claim to be the universal class" (501). This is what happened during the French Revolution, where the bourgeoisie represented the sphere of emancipation over against the nobility and the clergy who represented the old oppressive order. For a revolution to succeed, this polarity must exist: "If a people's revolution is to coincide with the emancipation of a particular class [*Klasse*]¹⁵ of civil society, if *one* Estate [*Stand*] is to stand for the Estate of the whole society, then all the defects of that society must, conversely, be concentrated in another class, then a particular Estate must be the Estate of universal offense and the incorporation of universal limitation, then a particular social sphere [*Sphäre*] must stand for the notorious crime of society as a whole so that the freeing of this sphere appears as the universal self-emancipation" (501).

In Germany, no such class exists; there is no negative representative of the whole society which could identify, even only momen-

tarily, with the whole of the people; there is no one who can say "I am nothing, and I should be everything" (501). In France, on the other hand, every class is a "political idealist," says Marx; each thinks that it is the universal class, and acts as if this were the case. Hence, in France a partial emancipation is a step on the way to total emancipation; the mantle of the "universal class" passes from hand to hand, and each liberation is a step toward universal liberation. In Germany, the relation of classes is not "dramatic" but "epic," says Marx. A revolution, however, comes only from the dramatic confrontation of opposites. The episodic relations between classes make a partial emancipation impossible. Emancipation in Germany must come from the "immediate conditions, through material necessity, through the chains themselves" which will force one class to make the truly universal revolution (503). Thus far, Marx's analysis of the relations within civil society has not permitted him to discover whence the "material necessity" of revolution will come.

"Where then is the positive possibility of German emancipation?" asks Marx.

Answer: In the formation of a class with radical chains, of a class of civil society which is not a class of civil society, of an Estate which is the dissolution of all Estates, of a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and which claims no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is done to it; a sphere which can invoke no historical title but only a human one, which is not in one-sided opposition to the consequences but is in total opposition to the premises of the German political system; a sphere, finally, that cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society, thereby emancipating them, which, in a word, is the complete loss of humanity and can only redeem itself through the complete redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a particular Estate is the proletariat. (Pp. 503-4)

The key to Marx's argument is the term *formation* of the proletariat. The proletariat as such does not yet exist in Germany, though Marx does say that it is beginning to appear with the recent industrialization. The proletariat, Marx notes, is not the re-

sult of the poverty which arises from natural circumstances; such poverty existed in all societies and has not created the conditions of a proletarian revolution which would be a universal revolution. The proletariat is the result of an "artificial poverty" created by a specific type of society. Though in this essay Marx does not pursue further the nature of this society, he obviously has in mind the capitalist society. He is thinking dialectically, and understanding history as the positive development of the conditions of freedom.

The increasingly obvious misery of a formerly rural segment of the population, driven to the cities and factories, had drawn the attention of charitable souls and social theorists of conservative (Carlyle, F. von Baader) and radical (Hess, Engels) tendencies. Marx's notion of the proletariat differs from these in its dialectical rigor—though it has been subjected to an often bewildering variety of interpretations. It has been suggested that this is merely a logical move, an inversion of the Hegelian notion of the bureaucracy as the universal class. Or, that its origins lie in the Hegelian dialectic of the Master and Slave, which is then traced back to the Christian doctrine of the salvation of suffering mankind. Others have a different tack, either comparing the proletariat with the Third Estate of the French Revolution, or seeing its origins in Marx's readings of contemporary French socialists and/or von Stein's study of French socialism and communism. While all of these interpretations have some plausibility, it should be noted that Marx never claimed to have discovered the principle of class struggle,¹⁶ and moreover, that the discussion of the proletariat here still takes place on a philosophical level, determined by the necessity of finding the mediating principle in terms of which philosophy can be made worldly and the world made philosophical. Hence, attention must be called to the two-sided formulation of Marx's demand for a proletarian revolution.

The proletariat is introduced, first of all, as a kind of logical missing link. A material element is needed in which theory incarnates itself in order to become a weapon capable of destroying the unworthy German conditions and creating new, "philosophical" ones. This material element could only be the proletariat, for the other classes of society have already had their day in the partial revolutions in France and England. Further, a raw determinism is

avoided by choosing a "material force" which is nonetheless subjective. The subjective nature of the proletariat, its position as subject-object of the capitalist production process, has been stressed by Georg Lukács.¹⁷ The proletariat is produced by capitalism; this is its "artificial" formation. At the same time, it produces and reproduces the capitalist conditions which objectively define it. As subject-object of capitalist society, the proletariat is uniquely suited to mediate between the poles of that society and to overcome it by instituting a classless society.

Second, and more important, the proletariat is not presented as a mere logical construct. Marx argues that the proletariat is *in fact* being formed by the evolution of German society. He notes that "if the proletariat announces the dissolution of the existing order of things, then it is only expressing the secret of its own being, for it is the factual dissolution of this order" (504). There is a logic of the social relations themselves, which Marx attempts to understand dialectically, that creates the proletariat. Put in another way, Hegel's philosophy of the state presents the completion of the political state, while at the same time it illustrates the contradictions and the eventual dissolution of that state. In a similar manner, the present society creates the proletariat as its necessary complement, while this proletariat is at the same time the negation of the very order which created it. Marx notes that if the proletariat demands the negation of private property all that it is doing is making into a principle of society the very principle that society made into the principle of the proletariat. There is, in other words, a subtle dialectic being engaged here to account for the necessity of the formation of the proletariat "out of the entrails" of the present society (to pick up a metaphor from "On the Jewish Question").

German emancipation, total human emancipation, will be the fruit of the proletarian revolution. This revolution cannot be reduced to a deterministic evolution through a necessary change in passive matter. The passive matter, the proletariat, has to *want* and *need* to become philosophical in the same way that philosophy wants and needs to become worldly. "As philosophy finds in the proletariat its material weapons, so the proletariat finds in philosophy its spiritual weapons, and once the lightening of thought has struck in this native soil of the people, the Germans will complete

their emancipation and become men" (504). The proletariat thus plays a double mediating role. It supplies the material weapons for philosophy's becoming worldly; and it uses philosophy as its own spiritual weapon, making the world philosophical.

Marx has found a way to achieve that union of philosophy and the world after which he had striven since the dissertation period. He summarizes his results:

The only practically possible emancipation of Germany is the emancipation from the standpoint of the theory which explains that for man the highest being is man. In Germany the emancipation from the Middle Ages is possible only if at the same time there is emancipation from the partial victories over the Middle Ages. In Germany, no kind of bondage can be broken without every kind of bondage being broken. . . . The emancipation of the German is the emancipation of mankind. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart is the proletariat. Philosophy cannot be actualized without the transcendence [Aufhebung] of the proletariat; the proletariat cannot be transcended without the actualization of philosophy. (Pp. 504-5)

The realization of philosophy is the transcendence of the proletariat, of the society based on class. Both of these tasks can only be achieved by the proletarian revolution.

Evaluation

The necessity of the proletarian revolution which will create the classless society—and, indeed, the nature of the proletariat itself—is the misunderstood center of the Marxian theory. The practical and theoretical debates to which it has given rise themselves provide the material for a multifaceted study. What is striking, however, is that inasmuch as the majority of Marx's supporters and critics ignore the theory-praxis problem as the theoretical underpinning of the evolving position which culminates in this dialectical theory of the proletarian revolution, their jousts with it often recall the valiant but misguided struggles of that knight-errant of tragicomedy, Don Quixote. Mistaking appearances for reality, their fetishized facts prevent them from appreciating both the strength

and the suppleness of this dialectical position. Although it cannot be our task here to "prove" the applicability of Marx's theory to contemporary society, it is necessary to clarify some of the oft-repeated misinterpretations to which it has given rise.

It is often argued that history has refuted the "historical materialism" on which Marx built his theory. The rough edges seem smoothed over; the miserable proletariat of the moralist receives an ever-growing share of the pie. Recourse to the "third world" as a substitute proletariat satisfies the "misery criterion," but opens more problems than it solves. Neocapitalism or state socialism seems to have provided a third way, a kind of Hegelian higher unity of the opposites. Revolution no longer appears on history's agenda, and its present apostles seem to be utopian dreamers or foolish fanatics.

Yet Marx's theory is not a moralistic socialist Darwinism in which the proletariat would be the "ethically fittest" to survive the class struggle; it is a dialectical theory, understandable only in its own terms. It will be recalled that Marx's critique of Hegel continually attacked the uncritical mixing of empirical facts with theoretical categories which enabled Hegel to continually rediscover the categories of the *Logic* within the real world. Hegel had defined state and civil society as opposite poles, and attempted to mediate between them in what Marx saw as an illegitimate manner. Marx criticized the identity which Hegel constructed as the "identity of two enemy armies, where every soldier has the 'possibility' of becoming a member of the 'enemy' army through 'desertion' . . ." (321). Hegel's tactic was to treat actual, empirical extremes as determinations of one essence, and to mediate between them by the "mystical" recourse to the Idea as Absolute Subject. As opposed to this, Marx developed his own dialectical method, one succinct definition of which is worth citing here:

The true philosophical criticism does not point out the contradictions as subsistent; it explains them, comprehends their genesis, their necessity. It takes them in their specific signification. This comprehension [Begreifen] does not consist, as Hegel implies, in once again recognizing the determinations of the logical concept throughout, but in taking up the specific logic of the specific object. (P. 377)

This "specific logic of the specific object" is what Marx seeks in the "Introduction." It enables him to assert that the present system will evolve, out of its own essential nature, its opposite, the proletariat, which will make a revolution negating the system which gave birth to it.

To assert that there is no reason that the proletariat remain eternally opposed to the existent order is to ignore its dialectical genesis within the Marxian theory. The specific form in which the particularity of the proletariat is expressed may change; nonetheless, its particularity remains. To envisage a reconciliation which would not be a revolution destroying this particularity is possible only by recourse to the "mystical" analysis which Marx criticized in Hegel. One would have to fall back on some kind of "essence" of which it could be claimed that the two classes of society are only opposed determinations, whose union in a higher stage is possible. (And, implicitly or explicitly, this is what is invoked by those who make the "modern" claim that the class struggle has been transcended.) The tension may have been lessened by various palliatives; but no quasi-Hegelian "transubstantiation" is possible.

But, has the proletariat ceased to exist; has the growing material wealth of society rendered it obsolete? Without entering into the sociological detail,¹⁸ the theoretical origins of the proletariat indicate that this position can only be justified through a nondialectical, empiricist hypostatization of Marx's analysis. The proletariat is not defined in moral terms; the proletarian is not that archetypal image of the sweating, starving individual, brutalized by a Taylorized production process and exploited from morn till night. Marx speaks of the *formation* of the proletariat, and expects the proletarian revolution to result from the development of proletarian class-consciousness. The myth—furthered by the Moscow-oriented Communist Parties—of the "absolute pauperization" of the working class is just that—a myth: it has nothing to do with Marx's position.¹⁹ The revolution of which Marx spoke was not the product of the *lumpen* elements, dispossessed from the wealth of bourgeois society; it was the culmination from within of that society.²⁰ This is why the proletariat must be understood as the subject-object of history, and not an external force, breaking and destroying past developments.

But what are "they" waiting for? Why has there been no proletarian revolution? The theoretical correctness of the Marxian theory is not invalidated by "their" inaction. Insofar as the proletariat is in formation, today the problem must not be understood as "theirs," but as ours. Marx's theory is still abstract; it is theory, not sociological description. The theory is subtle, for it demands both subjective and objective mediations. Both change as history moves forward. This, however, does not undermine the theoretical formulation; on the contrary, it means simply that the sociological concretion must be continually revised, without, however, affecting the dialectical theory which is at its base.

The conceptual solution at which Marx has arrived is still only an outline, lacking the full mediation necessary. As theory, communism contains three elements. Philosophy must be shown to become worldly, to make demands on reality. The world must be shown to become philosophical; the contradictory social relations must tend toward a resolution. Finally, a material principle on which philosophy's demands are made, and which incarnates the tendency to resolve the social contradictions, is needed. Theoretically, the material principle must be subjective, conscious, and able to incarnate in itself the demands of philosophy; and it must be objective, a product of the contradictions in civil society, and the bearer of the principle of the resolution of those contradictions. It is in this context that Marx's discussion of the proletariat must be understood.



AFFIRMATION OF THE NEW POSITION

The groundwork of Marx's future theory is now established. The abstract notions with which he began have been reformulated and fitted together consistently. Of course, it is not possible, on the basis of this framework, to predict in minute detail Marx's future political activity, which was obviously affected by the changing complexion of the times in which he lived. Nor does this groundwork permit one to predict the intricate structures of Marx's future *magnum opus*, *Capital*. What is possible, however, is that the attentive reader who encounters Marx's later work will read it with a sense of recognition; he will recognize familiar methodological turns, the continued use of the critical philosophy and the accompanying dialectic with its concern that philosophy become worldly and the world philosophical. The reader will not find many Marxes—the economist, the political thinker, the journalist, and the revolutionary—but will recognize the unity which guides Marx's life work. Only on this basis is it possible to appreciate Marx at his full value and to comprehend and criticize both his own work and the theories and practice of those who consider themselves to be his disciples.

To illustrate the way in which the groundwork elaborated here can help in understanding Marx's further work, and to see that in

fact this further work confirms the interpretation offered in this essay, our final chapter will treat two works written in Paris in 1844. The first of these, "Critical Notes on 'The King of Prussia and Social Reform,'" is a political polemic directed against Arnold Ruge, whose article, "The King of Prussia and Social Reform," had appeared in the German émigré journal, *Vorwärts*. Then, it will be interesting to analyze some key notions in the so-called *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* (the *Paris Manuscripts*) to see the first results of Marx's encounter with political economy.

*Political Affirmation: "Critical Notes on
'The King of Prussia and Social Reform' "*

After the demise of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, there remained one German émigré journal in Paris, the *Vorwärts*, which appeared twice weekly. In 1844, the *Vorwärts* published a satirical attack on the Prussian monarchy by Arnold Ruge. Most of the article was on a petty, gossipy level. However, Ruge also attempted to refute the judgment of Louis Blanc's journal, *La Réforme*, which saw in the Silesian weaver's revolt a sign of the coming era of social reform in Germany. Ruge argued that social reforms could only follow a profound political reform, whose basis was lacking in backward Prussia with its autocratic ruler.

Ruge published his article under the pseudonym, "A Prussian." It was most likely this pseudonym, as Mehring suggests, that aroused Marx's anger and caused him to reply to Ruge's article. Ruge was a citizen of Saxony, and none of the major contributors to *Vorwärts* were of Prussian nationality. Hence, the pseudonym seemed to imply that the article was written by Marx, the only Prussian citizen of any importance living in radical circles in Paris at the time. Mehring indicates that perhaps Ruge chose this pseudonym in order to give more weight to his criticisms by making them appear to be directed at his own monarch. Even so, he continues, "it is quite understandable that Marx hastened to parry the trick of the alleged 'Prussian.' " ¹

It is easy to visualize Marx writing his reply to Ruge's article in a flash of satirical anger, drawing on the factual material on which

he was working, and reaffirming the theoretical conclusions at which he had arrived. Marx ignores Ruge's satire, concentrating on the analysis of the Silesian weaver's revolt, which Ruge had seen as an isolated event to which the King could reply only with administrative measures because of the "unpolitical" nature of the German state. Ruge argued that social revolts in the unpolitical German state were doomed to failure, and that Germany had first to become a political state, like England and France, in order—only then—legitimately to oppose the King and his state with a political revolution. At that time, argued Ruge, Germany can have a "social revolution with a political soul."

Marx had already elaborated his views on the relation between civil society and the political state, both in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," and in "On the Jewish Question." It is on the basis of those analyses and his understanding of the dialectic of proletarian revolution that he criticizes Ruge.

Marx begins by looking at England, a "political state." England is the home of pauperism; even the German term for pauperism ("*der Pauperismus*") is borrowed from the English language, says Marx.² In England, this problem is of a universal nature; it is not the result of a particular or temporary aberration. Yet the measures taken have not gone to its roots. Marx cites various British economists in order to show that the basis of the problem is not even theoretically clear to the English. English legislation relative to the poor has a history of failures. Attitudes toward the poor changed as their numbers increased until, finally, the poor themselves were blamed for their poverty, and all that was done was to discipline them and to perpetuate their situation. "Granted, then," says Marx, "that the charges our 'Prussian' directs at German society are founded. Does the explanation lie in the *unpolitical* condition of Germany? But if the bourgeoisie of unpolitical Germany cannot grasp the general significance of a partial misery, the bourgeoisie of *political* England, on the other hand, has failed to appreciate the general significance of a universal misery that has brought its universal significance to attention partly by periodic recurrence in time, partly by extension in space, and partly by the failure of all attempts to remedy it."³

French history reveals similar phenomena. The French Revolu-

tion attempted to suppress poverty by political means. Legislation was enacted; yet all that resulted was just "one more ordinance in the world, and . . . one year later the Convention was besieged by starving women." ⁴ Napoleon too attempted to introduce relief for the poor by legislative means; but the results again were only failure. The abolition of poverty can come, affirms Marx, only with the abolition of the proletariat. The problem, then, is can the state abolish the proletariat?

The French and English examples show that the political state reacts to the *social* problem of poverty in a political and administrative manner. "Can the state behave otherwise?" asks Marx rhetorically.⁵

"The state and the organization of society are not, from the political standpoint, two different things. The state is the organization of society. So far as the state admits the existence of social evils, it attributes them either to natural laws, which no human power can change, or to private life, which is independent of the state, or to the inadequacy of administration, which is dependent on it. . . . In the end, every state seeks the cause of its ills in accidental or intentional defects of administration and therefore seeks the remedy in reprimand of the administration." ⁶

The state is political, and as such its range of responses is limited to political ones. As the organization or administration of society, the state is different from society and separated from it. If some facet of the society is out of kilter, the state must either attribute the defect to something beyond its control ("natural laws," or "private life"), or correct some inadequacy in itself. The inadequacy of the state is by definition, administrative, and the remedy will have to fall in this domain, and will not effect the essence of civil society.

The state cannot transcend the contradiction between the intentions of the administration and the means and resources available to it, without transcending itself, for it itself is based on the opposition of public and private life, of the general and the particular interest. Administration is formal; its power ceases where civil life begins. Consequently, "impotence is the natural law of administration." ⁷ Marx had already seen that the administration—

the bureaucracy—is based on a formalism which reifies its objects, treating them as things to be manipulated. This reification, however, prohibits the administrators from truly affecting the living relations with which they must deal. To be effective in the struggle against poverty, the administration would have to transcend its own nature, ending the split between civil society and the state. But to do this, civil society, and not the political state, would have to be changed; a political revolution would alter only the form of the administrative formalism, not its content. The change Marx had expected to result from the introduction of active voting rights and democracy is now seen as following from the proletarian revolution.

A critical appreciation of the theoretical basis of the modern political state, and of German conditions, leads to a different interpretation of the Silesian weavers' revolt than that of Ruge.

Were the "Prussian" to take the correct standpoint [writes Marx], he would find that not a single French or English labor revolt possessed such a theoretical and conscious character as the uprising of the Silesian weavers. . . . The Silesian uprising begins precisely where the French and English labor revolts end, with the consciousness of the nature of the proletariat. The action itself bears this superior character. Not only the machines, the rivals of the worker, are destroyed, but also account books and titles to property. While all other movements were directed first against the visible enemy, the industrial lord, this movement is at the same time directed against the hidden enemy, the banker.⁸

The weavers were not misled into transferring their revolt to the political plane. They revolted for social reasons, and they demanded social remedies. They understood implicitly that the roots of their misery lay in the social system, and not simply in the immediate capitalist oppressor.

Marx compares the action of the Silesians with that of the French workers at Lyons in 1831, which was hitherto the most significant working class revolt. Precisely because of the tradition of *political* struggle, the French struggle stopped short.

The more developed and general the political intelligence of a people, the more the proletariat—at least at the beginning of the

movement—wastes its energies in irrational and useless uprisings which are suppressed in blood. Because it thinks in political form, it sees the cause of all evils in will and all remedies in force and the overthrow of a particular form of the state. . . . Thus the political understanding [of the workers at Lyons] clouded the roots of their social misery, distorted their insight into their actual aims, and deceived their social instinct.⁹

The point is that the problem cannot be solved from the top down, by means of administrative or political change; the “general principle of social ills [lies] in the principle of the state itself, thus in the existing organization of society of which the state is the active, self-conscious, and official expression.”¹⁰ With the social revolution, the political state as such must disappear.

Marx’s analysis is clearly based on the insights developed in the “Introduction to a Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*,” the reading of which he recommends to the “Prussian.”¹¹ The actions of the proletariat represent the completion of philosophy; the proletariat is the agent which will make the world philosophical and philosophy worldly. Marx talks about the capacity of the German workers for education, and refers favorably to Weitling’s¹² *Guarantees of Harmony and Freedom* as far better than any bourgeois work on social theory. “If one compares the insipid mediocrity of German political literature with this tremendous and brilliant literary debut of the German workers . . . one must predict an athletic figure for the German Cinderella. . . . It must be granted that the German proletariat is the *theorist* of the European proletariat, just as the English proletariat is its economist and the French proletariat its politician.”¹³

The weavers’ revolt confirms Marx’s analysis of the revolutionary future of Germany, of which it is the first stage. “It must be admitted that Germany, though incapable of *political* revolution, has a classical vocation to *social* revolution. As the impotence of the German bourgeoisie is the political impotence of Germany, the talent of the German proletariat—even apart from German theory—is the social talent of Germany. The disparity between philosophical and political development . . . is a necessary disparity. Only in socialism can a philosophical people find its suit-

able practice, thus only in the proletariat can it find the active element of its emancipation.”¹⁴ Ruge and his ilk are wrong to play schoolmaster to the German proletariat; they would be far better advised to learn from it.¹⁵ Because it has no political regime, Germany will not see a succession of changes in the rulers of her political destiny; the social revolution, which has been announced by the Silesian weavers, is an attack on the whole of society and not on some particular aspect of it. In answer to Ruge’s assertion that the weavers’ revolt is doomed because they are isolated from the community (by which he means the political community), Marx speaks briefly about the nature of the civil society which gives birth to the demand for social revolution. Three themes stand out in his discussion: the artificiality of the formation of the proletariat; its alienation; and the notion of the generic being of man. These themes are integral to the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, and discussion of them can be postponed for a few pages. Marx sums up his argument here by insisting that

*the community from which the worker is isolated is a community of a very different order [Realität] and extent than the political community. This community, from which his own labor separates him, is life itself, physical and spiritual life, human morality [Sittlichkeit], human activity, human enjoyment, human existence. Human existence is the true community of men. As the disastrous isolation from this existence is more final, intolerable, terrible and contradictory than isolation from the political, so is the transcendence of this isolation. And even a partial reaction, a revolt against it, means all the more, as man is more than citizen and human life more than political life. Hence, however partial the industrial revolt may be, it conceals within itself a universal soul; no matter how universal a political revolt may be, it conceals a narrow-minded spirit under the most colossal form.*¹⁶

The weavers’ revolt is just the opposite of Ruge’s “social revolution with a political soul.” The only political revolution which could help is one that is not simply the replacement of one ruling class by another but rather the dissolution of the state altogether. This is the socialist revolution. It is *social*, the refusal of the proletariat to be excluded from the community of man. “It requires

this political act so far as it needs overthrow and dissolution. But where its organizing activity begins, where its own aim and spirit emerge, there socialism throws away the political hull.”¹⁷

The implications of this analysis for a judgment of Marx's future political activity, as well as that of his epigone, are significant. Franz Mehring is correct in seeing this article as an attack on the Blanquist theory of revolution.¹⁸ Socialist revolution cannot be the result of a political *Putsch* conducted by a conspiratorial band acting in the name of the proletariat. Such a “revolution” would only be a kind of administrative change, and would not affect the lives of the men and women who compose the state, for it would only consecrate the division between the state and civil society. Socialist revolution must have its source in civil society, and must be the result of, and result in, a change in *everyday life*. This does not, of course, imply a purely syndicalist strategy; clearly, political power does have to be seized—but this is a means to the revolution in daily life, not its end. As the proletariat manifests its power, political reforms will be inevitable; and these are not to be shunned as “reformist sellouts.” But these reforms only make sense as articulations of a process which moves toward the final, social and socialist goal. The analysis of the relationship between the state and civil society remains the foundation of Marx's political activity, and his most faithful modern interpreter is not Lenin but Rosa Luxemburg.

Theoretical Affirmation: The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts

The philosophical stance which would necessarily lead to the study of political economy was elaborated in the “Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State.” Marx had already glimpsed the nature of the state and its relation to civil society in the *Rheinische Zeitung* articles. The analysis of Hegel's state led him to understand that the dysfunctions in the actual German state rested on the very principle of the state. Once Marx had shown the primacy of civil society over the state, he might have turned directly to the study of political economy as the key to this domain.

Hegel had already defined civil society as the “System of Needs,”

and noted that "political economy is the science which starts from this view, but then has the task of explaining mass relationships and mass movements in their complexity and their qualitative and quantitative determinations."¹⁹ Hegel speaks appreciatively of the work of Smith, Say, and Ricardo, and comments that "to discover this necessary element here [i.e., within the seemingly accidental segments of the economy] is the object of political economy, a science which is a credit to thought because it finds laws for a mass of accidents."²⁰ Hegel insists that the moment of civil society is subordinate to that of the state, but Marx's critique of Hegel's theory had shown the need to invert this relation.

There are several possible explanations for the fact that Marx did not turn to the study of political economy in 1843. The critique of the Hegelian state was made from a political perspective. Marx still believed that the state was the sphere of universality over against the particular interests in civil society, and he had not investigated the laws which govern these particular interests. He therefore felt that a change in the political state was all that was needed to achieve a true relationship between state and civil society.

A second factor was the theory-praxis problem, the need for a mediated development. In the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," Marx asserted that once the active vote was given to all the citizens, the relation of the state to civil society would be correctly mediated so that the particular individual would find his universality in the state. However, Marx had no way to introduce this "revolution"; he knew what should be, but was unable to mediate it with what is. The impotence of the idealist 'should' made its weight felt.

The contributions to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* represent the necessary reevaluation and reexamination. In the "Exchange of Letters," Marx elaborated the notion of the critique in an attempt to see how it can become an active weapon, making its force felt in the world. In the essay, "On the Jewish Question," Marx applied the critique to Bauer's position, and used the resultant analysis to reformulate the demand for democracy in terms of the need for a change in civil society itself. Finally, in the "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," Marx used

the critique and the dialectical method, along with the newly-found importance of civil society, to discover the active principle necessary to realize philosophy: the proletariat.

The discovery of the proletariat as the active principle of social change remained, however, a theoretical discovery. Marx spoke of the necessity of the formation of the proletariat, and was able to give some probable reasons for this "artificial" formation; but he did not have a thorough understanding of the mechanism of economic growth. The *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* substantiate those probable reasons suggested in the "Introduction."

In order to account for the formation of the proletariat, Marx went beyond a simple study of political economy. The *Manuscripts* are a confirmation of the entire development of his thought. In studying these *Manuscripts*, we must bear in mind their relation to the fundamental problem of theory-praxis and to the demand for a communist revolution.

The treatment of the *Manuscripts* can best be accomplished by discussing them under the following rubrics: A) the formation of the proletariat as the polar opposite of capital; B) the "critical" demystification of political economy and the notion of alienation; C) communism, the resolution of the theory-praxis problem.

A) *The Formation of the Proletariat*

In the preface to the *Manuscripts*, Marx "assure[s] the reader who is familiar with political economy that my results are due to a wholly empirical and conscientious analysis and study of political economy" (506-7). Replying mainly on the works of English and French writers, Marx says that he also made use of Weitling, Hess, and Engels, but could find nothing of importance in the German literature beyond these, though he acknowledges his debt to Feuerbach, whose works are "the sole writings since Hegel's *Phenomenology* and *Logic*, in which an actual theoretical revolution is contained" (508).

The first *Manuscript* is divided into three parts, written in parallel columns, treating the "economic trinity," wages, profit, and rent. Marx intended to use this form to illustrate the parallel errors in each of these categories, but he gave up that attempt.²¹ It will be easiest to look at each category separately.

"Wages," the *Manuscript* begins, "are determined through the bitter struggle between capitalist and worker" (510). In this struggle, the capitalist must win, for he can live longer without working than the worker. Further, the capitalists are united, while among the workers competition is the law. The split between capital and labor works against the workers, whose wages are forced down to subsistence level; the worker receives only enough to keep himself alive and to reproduce new workers. Wages are regulated by supply and demand; the worker is but a commodity like any other. Even when demand exceeds supply, the workers benefit less than the capitalists, whose profits are also on the rise. And, when the crisis comes, the workers are the first to suffer, for the capitalist can invest in another industry where profits are higher. Besides this, the prices of the commodity "labor" ²² are more constant than those of food. "In general one should note that where the worker and the capitalist suffer equally, the worker suffers for his existence while the capitalist suffers for the profits of his dead mammon" (512).

Marx is following the broad lines of Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations*. With Smith, he defines capital as accumulated labor. As capital grows, the power of the workers' past labor increasingly dominates over them in the person of the capitalist and in the form of the machine. The workers' labor is taken away, and relates to them as alien property.²³ Further, with the increase of capital, the division of labor increases, and the worker is all the more dependent upon capital and the machines in which it is incarnate. At the same time monopoly grows, and the small capitalists are forced into the ranks of the proletariat. The supply of workers becomes greater than the demand, and wages fall; the workers finally become machines, entering into competition with what they have built. The goal of political economy is to increase social wealth, hence the amount of capital. But, the foregoing indicates that in terms of its actual result, "the misfortune of society is the goal of political economy" (516).

The political economist maintains that the value of everything is measured in terms of labor. Yet there is a contradiction between this theory and the actual social conditions. Labor is said to measure values, yet it itself is bought for the most widely varying prices.

The division of labor increases national wealth; yet for the worker it means impoverishment and reduction to the status of a machine. The worker is maintained not as a man but as a "worker," not as a human being but as a slave. Marx concludes: "But that labor itself, not only under the present conditions, but in general insofar as its goal is merely the increase of wealth—that labor, I say, is itself harmful and pernicious, [and] this follows, without the political economist realizing it, from his own arguments" (517).

The problems of the workers are due to their position in society; more, they are inscribed in the "essence of modern work itself" (518). Even in the richest of societies, the worker is impoverished and dehumanized. The political economist does not take this into account. "It is obvious that the political economist regards the proletariat—that is, he who lives without capital and rent, purely from work, one-sided and abstract work—only as a *worker*" (518). The worker is treated like a horse in whom one is interested only during working hours. His free time is left for the consideration of laws, doctors, religion, statistics, politics, and the overseer of the poorhouse.

Marx presents several pages of citations from political economists, dealing with the fact that relative poverty increases when national wealth increases, treating the problem of machine labor, of female and child labor, of the growth of prostitution, and the increased competition among the working class. He poses two questions, which will be answered later. What is the sense, within the historical progress of humanity, of this reduction of the vast majority of mankind to the status of abstract labor? What are the mistakes of the piecemeal reformers who want to raise wages, and in this way help the worker; or who, like Proudhon, see the goal of social revolution as the equalization of all wages? ²⁴

Before analyzing the political economist's notion of profit, treated in the second column, capital must be defined. "Capital is . . . the governing power over labor and its products. The capitalist possesses this power not because of his personal or human properties, but insofar as he is owner of capital. His power is the purchasing power of capital, which nothing can withstand" (526). Capital is a *social* phenomenon expressing the interpersonal relations of men and women in their everyday interactions; it is

stored-up labor, accumulated due to the relative positions of worker and capitalist. Capital is not related to the individual qualities of the capitalist; its source is the social structure of bourgeois society. As was seen, this situation is far from salutary for the workers. The same, Marx indicates, is true for the capitalist—though he does not elaborate.²⁵

The discussion of profit consists largely in citations from the various political economists, especially Adam Smith. It shows that the classical economists did not have an adequate theory of profit. Profit seemed to be a percentage—according to Smith, twice the normal interest rate on money—which the capitalist received for advancing his money. Despite adherence to the labor theory of value, the classical economists thought that profit was made on money invested in the means of production as well as that which was invested in labor power.²⁶

Marx again stresses the antisocial effects which the classical theory conceals or passes over in the name of science. He shows that the capitalist must seek only his own profit; that he cares nothing for society; that it is the workers who create the wealth but suffer under the domination of their past labor accumulated in the hands of the capitalists; that competition leads to monopoly, which in turn leads to the proletarianization of the small capitalists; that the law of the political economist is a blind and inhuman law; and so on. This section of the *Manuscripts* is a rigorous indictment of the capitalist society taken from the mouths of its most vigorous and faithful defenders. The accent is placed on the mechanism by which the ranks of the proletariat are swelled as national wealth increases, and on the fact that the laws of the economy which lead to this effect are the impersonal laws which have their principle in the competitive society based on the "Rights of Man." Once it is clear how the proletariat is formed, Marx concentrates his rhetorical guns on showing the inhuman situation in which this majority of the nation must live and work.

Marx's treatment of the third part of the classical economic trinity, rent, begins by citing J-B Say's famous words: "landlord's right has its origin in robbery" (542). He then takes up Smith's argument that landlords are a class whose interests are the same as those of society as a whole. Smith's demonstration is based on the

fact that such factors as increased population, increased demand, improvements in production, and lower prices all benefit both society and the landlord. Perhaps, replies Marx; but in this case the interest which society has in the individual is the opposite of that which he has in society. The landlords do not help society; they only profit from its gains. Moreover, as with the small capitalist, competition works against the small landlord who can no longer live on his rents and must become a capitalist-farmer, or sell his land. "The final result is thus the dissolution of the difference between capitalist and landed proprietor so that there are now only two social classes, the working class and the capitalist class" (553; cf., also 579). This is a dialectical argument which does not claim that there are now only two classes, but that the *tendency* is toward a bipolar society.

Engels's attack on Carlyle had shown that the demise of the old forms is not to be sentimentalized with the romantics; it is a necessary development, contained in the essence of feudal property. "Already in feudal property lay the domination of land as an alien power over man" (554). Marx returns to the notion developed in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," that in feudal times the land is in fact subject: the right of primogeniture implies that the land inherits its master, who is thus "zoologically" determined. In feudal times there was still the appearance of personal ownership; the serf was not yet a depersonalized wage-laborer. But,

it is necessary that this appearance be abolished, that landed property, the root of private property, be dragged completely into the movement of private property and become a commodity; that the domination of the proprietor appear, stripped of all political tincture, as the pure domination of private property, of capital; that the relation between proprietor and laborer reduce itself to the political economic relation of exploiter and exploited; that all personal relations of the proprietor with his property end and that the latter become only objective, material wealth; that in place of the marriage of honor the marriage of interest with the land should appear, and that the land should sink to the status of a value to be huckstered, just like man. It is necessary that that which is the root

of landed property—filthy self-interest—appear also in its cynical form. It is necessary that the unmoving monopoly turn into the moving restless monopoly, into competition; that the idle enjoyment of the products of other people's blood become a bustling commerce in that same commodity. Finally, it is necessary that in this competition landed property, in the form of capital, manifest its domination over both the working class and over the proprietors themselves in that the laws of the movement of capital either ruin or raise them. Thus in the place of the medieval proverb, "nulle terre sans seigneur," steps the modern proverb, "L'argent n'a pas de maître," wherein is expressed the whole domination of dead matter over mankind. (P. 555)

This attitude is determined by the dialectical analysis of the relations in feudal society, and by the way in which the dialectic shows that they must advance.

Marx returns to the necessary development of feudal property at two points in the third *Manuscript*. Once, he treats it in terms of the evolution of economic theory, showing the advance made by the physiocrats, who saw the essence of wealth in land and agriculture, over the mercantilists, who saw wealth as contained in precious metals. The physiocratic doctrine whereby wealth is created only by agricultural labor naturally led to Smith and the labor theory of value, where the measure of wealth—labor—is both universal and abstract. In this way, agricultural labor becomes just another form of industrial labor, and agriculture just another industry. Later, Marx returns to this subject in an attack on Proudhon's belief that the industrialization of agriculture meant that the demise of capitalism was near. On the contrary, he argues, this is but a sign of the total victory of capitalism. When agriculture is capitalist, capital has reached world dominance; every facet of life is but a predicate of this impersonally ruling subject.

The "necessity" in this process is the logical necessity revealed by the dialectical analysis. It is not a moral "ought," supposedly necessary because present conditions run counter to the generic man whose creation is the task of history. Within the essence of feudal property are contained the seeds of capitalist relations. Thus, continues Marx, it is wrong to follow the reformers who feel

that the evils of landed property could be avoided if land were divided into small parcels. Aside from the fact that it would add to the amount of waste work done, to the reduplication of tasks, this solution does not go to the roots of the problem. To abolish the evils of landed property, its essence, its source, must be eliminated. As long as the principle of private property is not abolished, then, through the mechanisms of competition, large landed property will once again make its appearance.²⁷

The dialectic also explains the nature of a society in which the principle of private property has been abolished. Though this is discussed below, we can conclude this section by citing a description which Marx gives here:

The first abolition of monopoly is always its universalization, the extension of its existence. The abolition of monopoly, once it has come to exist in its widest and most complete form, is its complete annihilation. Association, applied to land, shares the economic advantage of large landed property and first realizes the primal tendency of division, namely equality. Association also reestablishes, in a rational manner and no longer through the mediation of serfdom, domination and a silly mysticism of property, the intimate relation of man to the land inasmuch as the land ceases to be an object of huckstering and through free labor and free enjoyment becomes again a true, personal property of man. (P. 556)

Marx has shown the tendency toward monopoly. He will have to show how the completion of this tendency leads toward the abolition of monopoly.

B) Demystification of Political Economy: The Theory of Alienation.

The analysis of the economic trinity enabled Marx to show how, in fact, the proletariat is being formed in civil society. Though he does stress and condemn the conditions in which the proletarianized masses are forced to live and work, the main thrust of the argument is the tendency of society to divide itself into two classes as capital conquers all the old forms of society.

We have begun from the presuppositions of political economy. We have accepted its language and its laws. We presupposed private

property, the separation of labor, capital and land, hence of wages, profit of capital and rent, likewise the division of labor, competition, the concept of exchange value, etc. From political economy itself, with its own words, we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, the most miserable commodity; that the misery of the worker is inversely proportional to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands and thus the revival of monopoly in a more frightful form; and finally that the distinction between capitalist and landowner, between agricultural laborer and industrial worker, disappears and the whole society must divide into two classes of proprietors and propertyless workers. (P. 559)

This is the material demonstration that was needed for the introduction of the proletariat in the "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*."

The production of the proletariat is only the first step in Marx's demonstration. The critique must now be applied before the next positive stage can be reached. In the same way that "the critique of religion is the premise of all critique" (488), in civil society the critique must be applied to the economic equivalent of religion, to political economy. Like the critique of religion, this critique will be self-negating. The theoretical critique of the categories of political economy will show the "tasks" which must be undertaken by praxis.

Marx takes two different tacks in his critique of political economy, the second of which is a critique of the results of the first. He traces the history of political economy, showing the successive moves by which it became more and more scientific. Political economy has always played a dual role: it is a product of the movement and evolution of private property which it reflects, while at the same time it glorifies and aids each successive evolution, making itself the intellectual defender of the *status quo*. Political economy is thus an ideology: it is at once a reflection of the world from which it springs, and an attempt to justify the existence of that world; it is a false consciousness which is not self-critical.

The mercantilists, who saw the objective essence of wealth and of private property in precious metals, necessarily became "fetish-

ists, Catholics" (585). They paid obeisance to an external force, metallic currency, and did not question the subjective essence of this externality. Taking up a metaphor used in the "Introduction," Marx notes that "Engels thus correctly called Adam Smith the Luther of political economy" (585). By making labor the essence of wealth, Smith put that essence in man just as Luther had put the priest inside man. This adds a subjective side to be considered. But, the same mystification which vitiates Hegel's system is present here. Man, the true subject, is made a determination or predicate of an external object. As predicate, man is abstract and dehumanized; the "labor" which Smith made the essence of wealth is abstract labor, free of all qualitative or individual determinations. The capitalist economy is thus freed from all local boundaries and national peculiarities because its wealth is not fixed, but defined in terms of abstract universal human labor; it becomes cosmopolitan, overthrowing all bonds and all previous modes of production.

Freeing itself from the mercantilist's fetishism, political economy became more scientific. It developed the labor theory of value until, with Ricardo, it reached its pinnacle. Ricardo is often accused of immoralism because he treats the worker in an abstract and dispassionate manner, ignoring the misery which is the lot of the working class. This, says Marx, is not the fault of Ricardo. All he did was to develop consistently the principles of political economy, letting it speak its own language. The contradiction enters into political economy after Ricardo, for only then was the evidence against such apologetics too self-evident to be denied. The Ricardian theory expressed correctly the nature of the developing capitalist society; but once that society had completed its development and achieved world dominance, it was doomed to fall into contradiction because it is based on a *negative principle*. This negative principle is the abstract man, man considered only as a worker.

In the above citation in which he summarized the results of his study of political economy, Marx noted that he began from the "presuppositions of political economy." His first application of the critique to the history of political economy shows him that the modern political economy from which he began is based on a negative foundation, that it had freed man from the domination

of feudal property but had not succeeded in totally liberating him; its results were analogous to those of the French Revolution, criticized in "On the Jewish Question." Marx observes that whereas the opposition of propertylessness to property is an indifferent opposition which does not move toward its solution, when that opposition becomes one of capital and labor, the opposition becomes a contradiction between true dialectical opposites, and, when developed, it must move toward its solution (590).²⁸ This solution is true human freedom, and Marx's task is to indicate the way in which this will be achieved.

Political economy begins from the "fact" of private property. It never tries to explain the source or ground of this fact. It examines the way in which the economy actually functions, and from this develops descriptive laws. It never questions such phenomena as the opposition of capital and labor, or of capital and land. It makes continual use of the notion of competition, but never explains why it brings in this external factor to solve its problems. Thus, in a second stage of the critique of political economy, Marx sets out "to grasp the essential connection among private property, greed, division of labor, capital and land-ownership, and the connection of exchange with competition, of value with the devaluation of men, of monopoly with competition, etc., and of this whole alienation with the money-system" (560).²⁹

It is not possible to explain the existence of private property by referring to some imagined primordial society, a kind of "robinsonade." One cannot speak about the "creation" of private property and expect this to be taken as an explanation any more than one can talk about the "creation" of man by God. Such an argument postulates first the nonexistence of private property, or of man, and then asks for a proof of its existence—which is manifestly impossible (606-7). Or, if the political economist chooses to speak of private property as the result of some long-since-forgotten circumstance in human history, he still has not given an explanation but only presupposed what he set out to demonstrate, namely, the existence of private property (560).

Marx prefers to explain the existence of private property in terms of contemporary social fact. The contemporary social fact to which Marx refers is the phenomenon of estranged or alienated labor.³⁰ Though Marx's analysis is rich in sociological and psycho-

logical detail, the discussion here will be limited to the philosophical essentials. Recently, *alienation* has become a catch-all term, used in a way more or less equivalent to Durkheim's *anomie*. Marx's usage is more precise, and different than contemporary usage.

Marx distinguishes four facets of alienated or estranged labor in capitalism. To begin with, man is alienated from the product of his labor. The more he produces, the less he receives. The object he produces is transformed into capital which stands over against him and buys him as if he were just another commodity on the market. The product in which the worker has invested his labor takes a form external to him and has power over him. Worse, this power is appropriated by another, the capitalist. The situation is like that of the religious man: the more attributes man gives to his gods, the less he himself retains; the more the worker labors, the more the capitalist appropriates and the less the worker himself retains.

In order to produce, the worker needs nature, the external sensuous world. In nature his labor is realized, takes on a concrete form and becomes an object of use. Nature is a means of life for labor in a second sense as well. Not only is it impossible for labor to materialize itself without nature, but the laborer himself cannot live without the products of nature to nourish him. But, as the worker produces more and more products, there is less and less of nature available from which he and his labor may live; nature itself becomes a commodity. The worker becomes enslaved: he must be given the objects on which he will labor, and he must be given the objects which will sustain his life.³¹ Political economy has ignored the implications of this situation because it does not consider the relation between the worker and his products, nor the life of the human being in which that abstraction, the "worker," is incarnate. Though the products of labor may be palaces, the workers live in hellholes; the production of beautiful objects may bring with it the mutilation of the worker, his replacement by machines, or, worse, his replacing the machines. Because it is concerned only with the wealth produced by society, political economy is not conscious of the human beings who constitute that society.

Alienation manifests itself in the working process as well. "How,"

asks Marx, "could the worker stand in an alien relationship to the product of his activity if he did not estrange himself from it in the very act of production?" (564) In the work process, "labor is external to the laborer, that is, it is not a part of his essence, and he thus does not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, does not feel fortunate but unfortunate, develops no free physical and mental energy but mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind" (564). The worker feels forced to work; his work is only a means to satisfy basic animal needs. And "its alien character shows itself in its purity in that as soon as no physical or other pressure exists, labor is avoided like the plague" (564). The argument that work is a means and not an end is the important philosophical point here; the other considerations are of a more psychological nature.

As a result of these two direct facets of alienation, two more subtle forms can be described. Because his labor is only a means to the sheer physical end of maintaining life, man is reduced to the status of an animal. What is specific to man, the fact that he is a conscious being who has the freedom to choose his goals and actions, is lost in the proletarian. Instead of being able to relate to himself and to nature as a conscious thinking being, the proletarian is forced to treat himself and nature as means toward the end of simply keeping alive. The proletarian is thus alienated from his own generic being. Alienated labor turns "the generic existence of man, and also nature, as his mental [*geistige*] generic capacity, into an existence alien to him, to a means for his individual existence. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual essence, his human being" (568–69). The proletarian is alienated from his generic being; he is unable to be what he can become.

A direct consequence of these forms of man's alienation is his alienation from other men. Not only is man alienated from his fellows; alienation manifests itself in his relation to the activities and products of human labor in general. Marx insists that the relation of man to man is the index of man's relation to himself, his world, and his activity. The final consequence, therefore, of alienated labor is an alienated society, a society of egoistic individuals locked up in their particularity, relating to each other only *as means* and only *by means* of things.

Within the society of alienation, what man produces becomes the property of another, becomes capital which stands over and oppresses the worker who produced it. Man himself creates the conditions of his own oppression; he creates the very objects which oppress him. Man produces, therefore, the conditions of his own unfreedom. What is more, the conditions of his unfreedom are none other than the capitalist economic relations: *private property is the result of alienated labor*. That is: "we have obtained the concept of alienated labor (of alienated life) from political economy as a result of the movement of private property."³² But the analysis of this concept shows that though private property appears to be the ground and cause of alienated labor, it is rather the consequence of the latter, just as the gods originally are not the cause but the effect of the aberration of the human mind. Later, this relation reverses its effects" (572).

Marx thinks that his critique of political economy in terms of its alienation has uncovered the secret of private property. However, the argument seems to be circular, a *petitio principii*. Marx recognizes and even accepts this in the lines just cited. He poses two questions which still need to be answered: 1) what is the relation of private property in its alienated form to true human and social property? 2) how did man get into the situation in which he had to alienate his labor? The answer to the first question is discussed tentatively in the last section of this chapter; but the second question, which is crucial if Marx is to avoid the accusation of a vicious circle, is never answered—or discussed—in the remainder of the *Manuscripts*. This may be why the theory of *Capital* differs from that of the *Manuscripts*.³³ What Marx has been able to show is that capitalism, the system of private property whose essence is labor, is intimately connected with the phenomenon of alienation, and that, as the historical step of the critique showed, the labor which is taken as the essence of wealth in capitalist society is one-sided and negative. No matter whether alienated labor is the cause of private property, or if private property is the cause of alienation, the two form an indivisible pair.³⁴

Marx can now answer the second of the questions posed in the discussion of wages. Those piecemeal reformers, like Proudhon, who think that social justice will be achieved through the equal-

zation of wages have not understood the intimate connection between capitalism and alienated labor. Higher wages make only for better-paid slaves, for the wages system is but the opposite side of the capitalist coin: "With the fall of the one, the other must fall as well" (573). No matter how well paid, the worker is still a "worker" whose labor is a *means* to the mere animal maintenance of life. The theory of alienation, which Marx maintained all his life,³⁵ implies the need for total revolution, a revolution which will restructure the entire fabric of daily life. In the revolutionary process, men and women seize the hold of their own lives, reshaping them as *ends* whose inherent dignity shall no longer be sacrificed on the economic altar.

C) *Communism: The Resolution of the Theory-Praxis Problem*

In the "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," Marx asserted that after the critique of religion comes the "irreligious critique," whose foundation is "man makes religion, religion does not make man" (488). Religion—or, more generally speaking, ideology—is a "moral sanction," a justification of the "inverted world" which gave birth to it; and it is the inverted world which must be changed if religious or false consciousness is to be transcended. The alienated consciousness which is theorized in political economy, and the actual alienation of the capitalist society, have been shown to be essentially connected with the existence of private property. The process of the elimination of the latter therefore implies the elimination of both alienated existence and its theoretical expression.³⁶

Communism, the resolution of the theory-praxis problem and the transcendence of alienation, is the product of "the entire movement of history" (594; also 618). Marx's concept of history is indebted to that of Hegel, which perceives history as a developmental progression toward the Absolute; each stage can be understood as a movement toward, and an imperfect realization of, the final goal. Marx's position is of course "demystified"; history is not viewed as tending toward a theoretical Absolute; rather, "the entire so-called world history is only the creation of man through human labor and the development of nature for man" (607). History has a *telos*, a final goal; but the realization of this goal, which informs

and gives sense to each stage on the way, depends on man's ability to create himself and to humanize nature. The *telos* of history, the necessity of communism, is that principle of closure which is the *sine qua non* of a dialectical understanding of the present as history.³⁷

The observation that the worker creates the conditions of his own alienation can now be extended to the entirety of human history. This answers the first of the two questions posed at the end of the discussion of wage-labor. The "sense, within the historical progress of humanity, of this reduction of the vast majority of mankind to the role of abstract labor" must be understood as a stage on the way to communist society; "the transcendence of self-estrangement follows the same path as self-estrangement" (590). Under the conditions of alienation, human history itself appears to mankind as something Other, foreign, and mysterious, independent of its action. The critical philosophy, however, reveals that mankind in fact makes its own history, and that it continually reproduces the historical conditions in which it lives; there is a homogeneity between man and the history he produces such that the end of alienation will also be the reconquest of human history. Meanwhile, even in its alienated condition, mankind is producing the preconditions of its own liberation. Marx had already observed that the particular individual is not "its beard, its blood, its abstract *physis*, but its social quality" (281). Here he extends the notion, understanding man as both the product and producer of his social conditions: "One sees how the history of industry and the present objective nature of industry is the open book of man's essential powers, the sensibly present human psychology" (602).

On this basis, Marx attacks several forms of communism which have not understood the progressive nature of history. He rejects the "crude communism" which reacts to the increasing misery of the proletariat in an immediate and unreflective manner, demanding the elimination of private property and its replacement by a system of universal proprietors. Crude communism believes that through the universalization of private property and the creation of a community of equals, the injustice of capitalist exploitation can be eliminated.

Because the crude communists have not understood the positive nature of private property and its foundation on human labor, they overreact and want to destroy everything which cannot be possessed *immediately* by the entire community as the private property of each individual. This means that they abstract from talent, from individual skills and differences. The "community of equals" becomes a society in which all are "proletarians," working for the "community" which, then, becomes an "abstract capitalist" or state capitalist, who commands their labor and receives its fruits. Crude communism is a "leveling communism" lost in the immediacy of possession. It is not a freeing of truly human man but a "return to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and wantless man who has not gone beyond private property nor even yet achieved it" (592).

Crude communism devalues the individual personality, considering the worker, not the man. It is not a step toward the creation of generic man. Marx comments that from its attitude toward women, one "can judge the entire level of mankind's development. From the character of this relationship follows the extent to which man has become and comprehended himself as generic being, as man" (592-93). Crude communism wants to establish a community of women, and to abolish marriage.³⁸ This shows its regressive nature. "As women go from marriage into universal prostitution, so the whole world of wealth—that is, the objective essence of man—passes from the relation of exclusive marriage with the private owner into the relationship of universal prostitution with the community" (591). Crude communism is not willing or able to see that alienation of the worker or of the woman is eliminated by mediated progress in history and not by a regress to the stage of immediacy in which primitive man was once forced to live. It has not understood history as the process of human liberation.

Marx attacks a second form of communism, "political communism," which, in either a despotic or a democratic form, and with the complete or partial abolition of the state, consciously attempts to eliminate human alienation. This communism, like crude communism, does not understand the origins of the alienated human condition it seeks to change. "It has, indeed, grasped its concept," says Marx, "but still not its essence" (593). Political communism

understands the need for change, but because it does not understand how things came to the present pass, the essential relationship of private property and alienation, it cannot prescribe the correct means to eliminate alienated society. It does not see that the root problem lies in civil society, in the alienated labor and alienated man whose praxis creates the institutions it proposes to change through political means. Political communism, in other words, is similar to Ruge's position in his evaluation of the Silesian weavers' rebellion.

The communism whose necessity Marx analyzes is the product of history. This does not mean, he stresses, that its necessity can be somehow proven by searching back through the foggy haze of prehistory to find moments when "communist" societies did in fact exist. Not only would such a procedure violate Marx's understanding of the progress of history, but it would mean, conceptually, that the existence of communism preceded its essence, that communism could exist before the necessary conditions for its actual appearance had been prepared. The point is not to show that there have been "happier" or "better" or "more moral" societies in the past. Such a procedure would be a return to the idealist usage of a paradigm in terms of which the present can always be found wanting; it would be an abstract criticism, not a dialectical development. Under capitalist conditions, the products of social, human praxis are estranged from their producers and relate to these latter as an opaque Otherness, inscrutable and seemingly self-justificatory. However, it is precisely this alienation which must be shown to create the preconditions of its own negation. Such a demonstration is possible only by means of the critical, dialectical analysis which breaks down the mystified opacity, understanding the things of the world in terms of their specific becoming.

Communism is the reappropriation by human praxis of its own products. This revolution is necessitated "in the development of private property—in the economy, to be exact" (594). Paradoxical though it may ring, Marx follows his condemnation of capitalism by stressing the positive results to which it leads; indeed, perhaps no one has sung the praises of capitalism as well as do Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. This paradox is understand-

able if it is recalled that capitalism is built upon a negative principle; hence, in its self-realization, capitalism creates the conditions for its own negation.

As was clear in the discussion of the proletariat as the necessary mediation between the subjective and objective development, communism is not the result of an objective evolution and growth of the means of production. Crucial is the subjective factor, the "lightening of thought" which leads to the realization that the alienated Otherness is not foreign, and can be repossessed. This does not mean that the proletariat has to read books, to study philosophy. The point is that capitalism itself, in its development, creates new needs and new human possibilities at the same time that it can only maintain itself through the preservation of an artificial poverty which masks the contradictions.

Marx does not analyze the precise mechanism by which the mystified consciousness of the proletariat seizes hold of itself and of the new possibilities created by capitalism. Indeed, this is a fundamental weakness, and has led to many misunderstandings, both theoretical and practical. What he does do is analyze the dialectical interaction which makes possible and necessary this new stage in human evolution.

In the partially lost and very incomplete third *Manuscript*, Marx enthusiastically describes the meetings of the Communist workers in Paris. What was a means—the coming together to talk and agitate—becomes an end in itself; the need for human fellowship is born; social solidarity is created in the face of the individualizing and competitive conditions of capitalism; and these become a weapon in the coming revolution. The immediate reaction to capitalist exploitation creates a response which is a prefiguration of the new social stage of history.

In the same manuscript, Marx also recognizes and describes the way in which capitalism creates and maintains *false needs*, the needs of a worker and not those of a human being. While today the process by which these false needs are created is far more sophisticated, nonetheless, the basic mechanism—the structure of alienated consciousness, and the capitalization of sectors of real physical needs (e.g., the need for fresh air and trees, or for relaxation away from the polluted and always-rushing cities), whereby what is naturally free becomes a commodity placed on a (manipu-

lated) market—remains the same. How is it possible to transcend the structure of false needs?

The *historical* nature of Marx's dialectical notion of man's generic being provides an insight into the possibility of escaping this paradox. He writes that

The practical creation of an objective world, the working on [Bearbeitung] inorganic nature, is proof that man is a conscious generic being, that is, a being which is related to its genus as to its own essence, or is related to itself as a generic being. To be sure, animals also produce. They build themselves nests, dwelling places, like the bees, beavers, ants, etc. But the animal produces only what is immediately necessary for itself or its young. It produces in a one-sided way while man produces universally. The animal produces under the domination of immediate physical need while man produces free from physical need, and only genuinely so in freedom from such need. The animal produces only itself while man reproduces the whole of nature. The animal's produce belongs immediately to its physical body while man is free when he confronts his product. The animal builds only according to the standard and need of the species to which it belongs while man knows how to produce according to the standard of any species and at all times knows how to apply the intrinsic standard to the object. Thus, man creates also according to the laws of beauty. (Pp. 567-68)

It is significant that if one were to substitute the term *knows*, or *thinks*, or *is conscious* for the term *produces*, one would have rewritten the first paragraph of Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*. Marx's stress on the production of a world indicates clearly his break with the abstract humanism to which certain of his earlier positions seemed close.

Man's production of the world in which he lives, and the distinction of that "universal" production from the "immediate" and "one-sided" production of the animal, explain the sense in which "man is a conscious generic being, that is, a being which is related to its genus as to its own essence or is related to itself as a generic being." The produce of the animal, Marx asserts, "belongs immediately to its physical body," while "man is free when he confronts his product." Immediate production is the labor of the

beast, whereas the human specificity is that its self-activity is social work. The world which man produces is a social world, one which bears the imprint of its producer. Alienated man produces an alienated world. However, capitalist production is at the same time the conquest of nature, the production of ever greater and more sophisticated possibilities. Granted, the products of the worker are taken from him; nonetheless, in producing them, the worker has changed himself, and changed the conditions in which humankind lives, works and reproduces. A "new" worker is produced as the product of his own productions. In his relation to the social world, this new worker can recognize the imprint of his own labor. He is still unable to relate to it as his own, for he lives in a capitalist society. Nonetheless, the "naturalness" of the exploitative and alienated capitalist relations falls before the possibility of the worker's relating to his products as his own, as social products of humankind. Here, it seems, in the potentialities of generic being which are withheld from the worker by the social system, lies the contradiction which can lead to the recognition and overcoming of the paradox.³⁹

The world that man produces is not only material; man produces and reproduces his social relations—family, civil society, and the state; and cultural relations—art, culture, and ethical life. Even the language with which men communicate is a social product, continually produced and reproduced, historically changing. All these human products can be alienated; but at the same time, they all represent the possibilities of social man, and their totality is the historically evolving existence of generic man. On the horizon of the products of social man—even in their alienated existence—generic man is implicit as an ever-present contradiction and challenge.⁴⁰

As the producer of society and at the same time the product of the society in which he lives and works, the individual is social and produces in a social manner. In the alienated capitalist society, this sociality is mystified by the competitive individualism which is at once the condition of the maintenance of subservient working class, and also the product of a system which so maintains itself. Yet, the critical analysis shows that, for example, even the scientist whose work is done in the solitude of the laboratory or study is

performing social work: the products on and with which he works, the language in which he expresses himself, and even the very drive to do scientific work are social products. This does not, of course, mean that he loses his individuality. "Though man is . . . a particular individual—and precisely this particularity makes him an individual, an actual individual communal being—he is equally the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of society explicitly thought and experienced" (597). Man is the totality here in the same way that, in the "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," Marx affirmed that the lawmaker is my representative in the same way as the shoemaker, that "each man is the representative of the other" (415).

Communism is the liberation of total, social man, already immanent on the horizon of capitalist society; it is the actualization in every individual of the generic possibilities presently alienated. Marx speaks of it as "the completed essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the fulfilled naturalism of man and humanism of nature" (596). Here, man's relation to objects is no longer the one-sided relation of possession for use, where the object is a means to an externally given end. Communist "having," insists Marx, is "all-sided," and its object is an end, not a means to something else. This is the state of affairs predicted at the end of his analysis of the evolution of landed property. In possession man puts his personality into the object and it, as humanized, becomes a social object. Man is objectified and nature is subjectified.⁴¹

This communism, as the completed naturalism = humanism and as the completed humanism = naturalism, is the true resolution of the conflict between man and nature and between man and man; it is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the genus. It is the riddle of history solved, and knows itself to be this solution (Pp. 593-94)

This is nothing but the world become philosophical and philosophy become worldly; it is the solution to the historical problems

of philosophy which were insoluble until philosophy became praxis.

The objective component of communist society, the naturalism = humanism side of the double equation, is the result of the historical conquest of nature. "History itself is an actual part of natural history, of nature's development into man. Natural science will in time include the science of man as the science of man will include natural science" (604). It is difficult to talk about the naturalism = humanism side of the equation alone. This side, that of the world's becoming philosophical, or of nature's becoming human, is what I have called the materialist side. The idealist side of the equation, however, must accompany it if one is to avoid the pitfalls of a mechanistic determinism. Thus, "the social actuality of nature and human natural science, or the natural science of man are identical expressions" (655). The important factor on the materialist side of the equation is the growth of industry, the increasing development of capitalism.

Industry is the actual historical relationship of nature, and thus of natural science, to man. If it is grasped as the exoteric manifestation of man's essential powers, then the human essence of nature, or the natural essence of man can be understood. Hence, natural science will lose its abstract material—or rather idealistic—tendency and become the basis of human science as it has already become, though in alienated form, the basis of actual human life. (Pp. 603-4)

The science of nature becomes a human science when nature is reclaimed as the product of human praxis.⁴²

The subjective component of communist society, the humanism = naturalism side of the double equation, is the result of man's progressive conquest of his own individuality. Marx does not conceive of this conquest in the abstract mode of the Young Hegelians. Man's conquest of himself is a real struggle which takes place in the actual world, and victory is dependent on changes in that real world. "The development [*Bildung*] of the five senses is the work of all past world history" (601). Man's self-conquest is not an isolated act of consciousness seizing itself; it is human praxis operating within a given social and economic development which

creates the conditions of the possibility of this conquest. Consequently,

Just as the coming society finds at hand all the material for this cultural development [Bildung] through the movement of private property . . . in the same way the fully constituted society produces man in this entire wealth of his being, produces the rich, deep, and entirely sensitive man as its enduring actuality. (P. 602)

The conditions which produce alienated man also produce the preconditions for the end of alienation.

Marx notes that "I can practically relate myself to the object in a human way only if it itself relates humanly to man" (599n). The cave man, for example, could not relate to nature in a human manner. For him, nature was an Other, an alien and unknown power to be feared and revered, as were the gods for the Greeks. The historical task of capitalism is the conquest of nature. Through technology, capitalism makes possible the elimination of scarcity, and therewith, the creation of a new man living in a progressively conquered nature.⁴³ Thus, Marx points out that the starving man cannot appreciate the aesthetic qualities of the food he eats; the man who is worried about his future, about what he will eat or where he will sleep on the morrow, cannot appreciate the finest art; the mineral salesman cannot appreciate the beauty of his specimens, since for him they represent just so much exchange value, so much rock money which, once sold, will buy tomorrow's dinner.

The double equation "naturalism = humanism and humanism = naturalism" shows that the stress must be placed on the materialist side. However, Marx is not a mechanistic determinist. As Alfred Schmidt notes, "what differentiates Marx's concept of nature from all others is its sociohistorical character."⁴⁴ It is not possible to talk about nature without talking about man. Man is a part of nature; without the mediation of man and his work, nature cannot be said to exist in any meaningful sense. On the other hand, the development of the objective world, more specifically, the humanization of nature and its being placed in the service of man, is the key to the subjective development. There is a dialectic of mutual interdependence such that, under communism, "the eye

has become a human eye, just as its object has become a social, human object derived from and for man" (599).

Though the development up to the stage of communism leans heavily on the objective development which makes possible the subjective changes in man and the creation of the new society, Marx does make the significant observation that communism is *not* the final stage of human history.⁴⁵ Communism is only the beginning of human history, real human history, and all the previous development is nothing but the prehistory of mankind. In the new stage, "the *senses* . . . become immediately, in their praxis, theoreticians" (599), and man stands on his own. "A being (*Wesen*) is first independent when it stands on its own feet, and it stands first on its own feet when it itself is responsible for its own being (*Dasein*)" (605).

The new history which begins with independent communist man is governed by new, wholly different standards.

It begins from the theoretical and practical sensuous consciousness of man and of nature as essential being. It is man's positive self-consciousness, no longer mediated by the transcendence of religion, just as actual life is positive, no longer mediated by the transcendence of private property, by communism. Communism is the position of the negation of the negation, and is hence the actual moment necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation. Communism is the necessary form and dynamic principle of the immediate future, but it is not as such the goal of human development—the form of human society. (P. 607–8)

Communism grows out of the old society, "out of its own entrails," in the same way as the proletariat grows from it. But, with the achievement of communism,

one sees how in the place of the political and economic wealth and poverty steps the rich man and the rich human need. The rich man is at the same time the man in need of a totality of human manifestations, the man in whom his own realization exists as internal necessity, as need. Under the premise of socialism, not only the wealth, but also the poverty of man equally acquires a human and hence a social meaning.⁴⁶ This is the passive bond which lets

*man experience the greatest wealth, the other man, as need. The domination of the objective essence within me, the sensuous eruption of my essential activity is passion which here becomes thereby the activity of my essence.*⁴⁷ (P. 605)

The resolution of the theory-praxis problem, communism, thus represents the birth of a new man, a new science and a new history. Communism is the logical clôture of past history and the beginning of a new era. It could be said that Marx has himself replaced Hegel as a nodal point in the history of philosophy; it is Marx who has closed the history of philosophy as a purely theoretical discipline. Marx had already noted, in his polemic against Ruge, that "only in socialism can a philosophical people find its suitable practice." He would want to say here that only in socialism (or communism) does philosophy become praxis; the solution of the theory-praxis problem makes possible the advent of real praxis.


Yet, the problem remains: though Marx has elaborated the conditions necessary for the actual completion of philosophy and the beginning of a new human history, the "lightening of thought" has not yet struck; the alienation of capitalist society has been unveiled by critical theory, but socialist practice has lagged behind. Capitalism has refined its techniques of domination, and proclaimed the "end of ideology." The traditional working-class movement no longer seems to represent that "radical negation" for which the theory calls. The forces of the "Third World," and these which have not materially benefitted from the growth of capitalism, cannot be expected to overthrow a system to which they represent only an external negation and a moral reprobation.

Does this mean that the theory is utopian, only a theory with no relation to practice? This would be the case only if the theory is interpreted as presenting a paradigm, an ethical 'ought' to which mankind should pay heed. But a dialectical theory is not fixed and eternal, transcendent to daily life; it is the expression of the latter, its interpretation, the tool with whose aid the present can be understood as history. As such, it is in need of continual modification and renewal. It explains the actual struggles of the times, situating their becoming in terms of their futurity, and permitting their articulation in terms of a coherent totality.

While there is much in the foregoing analysis of the develop-

ment of the Marxian dialectic which is still valid today, there is no excuse for taking it as dogma. The method must be continually applied, at the same time that in our common practice we strive to remodel and to repossess the communal possibilities that we have collectively created. The theory shows that we *can* do this; and our daily experience tells us that we *must*. The necessity of the socialist future which provides the *telos* for the dialectical analysis is a theoretical necessity which assumes, as it must, that mankind is rational and human. The choice which confronts us, all of us, was seen by Rosa Luxemburg more than fifty years ago at the outbreak of the First World War: *socialism or barbarism!*

Notes/Index



NOTES

1—Encounter with the Hegelian System

1. R. Haym, *Hegel und seine zeit* (Berlin: 1857), pp. 4–5; cited in Auguste Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels* 4 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 1:80, n.1.

2. Henrich Heine, *Werke* 4:110; cited in Heinrich Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967), p. 64.

3. Karl Marx, *Friedrich Engels: Historisch kritisch-Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Ryazanov (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927 ff.), Vol. 1, p. 2, p. 164. This edition is hereafter referred to as MEGA, followed by a volume and part number.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

8. Cornu, 1:64.

9. H. P. Adams, *Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), p. 19.

10. Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, n.d.), p. 17.

11. Gunther Hillmann, "Zum Verständnis der Texte," *Texte zu Methode und Praxis* (Munich: Rowohlt, 1966), 1:221. Hillmann suggests, for example, that Marx "had to elevate Hegel to an Idol in order to free himself from his father . . ."

12. Cornu, 1:77.

13. When possible, references are taken from the "Cotta" edition (Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth [Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962]). This is the most accurate edition, and includes alternate readings of Marx's handwritten manuscripts, which other editions have often incorrectly deciphered. For convenience, references to this volume

are indicated by a page number in parenthesis, as above. References to those of Marx's works not in the "Cotta" edition are taken from the MEGA, which for the early works is in many respects superior to the recent East German edition, the *Marx-Engels Werke* (MEW), though occasionally I have used this edition for convenience.

14. Fichte's philosophy can be called a *subjective idealism*, in opposition to his friend and contemporary Schelling's *objective idealism*; the Hegelian philosophy is the reconciliation of the two. (Cf., Hegel's *Differenz des Fichte'schen und Schelling'schen Systems* [1801].) Fichte recognized that the center of the Kantian philosophy was the ethical concern which manifests itself in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, in which the active transcendental ego can arrive at knowledge of the things in themselves through its ethical striving. Radicalizing this insight, Fichte develops a dialectic of ego-world, whereby the (transcendental, not the empirical) ego is responsible for positing the world, seeking to find itself in that world which, in the original opposition, is defined only as not-ego. In this way, Fichte is able to give a more sophisticated derivation of the Table of Categories, which Kant simply took as given. Moreover, Fichte's stress on the active role of the ego is the beginning of the break with the contemplative attitude in which philosophy's role is only to know the world, not to change it. The problem, however, is the subjective nature of the Fichtean position; the world and the things in it are given only a negative valence, so to speak, and the possibility of discovering objective mediations is discounted. Fichte's philosophy of history and his philosophy of natural law are idealistic in this sense; the basic operating principle is still the opposition ego-world (or, ego-nonego), where the ego posits determinations (or categories) in the world, and these determinations are then to be realized by subjective and ethical action. But the question is, how? What are the mediations which permit this realization? Fichte's role in the development of an active, dialectical philosophy has not been sufficiently analyzed. The best studies at present are contained in Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, and Kroner's *Von Kant bis Hegel*. In a work in progress, I intend to deal fully with the development of the dialectic from Kant through Marx.

15. Hegel, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin: Akademie edition, 1966), p. 186.

16. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), p. 549.

17. D. F. Strauss, *Das Leben Jesu*, 3rd ed. 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1839), 2:767, paragraph 149; cited in Iring Fetscher, ed., *Der Marxismus*, 3 vols. (Munich: Sammlung Piper, 1965), 1:45.

18. MEGA, I, 1:138.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

20. It is noteworthy that the majority of the young Hegelians did in fact return to systems which existed before Hegel, breaking up Hegel's dialectical synthesis and falling behind it. Marx, as will be seen, did not. For a valuable discussion of this problem, see Georg Lukács, "Moses Hess," reprinted in the new edition of Lukács's *Werke* (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1968), 2.

21. Klaus Hartmann, in *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), argues that this is indeed Marx's position, and one which he maintained throughout his work. The position which Marx develops on the basis of this argument, Hartmann calls *Ueberphilosophie*, or, in Marx's own terms, *critical philosophy* or *critique*. Hartmann criticizes Marx's position as a misunderstanding of the nature of the Hegelian concrete categories, for Hegel's claim is that in the move from the categories of the *Logic* to the analysis of nature and of the social world, the system already includes reference to worldly being, and hence a new opposition of philosophy-world is not possible. A discussion of this argument would take us too far afield here, and must be reserved for a later study.

22. MEGA, I, 1:125.

23. This passage has been interpreted to mean that Marx is opting for praxis as opposed to philosophy. The "new Athens" would be a new "practical" system where praxis would take the place of Hegel's Spirit as the driving force of the dialectic. This position is defended in detail by Gunther Hillman in *Marx und Hegel, Von der Spekulation zur Dialektik* (Frankfurt a./M: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1966). The problem with Hillmann's argument is that it implies that Marx's position is based on an "option", that there is no *philosophical* reason for the transcendence of philosophy. As will be seen, Marx does try to provide a philosophical justification in terms of philosophy's dialectical relation to its Other, the world.

24. MEGA, I, 1:139.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

26. August von Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* (Berlin: Veit und Comp., 1838), p. 129.

27. Moses Hess, *Die europäische Triarchie*, 1841, p. 17 f; cited in Fetscher, p. 148.

28. Georg Lukács, "Moses Hess," pp. 648, 649, 656, *passim*.

29. Philosophy thus appears to find itself in the position of Hegel's "Unhappy Consciousness," caught in a dialectical contradiction between essential and unchanging truth and its own anthropological existence. As with the "Unhappy Consciousness," the achievement of its goal, unchangeable truth, implies at the same time the loss of itself; moreover, in being achieved, the essential truth is infected by the anthropological singularity of the "Unhappy Consciousness" and loses its own absoluteness. For Hegel the recognition and acceptance of this contradiction is the essence of Reason, whereas Marx's goal is to overcome the contradiction in fact. That this problematic is essential to Marx's preoccupations is seen by the continual recurrence of the victoryloss metaphor, as will be seen.

It should also be noted here that for Hegel too the totality of knowledge leads over to praxis. Hegel makes this argument in the *Logik* (2:477, 483 f), and in the *Enzyklopaedie* (paragraphs 468, 469, 482). This would seem to justify Hartmann's contention, referred to in note 21, that Hegel's system does include within itself reference to the world. On the other hand, Marx's position clearly seems based on the assumption that philosophy is in the

position of the "Unhappy Consciousness," a position which must be overcome in fact and not merely in thought. The dialectical structure or form of Marx's argument is thus analogous to that of Hegel, but its object and goal are radically different. Hartmann's contention that this is a transference which violates the nature of the dialectic by introducing a paradox, confusing the Hegelian categories with an anthropological understanding, deserves a fuller analysis than can be given here.

2—The Philosopher in the World

1. Bauer to Marx, 11 December 1839, *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Historisch Kritisch-Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Ryazanov, (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927 ff.), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 233-34 (this edition is hereafter referred to as MEGA); also Bauer to Marx, 1 March 1840, *Ibid.*, pp. 236-37; Bauer to Marx, 30 March 1840, *Ibid.*, pp. 238-40; Bauer to Marx, 28 March 1841, *Ibid.*, pp. 245-47.

2. Bauer to Marx, 28 March 1841, MEGA, I, 2:246.

3. Jung to Ruge, 18 October 1841, MEGA, I, 2:261-63.

4. Bauer to Marx, 28 March 1841, MEGA, I, 2:247.

5. The book is usually attributed to Bauer alone. However, it is clear that Marx did work with his friend, and that he planned to do the major part of the work on a planned second volume. See Jung to Ruge, 29 November 1848, MEGA, I, 2:263-64.; and Marx to Ruge, 20 March 1842, *Ibid.*, pp. 277-78.

6. Bauer's idealism led him further and further from the concrete world which his "Absolute Criticism" proposed to change. Criticism becomes an end in itself; the stress on the Truth of Self-consciousness and the negativity of the phenomenal world led Bauer and his followers to the ridiculous postures which Marx and Engels pillory in *The Holy Family* (1845).

7. *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 4 (1841), Vorwort; cited in Klaus Hartmann, *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), p. 55.

8. *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, 5 (1842): 761; cited in Hartmann, p. 65.

9. *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, p. 763; cited in Hartmann, p. 64.

10. *Deutsche Jahrbücher*, p. 762; cited in Hartmann, p. 64.

11. On Marx's collaboration with the *Anekdoten*, and the various articles which he promised to Ruge but never completed, see, Ruge to Marx, 25 February 1842, MEGA, I, 2:267-68; Marx to Ruge, 5 March 1842, *Ibid.*, pp. 268-69; Marx to Ruge, 27 April 1842, *Ibid.*, pp. 274-75; Ruge to Marx, "2nd half of June," 1842, *Ibid.*, pp. 275-76; and Ruge to Marx, 21 October 1842, *Ibid.*, p. 281.

12. In Auguste Comu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 2:30.

13. Marx to Ruge, 30 November 1842, MEGA, I, 2:285-87.

14. Heinrich Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1967), p. 18.

15. Moses Hess, *Die europäische Triarchie*; cited in Lukács, "Moses Hess," *Werke*, new ed. 2:648, n.7. It is interesting to note that Hegel himself makes a similar point in the *Phenomenology*: "what only should be, but is not, has no truth" (*Phänomenologie des Geistes* [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952], pp. 189-90).

16. Lukács, 2:658-9.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 665.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 664.

19. In *Marx-Engels Werke* (MEW) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961), 19:7-8. In MEGA, I, 2:151, excerpts from the censor's reports are published. Marx is spoken of as the "doctrinaire middle point, the living source of the paper," the "*spiritus rector* of the whole undertaking." When Marx left the *Rheinische Zeitung*, the censor advised the government that "since Dr. Marx has left, there is in fact in Cologne no personality capable of keeping the paper in its earlier odious dignity and of directing it with energy." This advice was ignored, and the paper was suppressed.

20. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* (New York: International Publishers, 1941), p. 18.

21. While Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach* are well known, it is important to stress that Feuerbach's contemplative attitude, his inability to understand praxis and history, and the very abstract nature of his position were what prevented him from resolving the crucial problem of finding a mediation between theory and praxis, thought and being, infinite and finite.

22. Editorial comment by Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, (New York: Doubleday, Anchor, 1967), p. 93.

23. Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962), p. 109. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis as above.

24. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, Jubiläumsausgabe, paragraph 3, Anmerkung (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964), pp. 42-3.

25. Louis Dupré, *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 68. See also Sidney Hook, *From Hegel to Marx* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1962), pp. 141-44.

26. MEGA, I, 1:315.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

28. Marx is using the Hegelian distinction between abstract morality (*Moralität*) and what is called *Sittlichkeit* or concrete and lived moral values. Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 141.

29. MEGA, I, 1:316.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 318.

31. *Ibid.* Cf. the discussion below of "preventive laws," in the section "On the Freedom of the Press" in this chapter.

32. MEGA, I, 1:318.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid., p. 319.

35. Ibid., p. 317.

36. It would perhaps be better to say "gone beyond" than "turned away from" the critique of religion. In the "Introduction to a Critique of Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*," Marx remarks that "The critique of religion is the presupposition of all critique" (488).

37. The problem is, *how* are the new needs created? How can true needs—for freedom, for rationality, for community—replace the false needs of commodity-society? At this stage of his development, Marx's critique has parallels with an Appeal to Reason, an idealistic application of a paradigm as the measure of reality. His position is more subtle in the "Exchange of Letters" (see chapter 4) and thereafter, but the problem—in political terms, the question of class-consciousness—remains. Cf., my articles, "Aliénation, fétichisme et théorie critique," *L'Homme et la société*, No. 17 (1970), pp. 97-110; and "On Marx's Critical Theory," *Telos*, No. 6 (1970), pp. 224-33.

38. Cornu, 2:13.

39. MEGA, I, 1:154.

40. Ibid., p. 152.

41. Marx is not yet giving a philosophy of praxis; he is attempting to show how philosophy, on its own terms, must transcend itself: we have, in a word, a philosophy *for* praxis. The project is similar to that of Cieszkowski, but the argumentation is stricter. Klaus Hartmann, in *Die Marxsche Theorie*, uses the mathematical term *alogarithmic* to stress the theoretical necessity for the move to praxis, and argues that only in this light can the positive and negative aspects of the critique be united into one critique which escapes the idealist reef of the Platonic paradigm on which the other Young Hegelians came to shipwreck. The argument, as well as Hartmann's criticism of it as a misunderstanding of the Hegelian "concrete category," is too complex to treat here.

42. This must be stressed today. *Rationality* has taken on the connotation of a formal logicity which, more often than not, operates in terms of reifications of human praxis. This notion of rationality—which can properly be called bourgeois—is consistent with the evolution of capitalism traced and analyzed by Max Weber. It is a quantitative, calculative approach to the world, analytical and not dialectical. Its logical conclusion is the one-dimensional civilization analyzed by Herbert Marcuse. In reacting to this development, one must be careful not to fall back into a romantic ethos of existential authenticity, or into a utopian communitarianism. The point is not to go backward, but to develop a dialectical position which can integrate form and content. It is in this context that André Gorz, for example, talks about a "socialist rationality," which would reassert the human foundations of the social world. Marx's critique of the Hegelian Bureaucracy, as well as the entire analysis of *Capital*, point in this direction; the demystification or defetishization of the bourgeois quantitative rationality is the foundation of the critical method.

43. MEGA, I, 1:359.
44. Ibid., p. 373. Cf. the discussion of the proletariat chapter 6.
45. MEGA, I, 1:260.
46. Ibid., p. 263.
47. Ibid., Cf., Pierre Naville's discussion of the influence of Fourier and St. Simon as antidotes to the Hegelian idealism, in *Le nouveau léviathan*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 *De l'alienation à la jouissance* (Paris: éditions anthropos, 1970), pp. 65-79. The influence of the utopian socialists on Marx's development has not been sufficiently studied.
48. MEGA, I, 1:263.
49. Cornu, 2:78.
50. In the critique of Hegel's theory of the State, Marx uses the same imagery in a more strict contest. Cf., chapter 3, "Monarchy or Democracy" and "The Legislature and the Changing Role of Civil Society."
51. Marx is making the Hegelian distinction between Understanding (*Verstand*) and Reason (*Vernunft*). The former is incapable of comprehending the dialectical movement whereby the objects of inquiry show themselves as in movement and in relation to one another. Reason, on the other hand, is the dialectical process in which the reconciliation between the real and the rational takes place, where the fixed determinations of the understanding are understood as a fluid totality.
52. H. P. Adams, *Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), p. 64.
53. It is difficult to agree with Ernest Mandel, who sees here an anticipation of the surplus-value theory of *Capital*. Cf., *La formation de la pensée économique de Karl Marx* (Paris: Maspero, 1967), p. 12.
54. In his polemic with the *Kölnische Zeitung*, Marx insisted: "But the true 'public' education of the state is much more the rational and public being [*Dasein*] of the state. The state itself educates its members by making them members of the state, by transforming the goals of the individual into universal goals . . . by the individual finding his satisfaction in the life of the whole, and the whole in the sentiment [*Gesinnung*] of the individual" (185).
55. K. Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, tr. David E. Green (London: Constable, 1965), p. 154.

3—Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State: The First Positive Steps

1. Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962), p. 306. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis as above.
2. Though Schlomo Avineri exaggerates somewhat in stating that the essay "resembles an advanced student's effort to work through a difficult text," he is correct in observing that "the distinctive patterns of Marx's later thought

had already taken shape when he attacked Hegel in this work." (Avineri, *The Social and Political Theory of Karl Marx* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 13.

3. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Vorläufige Thesen zur Reform der Philosophie," in *Kleine Schriften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p. 125.

4. Ibid., p. 126.

5. Ibid., p. 127.

6. Ibid., p. 130.

7. Ibid., p. 135.

8. Ibid., p. 131.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 135.

11. Ibid., p. 132.

12. Ibid., p. 139.

13. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft," in *Kleine Schriften*, p. 200.

14. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Brief an Hegel (1828)," in *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 9-10.

15. Marx to Ruge, 13 March 1843, in MEGA, I, 2:308.

16. This is not a Rousseauian argument. Marx is not interested in developing a social contract theory; his notion of the state as democratic will be seen to be based on a dialectical notion of the individual.

17. In fact, Marx's discussion began with Hegel's Paragraph 257, but the first pages of the manuscript have been lost.

18. See "The Legislature and the Changing Role of Civil Society" in this chapter, for a discussion of the particular complications which this poses in the development of the legislative power.

19. Marx asserts frequently that Hegel applies a dualism in arranging his mediations. Besides this example, the most glaring misuse is the determination of the Estates as being at one moment political and at another a part of civil society. Marx notes that "as soon as the civil Estate becomes as such political Estate, then no mediation is needed; and as soon as this mediation is needed, the civil Estate is not political, nor is it this mediation" (382). Further, if the private Estate remains private while playing a political role; then the goals of the state may themselves become private goals—as Marx had already seen in his work on the *Rheinische Zeitung*. It is for this reason that Marx begins to see, dimly, the important role played by private property. Concerning Hegel's argument in favor of primogeniture—the institution Hegel thought would enable the private Estates to play a political role—Marx notes that "thus the political constitution is, at its highest point, the constitution [*Verfassung*] of private property. The highest political view [*Gesinnung*] is that of private property. Primogeniture is merely the external appearance of the inner nature of land ownership [*des Grundbesitzes*]" (387).

20. Later in Hegel's argument, the qualification of the landed Estate for its legislative function is said to lie in the natural birth which gives the eldest son (through primogeniture) a political determination. Marx's comment on this "natural determination" is to compare it with that of a horse.

In the light of the same principle, Hegel insists that one of the legislative Houses be composed of members of the landed Estate, and the other of representatives of the “mobile” Estate. The upper House is needed to avoid the caprice of a vote by majority rule. Marx comments: “Hegel sinks throughout from his political spiritualism into the most crass materialism. . . . The highest state actions come to individuals by birth, just as the position of the animal, his character, way of life, etc., are immediately born with him. . . . In this system, Nature makes kings and Peers etc. immediately, like it makes eyes and noses” (395–96).

21. The significance of the term *generic being* (*Gattungswesen*) will be clearer as the discussion progresses. The term has its origin in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Lutheran theology. It will be recalled that D. F. Strauss argued that it was not logically possible to talk of the Incarnation as occurring in one individual, and that the historical Christ had to be understood as the “Idea of the *genus*.” Feuerbach took over the term, identifying man as generic being with God. Hess dropped its theological connotation, referring to man’s nature as a social being. Marx’s use of the term is dialectical, and the fact that it does not appear in his later writings is not a sign that it is an “idealist” product of his youth, but rather an indication that, having served its purpose, Marx drops it when he turns to another domain of problems. The German *Gattung* literally means “genus,” with the implicit meaning—as in the Greek *genos*—of “begetting” or “a unity due to copulation or intermingling.” The English translations of Marx’s work ordinarily use “species” in conformity with the notion of the human species. While this usage stresses man’s zoological derivation, the German usage of *Gattung*, and its rendering here as “genus,” imply that man has a generic uniqueness which is not solely that of an animal species, but that he is a genus with no species under it. Where genus-species distinctions matter, the German translation of species is *Art*, which in daily usage has also the connotation of “kind” or “way of doing something.” Marx’s usage is clearly not meant zoologically, and in fact he often uses the French term *espèce* or the English *species*, when he wants to talk about “species.” This usage is in accord with the tradition of German idealism, designating that concrete universality to which an individual accedes when he or she acts or lives in accord with the truly human possibilities of mankind as they have developed and continue to develop in history. It should be noted too that Marx usually speaks of man as a *Gattungswesen*, which would literally mean a “generic essence,” though *Wesen* can also be translated as “being.” This in turn points to the stress on the inherent possibilities of mankind which would be realized in the *Gattungswesen*, living the truly human life. Understood as an historically changing concrete universal, the notion of generic being becomes a powerful tool in the analysis of the relations of the individual to the community, and the possibility of changing them. A start in this direction is made in Agnes Heller’s *Alltag und Geschichte* (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1970).

22. The term *civil society*, which recurs throughout, was first used by Adam Ferguson, the teacher of Adam Smith. Hegel took it from Smith, defining it as the “system of needs” as opposed to the “realm of freedom,”

the state. It is "an association of members as self-subsistent individuals in a universality which, because of the self-subsistence of the members, is only abstract. Their association is brought about by their needs, by the legal system—the means of security of person and property—and by an external organization for attaining their particular and common interests" (*Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 157).

23. *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 274, Addition.

24. Hegel sees civil society as organized into Corporations which represent the isolated individual interests. The Corporations are not solely economic, but religious and cultural as well. The translator of the *Philosophy of Right*, T. M. Knox, notes the analogy with Mussolini's "corporate state." He cites Finer's study, *Mussolini's Italy*: "'the Corporations are to act as decentralized administrative bodies, in order to achieve an organic and a morale half-way between the public irresponsibility and the technical agility of private enterprise and the public responsibility and heavy routine of the ordinary departments of state.'" (In, Knox, tr., *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1952], p. 360.)

25. Shortly after the publication of this text, the analysis of the bureaucracy in relation to the state took on a political actuality in Russia. After the banishment of Trotsky, his friend and defender, Christian Rakovsky cited these lines in attacking the "bureaucratic deformation" of the proletarian state. Trotsky himself took up the theme shortly thereafter in *The Revolution Betrayed*, and other writings. While we cannot enter into this debate here, it is clear that in Marx's eyes there will exist a bureaucracy as long as there exists a state, and that the state will exist as long as there are private interests ("classes") which need a pretended universal interest to mediate between them; the relation between civil society and the bureaucratic state is a dialectical one in which a change in civil society necessitates a change in the state, but where the state cannot enforce its universality on a recalcitrant civil society. The incompleteness of the Russian Revolution, its top-down character, created the conditions of possibility for the growth of a new bureaucracy. For an analysis and critique of this situation and its political implications, see the French journal *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, and the collection of essays by one of its leaders, Claude Lefort, *Eléments d'une critique de la bureaucratie* (Paris: Librairie Droz, 1971).

26. It is interesting to note that Kafka was a low-level bureaucrat.

27. Later in the text, Marx attacks Hegel's confusion even more strongly, using the term *accommodation* to criticize Hegel's illusory empiricism. He writes:

Here there is an inconsistency on Hegel's part within his own mode of perception, and such an inconsistency is accommodation. The Estates as political [Das politisch-ständische Element] are, in the modern sense, in the sense that Hegel develops, the completed posited division of civil society from its private Estate and its differentiations. How can Hegel make the private Estate the solution of the antinomies of the legislative power

in itself? Hegel wants to have the medieval system of Estates, but the modern sense of the legislative power; and he wants to have the modern legislative power, but in the form [Körper] of the medieval system of Estates! It is the worst kind of syncretism. (P. 383)

28. Though Marx is not clear about its role, he sees that private property is involved here. When Hegel asserts that the landed Estate has a directly political role and thus mediates between the government and the people, one of his arguments is that, because of the institution of primogeniture, the family life and its ethical principle, love, put this landed Estate in a position to exercise a universal, political role. A second reason which Hegel adduces is that the land is owned inalienably by the lord, who is thus freed from the war of all against all in civil society. Marx disagrees strongly:

In the Estate which has family life as its basis, there lacks the basis of Family life: love, as actual and thus as effective and determining principle. It is the spiritless family life, the illusion of family life. The principle of private property, in its highest development, contradicts the principle of the family. (P. 387)

What is ethical at one moment of development need not fill the same function at another moment. Previously, private property had played an ethical role. Yet it no longer does so in the state sphere. Marx notes that it is strange that Hegel would want to ground the ethically higher sphere in a lower, less universal one, such as the family (382). The political sphere, says Marx, is "the barbarism of private property against the family life" (387).

Marx presents a second argument to illustrate the power of private property in the state as depicted by Hegel. Earlier in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel defined private property as the incarnation of the free will; private property, he said, exists inasmuch as I put my will into it. On the basis of the social existence of private property, the sphere of private law, of exchange, contract, and the like was developed. Upon this sphere was developed that of the family, whose basis is love. Now, when the landed Estate makes the "political sacrifice," as Hegel puts it, of primogeniture, the basic determinations of the sphere of private right are annulled. No longer does property exist inasmuch as I put my will into it; now, on the contrary, I exist as a political man inasmuch as property puts its will in me! Property is no longer the predicate and man ('s will) the subject. In the realm of the state, property is the subject and man is the predicate and, moreover, an accidental predicate (387-92; 397). Marx observes that

the signification which private property has in the political state is its essential, its true signification . . . Here, in the sphere of the political state, the individual moments of the state relate to themselves as to the essence of the genus, as to the "generic essence"; [this is] because the political state is the sphere of their universal determination, their religious sphere. The political state is the mirror of truth for the different moments of the concrete state (P. 398)

Marx's criticism of private property is still undeveloped, and it would be incorrect to make too much of it at this point. Cf., "Positive Conclusions" later in this chapter, where the subject comes up again.

29. Marx's sympathy is obviously with this Estate. Yet he does not adopt a chiliaristic politics based on the opposition of rich and poor, as did his friend Moses Hess. Here, Marx's interest is first of all in finding the flaws in the Hegelian scheme, and second, in applying the dialectic in the attempt to develop the groundwork of a new synthesis. In the new synthesis, this "Estate of immediate labor," more precisely defined as the proletariat, will play a key role.

30. Pierre Naville, *Le nouveau léviathan* vol. 1., *De l'alienation à la jouissance* (Paris: éditions anthropos, 1970), p. 89.

31. It would be erroneous to argue, as does Mankel Friedrich, for example, that "Marx has given up the philosophical standpoint without admitting it and bases himself on rigorous empirical investigation" (*Philosophie und Oekonomie beim jungen Marx* [Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1960], p. 65). "Actual man, actual society" refers to man and society as seen by the dialectic. It is difficult to see how a "rigorous empirical investigation" without the aid of the dialectic would enable Marx to maintain his demand for a democratic state. The Prussian masses had lived for centuries under autocratic rule, and Marx was not so utopian as to contend that from one day to the next they would become good democrats. His contention is more radical (though still unmediated, and hence idealistic), namely, that only the instauration of a democratic state can eliminate the irrationality of the division between state and civil society and create a society where the private and public life of man would be united. In democracy, he writes, "not only the form but also the content" will change (340).

4—The Foundation of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher

1. No attempt will be made here to define what Marx "really" meant by communism as a political term. Marx's position changed continually as he learned from the actual experience of the working class. (See, for example, the 1872 preface to the new edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, in which Marx and Engels note that the experience of the Paris Commune necessitated the modification of some of their previous views.) I will treat here only the discussion of communism contained in the 1844 *Paris Manuscripts*, for it is there that Marx is most explicitly philosophical. I have argued elsewhere that I do not think that Lenin (and a fortiori Stalin et al.) is the faithful interpreter of Marx's views. See, *The Unknown Dimension: Post-Leninist Marxism*, ed. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972), for discussion of alternative views.

2. The review appeared in the issue of 16 March 1843 (cited by Maximilien Rubel, *Karl Marx: Essai de biographie intellectuelle* [Paris: Librairie Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1957] p. 64). Though it has been discovered that Stein was in

fact a police agent, his study of French socialist movements of the early 1840s is still an important source of information, and had an important influence on his contemporaries. The best study of Stein's work is Manfred Hahn's *Bürgerlicher Optimismus im Niedergang: Studien zu Lorenz Stein und Hegel* (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1969). Cf. my review of this book to appear in *Erasmus*, 1973.

3. John Lewis, in *The Life and Teaching of Karl Marx* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965), asserts that Marx's notion of the proletariat "undoubtedly derives from Stein" (p. 62). Robert Tucker, in *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), speaks of Marx's "minute textual familiarity with Stein's book" (p. 113). This seems to be the majority opinion among marxologists. Hahn takes up the debate over the influence of Stein on Marx, pointing to its political context in the polemic between Struve and Mehring, and then to the absurd consequences later drawn by Arnold Winkler (in *Die Entstehung des 'Kommunistischen Manifests'* [Vienna, 1936]) who finds similar passages in Stein and the *Communist Manifesto*, and concludes that Marx's theory derives directly from Stein, save that it pretends to be revolutionary. Cf. Hahn, pp. 161-67. However, whether Marx derived the term *proletariat* from Stein, or from F. von Baader, who seems to be the first German to use the term (Nicholas Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967], p. 280), is unimportant. It will be seen in chapter 6 that the conceptual structure within which Marx introduces the concept of the proletariat is unique with him, for it is intimately linked with his dialectical method. Marx does not speak of the proletariat as a sociological fact, but as a process in formation, as "artificial."

4. Feuerbach, *Kleine Schriften* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), p. 136.

5. Ibid.

6. *The Holy Family* and *The German Ideology* will not be treated here. They belong to the second moment of Marx's work, after he has resolved the theory-praxis problem and turned to the study of political economy. Speaking of the latter work in his preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx notes that he and Engels "abandoned it to the gnawing criticism of the mice" because they "had attained our principle goal: self-clarification." Though Isaiah Berlin, in his almost totally philosophical *Karl Marx*, calls *The German Ideology* "philosophically far more interesting than any other work by Marx," it and *The Holy Family* have no place in the development being traced here.

7. Auguste Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 2:245-47.

8. Ibid., p. 235.

9. Cited in Ibid., p. 250, n.1.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. It should be noted that Engel's addition to the Young Hegelian com-

bination of French and German principles was the decisive influence on the full development of the Marxian position, supplying the necessary mediation from the side of the world, and enabling Marx to avoid the idealism of his former associates.

13. Lewis, *The Life and Teaching of Karl Marx*, p. 48.

14. Rubel, *Karl Marx*; p. 114. It should be noted here that Rubel's detailed and scholarly treatment of Marx's development seems aimed at making Marx palatable to a western audience. Rubel neglects the philosophical problems which, in the interpretation presented here, are the key to Marx's evolution. He substitutes a Marx who becomes the father of modern sociology. While it is undeniably true that Marx did make important contributions to the discipline now called sociology, these were incidental to his main concern, and can only be understood in terms of that philosophical orientation exposed here.

15. Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, n. d.), p. 102; and Cornu, 2:322.

16. Marx was then 25 years old; Engels was 23.

17. *The Situation of the Working Class in England*. This book, published in 1844, is a masterful description of the misery created by the development of capitalist industry in England. It is not a particularly theoretical study, but is valuable for its empirical and passionate analysis.

18. *Marx-Engels Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961 ff.) 13:10.

19. Though one might well question the importance of Engel's contribution to the elaboration of Marx's theory, this is not the place for such a discussion. Marx profited from many influences, and his greatness is his ability to synthesize them into a coherent whole whose direction follows logically from the philosophical motivations of his youth, from his insistence on the power of Reason.

20. Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962), p. 427. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis as above.

21. The reference is to the Malthusian population theory.

22. Mikhail Bakunin was a young Russian *émigré* who, like numerous Russians at the time, came to Germany to study the Hegelian philosophy after a certain involvement in left-wing politics. He remained a passionate revolutionary all his life, and suffered imprisonment in Siberia after the Revolution of 1848. Bakunin claimed to have been involved in some forty-eight uprisings during his life. He and Marx were never close friends, nor were their political views particularly congenial. Bakunin developed an anarchist theory which stressed directly political, conspiratorial action leading to the violent overthrow of the state. Marx opposed this view on the grounds that it was necessary for the proletariat to develop class consciousness through a period of economic struggles, and because he saw that the key to revolution had to be the change in the structures of civil society. At the end of their lives, especially after Bakunin tried to take control of the First International, he and Marx were bitter enemies.

23. Cf. chapter 7, where the particular communisms are shown to contain implicitly, and lead to, a communism which is universal, incorporating the positive demands of the particular, one-sided communisms.

24. The victory-loss metaphor has been used before and is essential to understanding Marx's view of the role of philosophy. Cf. chapter 1, n27, as well as the view that the active vote implies the transcendence of the political state. The point here is that by forcing the people to consider the universal, the rational form of the state, in its everyday struggles, the political victories of the people will bring with them the loss of the previous standpoint which consecrated the separation of the state from civil society. The formulation is clearly dialectical.

25. The important notion that communists show others why they actually struggle reappears in the *Communist Manifesto*. Indeed, one could say that this is the motto of Marx's entire political theory. See, my introduction to the *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), and my commentary on Agnes Heller's paper, "Theory and Practice: Their Relation to Human Needs," to be published.

26. In *History and Class Consciousness*, Georg Lukács interprets this image as follows. Marx "criticizes the Hegelian knowledge for being simply a knowledge concerning an object—which is in itself essentially different [than the knowledge]—and not a 'confession' of that object which is human society." (French ed. [Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1960], p. 35.) Lukács' point is well taken. "Knowledge concerning an object" is theory which is not united with praxis; it is knowledge which has not understood the demands of the dialectic. The confession which Marx demands is only a metaphor for his early insistence that "the reason of the thing itself must roll forward in all its contradictoriness and find its unity in itself." (In the letter to his father, chapter 1 above.)

5—From the Primacy of the State to that of Civil Society

1. Too many commentators pick on this essay to show that Marx had psychological problems because of his Jewish background. One English translation of the essay, by Dagobert D. Runes, is entitled, "A World without Jews." This kind of literary psychoanalysis lends itself too easily to the self-fulfilling prophecy. It is safe to dismiss comments such as those of H. P. Adams (*Karl Marx in his Earlier Writings* [London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940], p. 95), or Theodore Von Laue (*The Global City* [Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969], p. 206), and the numerous repetitions of this theme by Edmund Wilson (*To the Finland Station* [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940], pp. 115, 151, 208–9, 304–6, 318–19, etc.). To give the reader the flavor of some of the "better" Marx-commentaries, the following from Isaiah Berlin is interesting:

The essay, "On the Jewish Question," was a dull and shallow composition, but it shows Marx in a typical mood: He was determined that the sarcasms and insults to which some of the notable Jews of his generation, Heine,

Lassalle, Disraeli, were all their lives a target, never be used to plague him. Consequently he decided to kill the Jewish problem once and for all so far as he was concerned, declaring it to be an unreal subject, invented as a screen for other more pressing problems: a problem which offered no special difficulty, but arose from the general social chaos which demanded to be put in order. He was baptized a Lutheran, and was married to a Gentile; he had once been of assistance to the Jewish community of Cologne: during the greater part of his life he held himself aloof from anything remotely connected with his race, showing an open hostility to all its institutions. (Karl Marx, *His Life and Environment*, 3rd ed. [New York: Oxford University Press, 1963], pp. 99-100; also p. 269.)

Such interpretations are not worth refuting. The reader will judge for him or herself the value of this essay. In my personal opinion, it is one of the finest short statements of his position that Marx ever penned.

2. Marx to D. Oppenheim, 25 August 1842, *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Historisch Kritisch-Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Ryazanov (Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1927 ff.), vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 279. This edition is hereafter referred to as MEGA.

3. Auguste Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 2:254.

4. Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962), p. 452. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis as above.

5. Like that of Hegel, Bauer's idealism makes it impossible to treat the particular concrete being of phenomena, reducing them to philosophical abstractions whose *differentia specifica* cannot, for this reason, be given. The importance of this Marxian position is stressed particularly by Galvano Della Volpe and his followers. See the lucid exposition of Della Volpe's position by Mario Montano in *The Unknown Dimension*, ed. Dick Howard and Karl E. Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

6. Marx speaks often here of the "completely political state," but does not explain what he means by the term. He is not referring to an Hegelian state, but simply to one in which there exists a political realm which is separate and distinct from civil society, and especially from the Church. His example of such a state is the "Free States of North America."

7. Cf. the analysis of Epicurus's rejection of the Greek deities as introducing heterogeneity.

8. See Marx's polemic with the *Kölnische Zeitung* and his *Anekdoten* article on censorship where the same argument appears, though in a more polemical context.

9. Marx is not opposing the idealism of the state to some sort of materialism of the state. *Idealism* need not be seen as a pejorative term in Marx's eyes, as will be seen in the concluding part of this chapter.

Avineri presents a detailed treatment of Marx's attitude toward the French Revolution, and especially his condemnation of the Jacobin Terror. Marx did

not condemn the Terror for moral reasons, but because it did not understand that the economic conditions for the universalization of man were not yet prepared. Thus, the political state had to force its domination onto the spheres of civil society which, unlike the romantic model of the revolutionaries, had grown independent of the *polis*. It is not possible to establish the *volonté générale* by negating the *volonté de tous*; the former can be created only by the latter. On this, see also Schlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Theory of Karl Marx* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 185–201, especially pp. 190–91. Cf., also Marx's judgment of the Silesian weavers' revolt, Chapter 7 below. This position explains Marx's opposition to the conspiratorial, self-declared vanguard parties of the Babeuvist or Blanquist type.

10. For Marx, as for Hegel, self-conscious activity is higher than more immediate natural activity. The natural man here "finds" the state in that he is at its base; but he becomes real man, generic being, only when raised to his universality.

11. It is important not to misunderstand Marx here. As Cottier notes, "the Jew represents the quintessence of bourgeois society. Marx demands that a personage incarnate a vice, lend his mask to one ethical mode, which is thus personified. This ethical mode . . . provides a type of man who explains a certain world. We know that Marx admired the novels of Balzac" (Georges Cottier, *L'athéisme du jeune Marx: Ses origines Hégéliennes* [Paris: Librairie philosophique, 1959], p. 227). Both Tucker and McLellan note that the German term *Judentum* had a secondary connotation of "commerce" in German. (Robert Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961], p. 111; David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* [New York: Harper & Row, 1970], pp. 141–42. Marx's analysis is not antisemitic. He writes, for example, that "The Jew, who exists as a particular member of civil society, is only the particular manifestation [*Erscheinung*] of civil society's Judaism . . . Out of its own entrails, civil society ceaselessly produces the Jew" (484).

12. These passages, and many others like them in the text, have their origins in part of Hegel's description of civil society, and in part in Moses Hess's article, "*Ueber das Geldwesen*," which was sent to Marx for publication in the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, but was published elsewhere.

The critique of the alienating nature of money will reappear in the *Paris Manuscripts*. The critique of the commodity relations between individuals also appears in the *Manuscripts*, and is carried over into Marx's later economic work, playing a key role in the exposition of the nature of commodities in the first volume of *Capital*, under the heading, the "Fetishism of Commodities." The importance of the notion of fetishism has grown as capitalist relations have become the sole bond uniting individuals, and Marx's categories here, more than ever, show their fruitfulness.

13. Though I shall not treat *The German Ideology* in this work, it is worth pointing out that already in "On the Jewish Question" an important insight of that book is implicitly applied and presupposed. In the discussion of the Jewish religion, and the way in which, in fact, all Christians have be-

come “Jews” within civil society; in the discussion of the way in which the true god of the Jewish religion is money and bargaining; and again in the assertion that there is no reason at all to expect that the Jew give up his religion which serves him so well in coping with life in civil society—what is seen is that the Jewish religion is the result of the material conditions in which it exists and grows. Religion is an ideological construct. As such, its origins, its nature, and its eventual disappearance can be explained by the material conditions within which it was born and lives. (Note, however, that this does not imply an economic determinism of infrastructure/superstructure; the material conditions are not only economic.)

14. Human emancipation in this essay is the same as what was, in the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State,” called “generic life,” i.e., the life of the individual who is both particular and universal.

15. Cornu, 2:273.

16. This thorny problem merits a caveat. The distinction drawn here is one which is internal to Marx’s own development, and has nothing to do with the more general philosophical alternatives of idealism and materialism, especially in the crude form which they are normally presented. Without pretending to give a detailed treatment in this note, I would assert that any dialectical philosophy is idealist in the broad sense insofar as it does not accept the brute positivity of matter but introduces a subjective element of becoming into a material world which is inherently social, praxical. The crude notion of a “dialectics of nature,” stressed by the Stalinist orthodoxy—e.g., that the transition from quantity to quality can be seen when we heat water to the point that it becomes steam, etc.—is nonsensical. The Marxian dialectic is not mechanistic, and makes sense only in a social world constituted, and continually reconstituted, by social human praxis. On the nature of idealistic philosophy, see Hegel’s *Wissenschaft der Logik*, ed. Erster Teil and Georg Lasson (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1963), pp. 145–46.

6—The Proletariat: Solution of the Theory-Praxis Problem

1. Auguste Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955), 2:11.

2. John Lewis, *The Life and Teaching of Karl Marx* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1965), p. 58.

3. Cornu, 2:288. See also David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 142.

4. Manfred Friedrich, *Philosophie und Oekonomie beim jungen Marx* (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot), 1960, p. 81.

5. Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth (Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962), p. 488. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis as above.

6. And it is historical as well, for the “world of man, state, society” is an historically evolving complex. For an attempt to develop this aspect, see

Agnes Heller, *Alltag und Geschichte* (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1970.)

7. The efficacy of such a critique must be understood in terms of Marx's notion of needs and the situation of the proletariat. See the section "Praxis and the Proletariat" in this chapter and note 12 below.

8. Marx refers here to the fact that whereas in England and France industry was by this time powerfully developed and could make its stand on the principles of free trade, in Germany industry was feeble, and had to rely on government protection in the form of tariffs and other protectionist measures. Cornu notes that Marx's knowledge of economics was clearly insufficient at this time, for he should have known that these measures taken by Germany were in fact progressive because they led to the development of German capitalism and to the creation of the proletariat which would destroy it. (Cornu, 2:228.)

9. There are many interpretations of these two "parties." Friedrich indicates that the "theoretical party" is the Bruno Bauer group, the "Critical Critique," and that the "practical party" is a reference to Feuerbach. (Friedrich, p. 150.) Cornu suggests that the former refers to all the Young Hegelians, but does not indicate to whom the "practical party" refers. (Cornu, 2:279–80.) Lobkowitz thinks that the "practical party" is the "South German Liberals," while Mehring sees this group as being the representatives of growing German industry. (Lobkowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 273; Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, n.d.), p. 66. The question, in fact, is not of extreme importance. However, it should be noted that Karl Korsch correctly observes that the attitude of the "practical party" is precisely that taken by the Lenin of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*. (Korsch, *Marxisme et Philosophie*, trans. Claude Orsone [Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1964]; my translation from the French). It is also the position too often taken by the contemporary New Left.

10. Klaus Hartmann's *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1970) stresses the notion of the "one critique," seeing it as consistent with the implicit demands of the Dissertation. Hartmann sees Marx's rejection of the option for praxis as "Marx's transcendental heritage" (71).

11. This analysis confirms Georg Lukács's interpretation, according to which all previous philosophies were bound up by their "contemplative attitude," by their "rationalism." Marx broke with this attitude by introducing praxis into the philosophical position. Cf., the essay "Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," especially part 2, "The Antinomies of Bourgeois Thought," in *History and Class Consciousness*.

12. *Ad hominem* here does not have the pejorative character of an *ad hominem* argument which is purely rhetorical. The remainder of the citation, referring to man as the root, indicates that theory must deal with real human problems on the basis of their human, social nature. An *ad hominem* argument in this sense is the kind of argument in the last of the "Exchange of Letters," which suggests that the function of the critique is to show those who are in fact struggling why it is that they struggle.

13. The notion of "radical needs" plays an important role in Marx's

elaboration of his resolution of the theory-praxis problem, and will be discussed in chapter 7. This is also the key to a Marxist politics. Revolutionary tactics must be such as lead to the creation of new needs, which can only be solved by revolutionary action. The most sophisticated development of the political implications of this position is found in the works of André Gorz. On this, see my "French New Working Class Strategies," in *Radical America*, (March/April, 1969) 1-20 and my "New Situation, New Strategy: Serge Mallet and André Gorz," in *The Unknown Dimension*, ed. Dick Howard and Karl Klare (New York: Basic Books, 1972).

14. The abortive 1848 Revolution in Germany confirms Marx's analysis. See Mehring, pp. 157-94.

15. Marx uses the terms *Klasse*, *Stand*, and *Sphäre* interchangeably here. He intends no sociological class analysis in this article, but only to show what is inherent in the evolution of civil society.

16. In a letter to J. Wedemeyer, Marx writes that "long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes. What I did that was new was to prove: 1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production, 2) that the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and to a classless society." (Marx to Wedemeyer, 5 March 1852, in *Selected Correspondence* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.], p. 86.)

17. In *History and Class Consciousness*. On this, see Paul Breines, "Introduction to Lukács," in *Telos*, No. 5 (1970), 1-20, and Andrew Arato's informative essay of the young Lukács in *The Unknown Dimension*.

18. The theory of the "new working class," when rigorously formulated in terms of Marx's later economic studies, seems to me to be an important response to the demand for a concrete, modern reformulation of the Marxian notion of the proletariat. See my articles on this subject, already mentioned, as well as André Gorz, *Strategy for Labor* (New York: Beacon); and Serge Mallet, *The New Working Class: A Socialist Perspective*, ed. Dick Howard and Dean Savage, to be published by New Critics Press, 1972, among a host of others.

19. The theory of "absolute pauperization" is a Lassalleian notion, against which Marx more than once found himself forced to polemicize. Its nefarious effects are discussed in *The Unknown Dimension*.

20. See Martin Nicolaus's "The Unknown Marx," first published in *New Left Review*, and reprinted in *The New Left Reader*, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: Grove Press, 1969), as well as his "Hegelian Choreography and the Capitalist Dialectic: Proletariat and Middle Class in Marx," in *Studies on the Left*, 7 (Jan-Feb. 1967), 22-49.

7—Affirmation of the New Position

1. Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, n.d.), p. 89.

2. The root, of course, is of Latin origin.

3. *Marx-Engles Werke* (MEW) (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961), 1:396–97.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

5. *Ibid.*

6. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, p. 404.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 407. Georg Lukács cites these passages as a confirmation of his view that class consciousness is not the result of immediate perceived oppression, but is based on a totality view of the society as historically given. *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein, Werke*, 2 (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1968), 358–59.

10. *Marx-Engels Werke*, 1:402.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 405.

12. Wilhelm Weitling, a journeyman tailor, was one of the first important German communists. He was an indefatigable orator and organizer, who worked for a time with the League of the Just. Like Proudhon, he was an autodidact, and wrote voluminously. It will be recalled that it was because the *Rheinische Zeitung* had published one of his articles that it was attacked for “communist sympathies” by its Augsburg colleague. Weitling’s most important works were the *Guarantees of Harmony and Freedom*, and the *Evangile of a Poor Fisherman*. He had messianic tendencies, and later turned to an apocalyptic form of communism, which he identified with primitive Christianity. He and Marx knew one another, but quarreled in 1846. Their final meeting, in Brussels, is described by P. Annekov. In answer to Weitling’s messianic, action-oriented position, and his criticism of armchair theoreticians. Marx rose from his chair and cried: “Ignorance never yet helped anybody!” With this, their relationship ended. (P. Annekov, in *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels* [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d.], p. 272.)

13. *Marx-Engels Werke*, 1:405. This stance had already been taken by Friedrich Engels. In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Marx reaffirms this position: “It is clear,” he writes, “that the transcendence of estrangement always takes place in terms of the form of estrangement which is the dominant power; in Germany, self-consciousness, in France, equality, because France is political, and in England, the actual, material, practical need.” (Karl Marx, *Fruhe Schriften I*, ed. Hans-Joachim Lieber and Peter Furth [Stuttgart: Cotta Verlag, 1962], p. 617. When possible, references are taken from this edition and are indicated by a page number in parenthesis in the text.)

14. *Marx-Engels Werke*, 1:405.

15. Ibid., p. 406. This is, of course, the theme of the final of the “Exchange of Letters,” in which Marx explains his understanding of the role of critical philosophy in the revolutionary struggle.

16. Ibid., p. 408.

17. Ibid., p. 409.

18. Mehring, p. 89.

19. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 189, Remark.

20. Ibid., paragraph 189, Addition. Cf., Georg Lukács, *Der junge Hegel*, 3rd ed. (Neuwied: Luchterhand Verlag, 1967).

21. The section on wages begins: “Wages are determined through the bitter struggle between capitalist and worker”; the section on profit begins: “What is the basis of capital, that is, of private property in the products of other men’s labor?” and cites Say’s assertion that it is based on theft; and the section on rent begins by citing Say’s: “Landlord’s right has its origin in robbery.”

22. In his later economic works, Marx recognizes that it is not the commodity *labor* but *labor-power* which the capitalist buys. This distinction is the basis of the theory of surplus value, for by buying *labor-power* the capitalist earns the disposition over the works for a longer time than is needed for the simple reproduction of the workers’ life; he thus receives a surplus, paying for some of the workers’ labor but not for all of it.

23. The implications of this for the theory of alienation will be clear below.

24. Both of these questions are answered below, the first at the end of section B, and the second in section C.

25. Marx talks about the situation of the capitalist, his “alienation,” at several points in the *Manuscripts*, but never elaborates on its negative features. See pp. 564, 571, 575, 619, etc. One surmises that what Marx had in mind is that in that the capitalist’s position is not due to his own qualities as a man; he too is dehumanized and treated as a thing. Thus, for example, he must obey the laws of capital, become a monopolist or get out of business. There is no middle road, no personal choice. On this, see André Gorz, *La morale de l’histoire* (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1959), pp. 104 ff. In *Capital* too, Marx affirms this position, saying that he is not against the capitalist, but the social relations of capitalism. He speaks of “the capitalist—who is actually but personified capital endowed with a consciousness of its own and a will.” (*Capital*, English ed., vol. 3 [Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House], 284.)

26. The problem of explaining capitalist profit is among the thorniest for political economy. The theory that Marx develops in volume 3 of *Capital* has been the subject of bitter controversy. Böhm-Bawerk and his followers say that to develop this theory, Marx had to abandon the “metaphysical” labor theory of value used in volume 1 and 2. Böhm-Bawerk misunderstands the dialectical structure of *Capital*—but an exposition of this would go beyond the confines of the present essay. See Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Marxschen “Kapital,”* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt,

1968), part 7; Robert Guihéneuf, *Le problème de la théorie marxiste de la valeur* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952), pp. 90-120; and Paul Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), pp. 109-30.

27. Misunderstanding this point is the error of "crude communism," discussed below. Marx seems to have had in mind here the theories of Proudhon and his followers, against whom he polemicizes continually. In relation to this particular point, Marx's polemic against Alfred Darimon, a Proudhonian who urged the foundation of a national bank which would issue tickets for each hour worked in place of money, is interesting. Cf., *Grundriss der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1953), part 1.

28. The notion of "true opposition" was discussed in the critique of Hegel's mystification. Here, insofar as capital is defined as accumulated past labor, the opposition capital-labor is nothing but the opposition between past and present labor, an "essential" opposition which must resolve itself.

29. Marx never does tie in the theory of alienation with money, save on a very superficial level. In the third *Manuscript*, there is a short section on money, in which Marx quotes from Goethe and Shakespeare on the alienating qualities of money, the way in which it can make the ugliest, weakest man into the most powerful and most desired, etc. The analysis is reminiscent of Marx's comments on money in "On the Jewish Question," and seems to have borrowed from Moses Hess's "*Ueber das Geldwesen*." Money is a mediator which ends up by dominating the subjects between which it is to mediate. Marx gives a more detailed analysis of the alienating character of money in the "Excerpt-Notes of 1844," and—from a more strict point of view—in *Zur Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* (1859) and in *Capital*.

30. Marx uses the terms *Entfremdung* (estrangement) and *Entäusserung* (alienation), and their cognates, frequently in this discussion. The terms offer some difficulty for the translator. I am following the usage of Martin Milligan (translator of the International Publishers' edition of the *Manuscripts*) which suggests that *Entäusserung* is alienation in the sense that commercially or legally one can alienate one's property; this is the sense in which the classical economists used the term. The term might also be rendered (as in the Easton and Guddat version) as "externalization." Cottier suggests that "*Entäusserung*" has its origins in Paul, who spoke of Jesus as the Self which alienates itself to become human, and therefore adopts the term *kenosis*. As opposed to this, *Entfremdung* refers to relations between persons or, with Hegel, between a thing and its essence. (Marx had used the term in this sense in the dissertation, pp. 55 and 58.) When I am not directly citing Marx, I shall speak simply of "alienation," as does T. B. Bottomore, who has also translated the *Manuscripts*. Bottomore claims, correctly I think, that "Marx (unlike Hegel) does not make any systematic distinction between them; Marx distinguishes between *Entäusserung*, *Entfremdung* (alienation) and *Vergegenständlichung* (objectification)" (in Bottomore, *Karl Marx, Early Writings* [New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963], p. xix.)

31. In *Capital*, Marx explains that the necessary condition for the possibility of capitalism is that the worker be dispossessed of the means of production, and therefore forced to sell his labor-power as a commodity.

32. The "movement of private property" is simply the movement of production and exchange within civil society.

33. There is an important theoretical ambiguity here, which unfortunately can only be briefly indicated in this note. The attempt to ground private property in alienated labor has the structure of a transcendental proof, founding an existent on a prior *principle*. Here, Marx is clearly indebted to the line of reasoning developed by German idealism from Kant to Hegel, as should be clear to the reader. But where Marx departs from this tradition is that he invokes an *existent* or *real ground*, not a categorial one. Hence the "vicious circle," and the problem of *transcendental linearity*. To escape this problem, Marx's later theory—in *The German Ideology* especially, but also in the famous chapter of *Capital* on primitive accumulation—tends toward a *genetic* account, invoking actual history as a ground. This problem is discussed in detail and criticized by Klaus Hartmann, *Die Marxsche Theorie* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1970), and also by D. Benner, *Theorie und Praxis* (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1966). One possible solution within the framework of the *Manuscripts* is seen in Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique*, which invokes man-as-praxis as a real ground for the theory. On Sartre's *Critique*, see my article in *The New Marxism*, ed. Paul Piccone and Bert Grahl (St. Louis: New Critics Press, 1973). For a critique of Sartre, see Klaus Hartmann's *Sartres Sozialwissenschaft* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966).

34. In the third *Manuscript*, Marx speaks of seven ways in which capital and labor are united in political economy: 1) capital is accumulated labor; 2) the determination of capital within the production process—as reproduction of capital with profit, as raw material, and as machine—is productive labor; 3) the worker is a capital; 4) wages are part of production costs; 5) for the worker, labor is the reproduction of his life-capital; 6) for the capitalist, labor is the moment of his capital's activity; 7) the paradise of the primordial unity of the two—though the economist doesn't worry about how they came to be divided (616). Note that Marx is using the Hegelian concept of essence in order to think this relationship in its duality. The significance of this, into which we cannot go here, is dealt with by Klaus Hartmann.

35. See Ernest Mandel, *La formation de la pensée économique de Karl Marx* (Paris: Maspero, 1967), pp. 155-203. The recently republished preliminary draft of *Capital*, the *Grundrisse*, shows this as well; cf., Martin Nicolaus, "The Unknown Marx," in *The New Left Reader*, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: Grove Press, 1969), and my "On Deforming Marx," *Science & Society* 33 (Fall 1969), 358-65. Cf., also my discussion of another recently published manuscript of Marx's, the *Resultate des unmittelbaren Produktionsprozesses*, in *Telos*, no. 6 (Fall 1970), 224-33 and in French (in a longer version), in *L'Homme et la société*, no. 17 (1970), pp. 97-110.

The idea that there are two Marxes, a humanistic young and a scientific older Marx, has a long, ideological history, but no theoretical basis. The publication of the 1844 *Manuscripts* and others of the early writings took place

during Stalin's consolidation of power, and their editor, D. Ryazanov, "disappeared" shortly thereafter. The language of the early writings clearly leads itself to a humanist interpretation, which could of course be used in the ideological fight against Stalinism. Anti-Stalinists of the left and the right eagerly seized upon them, and a humanistic, Hegelianized reading of Marx became the characteristic of what Merleau-Ponty called Western Marxism, while at the same time liberal democrats used the so-called Marxist humanism as an antisoviet, anticommunist weapon. The Russian-oriented communist parties replied to this by accepting the division of the Marxian corpus, and laying claim to the "scientific" work of the mature Marx. Moreover, with the stagnation of leftist activity in the West, and the turn to "peaceful co-existence," the "communist-Christian dialogue," etc., it was tempting for revolutionaries to once again assert the division-theory, arguing that the "humanism" of the established communist parties in the West (particularly in Italy, but also in France) needed to be thrown over in favor of a more "scientific" approach. This was the task of the school of Galvano Della Volpe in Italy, and of Louis Althusser in France. On this quarrel. See *The Unknown Dimension*.

36. The so-called socialist countries today do not accept the idea that with the introduction of socialism, the theoretical expression of alienated society, political economy, should disappear. It is foolish to invoke categories from *Capital* to account for socialist relations, as Rosa Luxemburg recognized in her *Einführung in die Nationalökonomie*, whose recent East German reedition contains a warning from the editors about this "error." The Marxian analysis in *Capital* is a *critique*, as the subtitle of the book clearly states; it is not a collection of eternal categories, nor a handbook for the socialist society. On this, see my two articles mentioned in n.36.

37. This is an important point which itself would demand an essay. If history is to be understood, it must be considered as rational. If one holds that history is not rational, then he can understand neither the past nor the present—let alone the future—and, Marx suggests, is reduced to a position which amounts to solipsism (606–7). In this light, the following citation is interesting:

In order to transcend the thought of private property, a thought-communism is sufficient. In order to transcend real private property, an actual communist action is needed. History will bring this; and this movement which we know in thought to be a self-transcending movement will be in reality a very severe and protracted process. But we must regard it as a real advance to have gained beforehand a consciousness of the limited nature as well as the goal of historical movement. (P. 618)

In the preface to the first edition of *Capital*, Marx speaks of his book as a tool to "shorten and lessen the birth pangs" of the new society. The point is that it is possible to know the rational steps history must take, but it is not possible to know them in their detail, nor their actual chronology. If there are societies, such as the Asiatic, which do not progress, this can only

be because the contradictions latent in them have not yet matured. Thus, Marx had suggested that the relationship between proprietor and non-proprietor is not a contradictory relationship, while that of capitalist and worker is. Eventually even the most stationary of societies enters into movement, as is clear from recent history. In such cases, "we must regard it as a real advantage" to be able to understand "the limited nature as well as the goal" of the movement.

Without this notion of history, Marx's thought has no central core, no method and no rationality. In this, Rosa Luxemburg was correct in seeing the denial of historical necessity as the major error of the Revisionists, who thought that capitalism was not doomed, and who therefore made a virtue out of the limited reforms that they could achieve, without understanding these reforms as stages in a revolutionary process. Cf. "Social Reform or Revolution, and my introduction, in *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971).

38. Replying to the accusation that communists want to establish the "community of women," Marx and Engels write in the *Communist Manifesto* that "the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere instruments of production," and then point to the hypocrisy of bourgeois marriage relations.

39. It is in this context that man's ability to create "according to the laws of beauty" is to be understood. The role of the aesthetic dimension cannot be overlooked without impoverishing the entire problematic. The thought expressed here is stated even more clearly and directly by the "mature" Marx of the *Grundrisse* (1857), who writes:

It is . . . certain that the individuals cannot subordinate their own social interconnections to themselves until they have created these connections. But, it is silly to think that this merely material interconnection is a natural one, indissociable from the nature of the individuality . . . and immanent in it. It is its product. It is an historical product. It belongs to a determinate phase of its development. The heterogeneity and autonomy which it conserves against the individuality shows only that the individuality is still in the process of creating the conditions of its social life instead of having begun from these conditions. . . . The universally developed individuals whose social relations have been submitted to their own collective control as being their own collective relations are not a product of nature but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of the capacities [of the reproductive forces] which makes possible such individualities presupposes precisely production based on exchange values which, with the universality [of this relation], produces the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also produces the universality and all-sidedness of his relations and capacities. (Pp. 79-80)

40. This does not mean, as Avineri thinks, that communist man is "other-directed." (Schlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Theory of Karl Marx* [London: Cambridge University Press, 1968] pp. 87, 88, 91, 231, etc.) Klaus

Hartmann's review of Avineri correctly criticizes this usage. (In *Erasmus* 20, no. 17–18 [1968], 513–16.)

41. The Hegelian philosopher, of course, accomplishes a similar movement . . . but in thought!

42. Marx writes that "the universality of man appears in practice in just that universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, both 1) as an immediate means of life, and 2) as the matter, object and instrument of his life-activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man. . . . Man lives by nature" (566). This does not mean, however, that nature is totally the product of human praxis. Man learns to use and to change nature in accordance with its own laws. Marx's view is in line with the developing Western science, as Alfred Schmidt points out: "It is part of the economic transition from the Middle Ages to bourgeois society that, epistemologically, nature presents itself more and more as 'something made' [*Gemachtes*] and less as a simple 'given.' " (Schmidt, *Der Begriff der Natur in der Lehre von Marx* [Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1962], p. 50.) In a remarkable discussion, which predicts many of the cybernetic developments in modern industry, Marx elaborates on the way in which technology is the key to the humanization of nature. (See *Grundrisse*, pp. 596–602.) It should be clear too, that a "dialectics of nature" in the abstract sense conceived by Engels and taken over by Stalinist dogma, is nonsensical.

43. On the importance of scarcity as an ontological category, see Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique*, where scarcity appears as one of the fundamental motors in the functioning and formation of the social system.

44. Schmidt, p. 9. Cf. the *Theses on Feuerbach*, where this point is emphasized in opposition to Feuerbach's *contemplative* materialism, which is unable to understand the praxical nature of the world.

45. Marx is not making the distinction between a "socialist" and a "communist" stage, implied later in his *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875), and whose consecration in Lenin's *State and Revolution* has made it into dogma among today's orthodoxy. This is the distinction between the stage of "from each according to his means"—i.e., the stage of the active dictatorship of the proletariat—and that of "to each according to his needs"—i.e., achieved "communism." As opposed to this more economic distinction, Marx's point in the *Manuscripts* is more ontological: the "prehistory" of mankind is the history of the overcoming of alienation, and of the creation of that generic being which will freely create and appropriate his own history.

46. This notion is present in Marx's later economic work as well. In the *Grundrisse*, he writes that "materially seen, wealth consists only in the multiplicity of needs." (P. 426; also pp. 505–6.)

47. In his critique of Hegel, Marx stresses this point. He writes: "To be sensuous [*sinnlich*], that is, to be actual, is to be an object of the senses, to be a sensible [*sinnlicher*] object—thus, to have sensible objects outside oneself, to have objects of one's sensibility. To be sensible is to suffer [*leiden*]. Man as an objective, sensible being is thus a suffering being, and since he feels his suffering, he is a passionate [*leidenschaftliches*] being" (651).



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
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